"Tehran breached a gentlemen’s agreement between the countries,” said Anwar Gargash, adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates. According to him, this agreement meant that Gulf territory would not be used to attack Iran in exchange for Iranian non-aggression.
This statement encapsulates the shock and astonishment that have gripped Gulf rulers following the launch of ballistic missiles and drones from Iran at the territories of all the Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Even Oman – the mediator – was not spared an attack.
What lies behind these attacks? Iran justified them as targeting American bases, but in practice, they extended to other military and civilian targets. The primary logic behind these strikes, as explained by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, identified with Hezbollah, is threefold.
First, to pressure Gulf rulers to use their leverage with US President Donald Trump to stop the war. Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz was intended to add an element of economic pressure on the Gulf states and other countries dependent on Gulf oil and gas.
The second reason is psychological: to influence the Gulf states. If reports are accurate that Qatar and the UAE are working with Trump and also in Europe to halt the fighting, then these first two objectives are indeed being served.
The third reason is to send a message that no state assisting the United States is safe.
For now, the Gulf states are cautious in their response. Their concern is understandable, given their limited military capabilities and the vulnerability of their oil and gas facilities. Yet, Qatar already responded militarily, while the United Arab Emirates closed its embassy in Tehran and may later sever relations.
Saudi Arabia is still waiting; though an Aramco refinery has been hit, the kingdom has not yet responded militarily. It can be estimated, however, that if Iranian attacks intensify, the crown prince will be compelled to respond since his leadership is being tested.
The unfolding events thus far suggest several important implications for the Gulf states:
Failure of hedging policy
Over the past decade, Iran-Gulf relations have experienced ups and downs. The UAE and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations with Iran (in 2022 and 2023, respectively) after several years of rupture. This warming was intended to reduce the threat from Tehran and from the Houthis in Yemen, who had launched missiles at Saudi oil fields in 2019.
The move was also linked to cooling relations between former US president Joe Biden and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman following the Khashoggi murder and human rights violations.
The UAE led this détente policy, serving as a base and port for goods moving to and from Iran as part of a mechanism to circumvent Western sanctions. In 2023-24, trade between the two countries soared to $27 billion. This reconciliation also ensured the continued flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.
However, the current conflict has demonstrated that this hedging policy had failed. The failure is particularly striking in the case of Oman, which mistakenly believed its status as mediator guaranteed its security. A similar situation occurred with Qatar after Israel attacked Hamas leaders on its territory in September 2025.
If there had indeed been a prior quiet understanding, as Gargash claimed, trust has now been severely damaged. It should be stressed that trust between the sides was never high, due to ethnic (Arabs versus Persians) and religious (Sunni versus Shi’a) conflicts.
A remarkable sentence buried in a 2010 WikiLeaks document reflects the depth of suspicion: “If the Iranians give you 100 words,” the Qatari Emir Hamad told John Kerry, then chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “trust only one of the 100.”
Given the absence of alternatives – Russia and China cannot offer a security umbrella to the Gulf states – the conclusion is a strengthened reliance on the United States, including the signing of defense treaties for those states that do not yet benefit from such arrangements.
Strengthening Gulf solidarity
Although the Gulf has a regional organization – the Gulf Cooperation Council (1981), it has not always operated harmoniously. Over the years, cracks have appeared due to differing political and economic interests. Only recently, tensions surfaced between Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding crises in Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia. Yet the Iranian attack broke the ice. The crown prince called the UAE president and offered any assistance required.
Just as the establishment of the GCC was a product of the dangers and anxieties following the outbreak of the 1980 Iran-Iraq War, the current war could lead to strengthened cooperation among Gulf states, including limited military cooperation. Nevertheless, disagreements may arise over the “correct” response to Iran.
Arab convergence
The Arab world, broadly speaking, is in crisis. Apart from summits and empty declarations, it has played little meaningful role in the Israel-Hamas War that began after Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023. The Arab world appears fragmented. However, an attack by a non-Arab state on six Arab ones generates solidarity rooted in shared Arab identity.
In this context, one should note Egyptian President Sisi’s interesting attempt to assume the role of the “responsible adult,” contacting most Arab leaders in the region to express solidarity and support for a peaceful, dialogue-based solution.
Israel: between aggressor and protector
The “Swords of Iron” war and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza – particularly Israel’s strike in Doha – have strained the Jewish state’s relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, which at best have continued quietly below the radar. Israel’s image as an aggressor seeking regional expansion has been reinforced.
The current situation holds potential for change – but in two opposing directions. On the one hand, a joint Israeli-American initiative to strike Iran could further strengthen Jerusalem’s image as a regional bully willing to use military force to achieve expansionist goals. If the Iranian threat weakens or disappears and the “Axis of Resistance” ceases to function as an axis, the perceived need for Israel may diminish.
On the other hand, a successful strike against Iran could restore Israel’s positive image from the Abraham Accords period as a military power worth cooperating with against shared threats (not necessarily Iran), and as a state possessing advanced technological capabilities. Israel’s ability to regain its lost position will depend on its stance in another arena currently less visible: the Palestinian one.
More broadly, relations between Arabs and Persians have long been marked by feelings of mutual condescension and hostility, certainly since the early sixteenth century, when Iran’s rulers adopted Shi’ism. There have been fluctuations over time, but the current attack is likely to rekindle these sentiments.
As long as the present regime remains in power in Iran, there will be no genuine revival of Gulf-Iran relations. Only a new regime could mend the rifts.
The writer is a professor who teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a board member of Mitvim and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.