Two years after Hamas’s murderous attack, an agreement has been signed that may herald the beginning of a new era. It is the result of the convergence of two processes: The first is massive pressure exerted by US President Donald Trump and his partners – through allies such as Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey – on Hamas. The combination of Arab and Muslim countries that, throughout the war, had not been in the same camp has changed the rules of the game.
The second process is that Israel and Hamas have reached what in international relations is called a “mutually hurting stalemate.” This means that both sides have come to understand that an agreement is preferable to the current situation.
Hamas has suffered severe military blows, most of its leadership in Gaza has been eliminated, local clans are challenging the organization, and even the population is showing signs of rebellion against Hamas rule. To this must be added the joint pressure of Arab and Muslim countries.
Hamas also apparently received a guarantee that fighting would not resume; otherwise, it would not have agreed in advance to give up its main bargaining chip – the hostages. The agreement leaves Hamas as an important actor in Gaza while allowing it to narrate a story of victory: survival against all odds and bringing the Palestinian issue to the center of international attention.
Israel, for its part, achieved impressive military gains, inflicting heavy damage on Hamas, but the organization has not been eradicated. After two years, the IDF realized that it was being dragged into a war of attrition in Gaza City that could exact a heavy toll. Moreover, the continued pressure from demonstrations for the hostages’ release led to a sense of exhaustion with the military campaign and the understanding that time was not on the hostages’ side.
Opportunities and issues of Trump's plan
Trump’s plan presents a major opportunity for resolution. In my research on missed opportunities in the Arab-Israeli conflict, I found that when a major change coincides with a political initiative, an ideal opportunity for resolution emerges. The problem is that not every ideal opportunity is realized, such as the 1982 Reagan plan, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, the 2003 Bush “Road Map,” and more.
The problem with Trump’s plan is that it actually consists of several plans – or one with several stages – without a detailed timetable. The first stage, now being implemented, includes the release of Israeli hostages, Palestinian prisoners, and detainees, and the entry of humanitarian aid. Even at this stage, changes were made to the original plan.
Alongside the joy and euphoria over the end of the war and the hostages’ release, continued negotiations over the next stages leave substantial problems.
In the second phase, a temporary administration composed of Palestinian technocrats is to be established under the supervision of an international “Peace Council.” These bodies will be responsible for implementing economic development programs. Names of potential figures for the local administration and of individuals for the Peace Council have already been proposed, but some arouse antagonism.
Dismantling Hamas, demilitarizing Gaza, the IDF withdrawal, and entry of Arab/international forces is the critical phase that will test the seriousness of all actors in upholding the agreement. Each of these issues could become a source of friction, or even lead to the plan’s collapse.
The key question is how to ensure that Hamas will not remain in Gaza and will be disarmed. Although some states – such as Indonesia – have agreed to send forces to Gaza, it is unclear how these forces will operate on the ground, since the Lebanese precedent suggests that foreign forces generally fail to maintain security.
At this stage, negotiations are expected to take place to create a political horizon, which would include reforming the Palestinian Authority and establishing conditions for “a credible path to Palestinian self-determination and a Palestinian state.” This phase, though not stated explicitly, is meant to lead to normalization between Israel and Arab and Muslim states.
Assuming the parties reach this stage, the question of a Palestinian state – or an equivalent entity – will be at the heart of the discussion. Of particular importance will be whether the states willing to normalize relations with Israel will make this conditional upon the establishment of a Palestinian state or accept less.
Potential problems
Regarding the actors, several potential problems may arise:
1. American fatigue
Trump is an energetic and involved mediator, even if driven mainly by ego. He has not received the Nobel Peace Prize, and that may dampen his enthusiasm. Moreover, Trump is a short-distance runner – he wants results, and fast. The main problem is that the longer the negotiations drag on, the more likely he is to lose interest and patience.
2. Arab and Muslim actors
The success of the current process was due, in part, to Trump’s ability to break down barriers between camps and form an Arab-Muslim coalition in which Egypt and the UAE, for example, cooperated with Qatar and Turkey. However, as time passes, the fundamental interests of each of these states are likely to reassert themselves, leading to renewed tensions and rivalries.
Each state seeks to promote its own agenda and interests – particularly Qatar and Turkey, which wish to preserve Hamas’s influence and play a central role in Gaza’s reconstruction. This would clash with the interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
3. The PA and Hamas
Between these two entities, there is rivalry and mistrust. All previous attempts at cooperation ultimately failed. Hamas seems to understand that it must cooperate with the PA, which enjoys international legitimacy, while the PA wants to return to Gaza after being expelled by Hamas in 2007. The explosive potential between them remains, and it is unclear whether and how they can overcome it.
What is clear is that Hamas will present the agreement as strengthening its legitimacy within Palestinian society. Furthermore, Palestinian politics is approaching a generational transition, which will inevitably affect the degree of cooperation.
4. Israeli domestic politics
Implementation of the first phase of Trump’s plan has already exposed cracks in the right-wing government. As negotiations progress, opposition from right-wing factions is likely to intensify and threaten the government’s stability. It is plausible that the end of the war and the hostages’ return will strengthen calls for early elections.
For Israel, insisting on continued negotiations led by the US with Egyptian mediation, and linking the various stages together, offers the best recipe for the Trump plan’s success. However, its implementation depends on many factors beyond Israel’s control.
In any case, “Gaza First” should serve as the first stepping stone toward resolving the broader Palestinian problem and completing Israel’s integration into the region. Hopefully, this opportunity will not turn into yet another missed one.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and is a board member of Mitvim.