France is reportedly working with several European countries to impose coordinated national sanctions against “violent” and “extremist” settlers and organizations.
The move, according to a European diplomat quoted by Reuters, comes because efforts to advance sanctions through the European Union were blocked. “There is no unanimity at the EU level, so we have moved to discussions at the national level,” one diplomat was quoted as saying.
In recent weeks, there have been numerous reports of sanctions levied against various settlement groups and individuals the EU considers violent or extremist, such as Amana and Regavim. Deplorable incidents of alleged violence against Palestinians in Judea and Samaria over the weekend will only increase calls to sanction “extremist” settlers.
The Europeans will say sanctions are needed to confront violence, which the government has failed miserably in stopping, with Israel paying a significant diplomatic price for that moral failure. But the deeper reason is that many European governments have not given up on their long-standing belief that pressure on Israel regarding the settlements can pave the way toward a Palestinian state.
It is a mistaken belief and one likely to boomerang.
If the Europeans hope their sanctions will bend Israel’s will, they are deeply misreading the Israeli public. Such actions will be used in the upcoming election campaign to bolster the Right, with the Likud and right-wing parties certain to argue that Europe is once again trying to pressure Israel into territorial concessions, and that only a strong nationalist bloc can withstand that pressure.
Sanctions on violent settlers reflect attempt to delegitimize settlement enterprise
The report of sanctions comes just days before France hosts a meeting that marks one year since the UN endorsed a road map toward Palestinian statehood, a process through which about a dozen countries, led by and including France, recognized a Palestinian state.
The sanctions campaign is not really about the actions of a violent fringe. Rather, it reflects a continuing effort to delegitimize the broader settlement enterprise and create international leverage to advance a predetermined political outcome.
Many Israelis will inevitably ask why violence by a tiny fringe has become the focus of international sanctions campaigns, while the violence that has shaped Israeli political thinking over the past quarter century – suicide bombings, rocket attacks, the October 7 massacre, and ongoing terrorism, such as the attack on Sunday at Tzur Yitzhak – often fades into the background of the diplomatic conversation.
While Europe may overwhelmingly still support a two-state solution, its leaders need to recognize how dramatically Israeli attitudes have changed since the October 7 massacre.
That terrorist attack rammed home for many Israelis a conclusion they had already begun to draw during the Second Intifada: that the conflict is not fundamentally about settlements, and that removing settlements will not magically end the violence.
For years, European governments argued that settlements were the primary obstacle to peace. Yet Hamas’s massacre was not about settlements. The terrorist attack emerged from Gaza, a territory from which Israel uprooted every settlement and withdrew two decades ago.
October 7 reinforced belief that conflict is over any Jewish state's presence
The October 7 massacre strengthened a belief held by large segments of the Israeli public that the core dispute is not over settlements or borders but over the very presence of a Jewish state in any part of this region.
Europe may disagree with that assessment, but attempting to pressure Israelis into abandoning a conclusion drawn from their own lived experience is unlikely to succeed.
When Israelis see people murdered simply because they are Israelis – as tragically happened again on Sunday – calls for territorial concessions appear strikingly detached from reality.
At a moment when Israelis are still living in the shadow of the October 7 massacre and confronting deadly terrorism inside their own borders, sanctions tied to the settlement issue will not be interpreted as a path to peace. Rather, they will be interpreted as another ill-advised attempt by outsiders to pressure the country into accepting risks most Israelis believe they cannot afford to take.
That is why these measures may ultimately boomerang politically. Rather than strengthening those forces in favor of territorial concessions, they will strengthen those arguing that in a region where people are trying to kill you, security concerns must come before all else, and that withdrawing from territory – as was done in southern Lebanon in 2000 and the Gaza Strip in 2005 – does not enhance security. Rather, it does the opposite.