In the wake of the 2026 war against Iran (“Operation Roaring Lion”), Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stood before the nation and articulated a vision that has become the bedrock of his strategic doctrine. He claimed that Israel’s military success would lead to a “dramatic expansion of the circle of peace,” arguing that regional players are turning to Israel precisely because “we are strong, right, and fighting.”
This sentiment was echoed in his previous exchanges with US President Donald Trump, where both leaders reaffirmed the classic adage: “Peace through strength.” This logic posits that military force is the primary condition for Israel’s regional acceptance.
While this approach finds a warm reception among some hawkish strategic circles, it is failing to convince some of Israel’s closest neighbors. For Jordan, the “peace through strength” paradigm is not a promise of stability, but a source of deep anxiety.
The dilemma between peace and strength is, of course, not new. Nearly five decades ago, in his historic 1977 address to the Knesset, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat urged Israel to “give up the belief that force is the best method for dealing with the Arabs.” Today, this advice remains more relevant than ever.
On the one hand, military power is undeniably important; it can serve as a stabilizing and deterrent force that preserves peace and prevents wars. On the other hand, the value of that power is dependent on how it is perceived. It can easily be interpreted as aggression rather than strength, and as offensive rather than defensive.
Israeli power framed as threat to Jordan
Unfortunately, this is precisely how Israeli power is being framed in Jordanian public discourse today – as a threat of regional superiority and hegemony that directly impacts Jordan’s national security.
At the core of Amman’s concerns is the belief that the Israeli right-wing government may use the war with Iran as a pretext to promote a radical agenda, using coercive force to reshape the Palestinian arena by annexing parts of the West Bank, weakening the Palestinian Authority, and encouraging Palestinian migration to Jordan – possibly with American backing.
In the corridors of power in Amman, these steps are interpreted as part of a broader “Israeli plot” in which Jordan becomes the Palestinians’ “alternative homeland.” For a kingdom where citizens of Palestinian origin already make up about half of the population, this is a direct threat to its demographic balance, its national identity, and even its very existence.
Recent discourse among voices affiliated with the Jordanian official line reflects these worries. Marwan Muasher, Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel, has warned that Israel may seek to shift its next battlefield to the West Bank with the aim of annexing territory without its Palestinian population. In his view, the future question is not who governs Iran after the war, but who dominates the entire region.
Similarly, Rana Sabbagh, former chief editor of The Jordan Times, suggested that after Netanyahu finishes with Iran and Lebanon, he may turn toward “Jordan’s strategic backyard,” the West Bank. She fears a promotion of silent annexation and forced displacement to resolve the “Palestinian problem” at the expense of the kingdom.
This tension creates a striking paradox. Even as Israel and Jordan maintain tight security coordination – intercepting Iranian attacks and defending their shared border against subversion by pro-Iranian militias – the Jordanian public narrative remains hostile. Israel is frequently depicted as an enemy that is unrestrained and “intoxicated by power.”
Against this backdrop, Jordan has maintained a policy of “positive neutrality” throughout the current war: defending its sovereignty while hedging against both the Iranian and Israeli regional projects. While weakening Iran is desirable for Amman, a total Israeli victory is not necessarily viewed as a gateway to a better future. Instead, it is seen as replacing one threat with another – one that could be no less dangerous for the kingdom.
Recognizing the gravity of this threat, Jordan is already preparing itself for the possibility of such a scenario. It is discussing responses that range from building regional and international counterweights to Israel with Arab and Muslim partners to influence Washington, to even considering a downgrade in diplomatic relations and security coordination with Israel if certain redlines are crossed.
Despite the friction, the war has reaffirmed that peace with Jordan remains a vital security framework, deeply aligned with the mutual interests and common regional adversaries facing both nations. The question now is how to preserve and further consolidate it. The challenge for Israel is to ensure that the war’s outcomes are seen as serving Jordan’s interests rather than undermining them.
As Sadat suggested decades ago, Israel cannot rely on military power alone. Strength is essential, but it cannot stand by itself or serve only one side at the expense of the other. Truly durable relations require a shift from a reliance on “hard power” to an investment in “soft power,” alongside a much greater Israeli sensitivity to Jordanian concerns in the Palestinian arena.
A promising first step in this direction is the recent government move to revitalize the “Jordan Gateway” Industrial and Employment Park. This decision, perhaps a quiet recognition of Jordan’s pivotal role in countering Iranian regional threats during the war, offers Israel a chance to prove its vision extends far beyond military deterrence. It demonstrates that trust forged in strategic and security cooperation can, and should, serve as the foundation for broader civilian and economic initiatives.
A peace held together only by the weight of arms is inherently fragile. A strong, lasting peace requires shared regional strategic vision, mutual reliance, and recognition that our neighbor’s stability is, in fact, our own.
The writer is a senior researcher at the INSS and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.