Why airstrikes alone won’t deter Iran: A case for a no-fly zone strategy - opinion

For too long, the international community has relied on the same playbook when it comes to Iran: limited airstrikes, economic sanctions, and vague diplomatic overtures. But these have failed to achieve what matters most—dismantling Iran’s nuclear ambitions and bringing lasting stability to the region.

Iran’s nuclear progress continues. Despite temporary and short-lived setbacks, the regime has shown time and again that it will adapt, rebuild, and press forward.

Airstrikes might delay centrifuge activity or disable an airbase, but they do not erode the regime’s intent—nor do they change its regional behaviour or aggression. If anything, these tactics risk rallying internal support around a government already embattled but still deeply entrenched.

It's time to break the cycle.

A coalition-backed no-fly zone over eastern and western Iranian airspace—specifically over regions dominated by minority populations such as the Kurds, Baluchis, and others- is a new approach that must be studied.

These are not arbitrary areas. They are geographically significant, politically sensitive, and symbolically powerful. Controlling the airspace here doesn’t just deny Iran’s military mobility—it introduces a new layer of economic and psychological pressure on a regime that is already overstretched.

Let’s be clear: this is not a call for invasion. This is a call for precision containment.

The aim is to degrade the regime’s ability to freely use its own airspace for military or logistics purposes in border zones where it often operates with impunity. By enforcing a no-fly zone:

Air superiority was achieved temporarily in western Iran in 2025 during the 12-day war when coordinated US and Israeli strikes severely disrupted Iranian air defences, command nodes, and weapons infrastructure.

These operations demonstrated that limited air dominance over key corridors is not only possible—it can be achieved swiftly and with precision. This time around, with stronger regional coordination, better Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and more calibrated rules of engagement, it can be done even more effectively.

But unlike before, this advantage must not be squandered. If maintained—not as provocation, but as a sustained enforcement mechanism—it becomes a tool of leverage, not simply a moment of tactical gain.

Iran has numerous ethnic groups that are predominately disgruntled with centralized authoritarian rule. Minority-dominated regions of Iran are among the most economically neglected and politically repressed.

The Kurdish areas in the west and Baluchi regions in the east have long histories of resistance and discontent. They are geographically closer to US allies and easier to monitor and interdict than central Tehran-controlled airspace.

These regions also serve as corridors for internal IRGC troop movements, drone testing, and weapons transfers toward Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Denying the regime the use of these air lanes complicates its internal repression and its ability to resupply forward-deployed assets and proxy forces.

But more importantly, it sends a long-overdue message to communities that have paid the highest price for standing up to tyranny.

The Kurds, in particular, have shown immense bravery and reliability as strategic partners to the West—from fighting ISIS in Syria to resisting Iranian pressure at home.

Yet time and again, they have been left behind. A no-fly zone over western Iran signals that they are not forgotten—that their lives and their skies matter. We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of betrayal, especially when our most dependable allies have already sacrificed more than their share.

While Iran's destabilising role in the region is widely acknowledged—from Baghdad to Beirut, from Gulf capitals and more recently in Damascus—the unfortunate reality is that the figure who most vocally highlights the Iranian threat is often discounted.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been sounding the alarm on Iran since the 1980s. But decades of political baggage and polarising rhetoric have made his warnings easy to dismiss, particularly in parts of the Arab world and even among some Western audiences, especially in the current climate shaped by the ongoing war in Gaza.

This credibility gap has hindered the urgency of the issue, even as facts on the ground validate the core concern: Iran remains the central driver of instability across the Middle East.

For many in the region, including those who may distrust Jerusalem, Iran’s meddling is not a theory, it's reality. What’s needed now is for a new coalition of credible actors to carry the message forward, not through hyperbole, but through coordinated action.

A no-fly zone offers that opportunity: a practical, enforceable measure that speaks louder than political rhetoric.

No-fly zones are not just military tools. They are statements. Enforcing one over Iranian territory says:

For the Iranian regime, airspace is not just about movement—it’s about legitimacy. The moment a foreign force controls the skies over any part of your country, your claim to unchallenged authority is undercut and the pressure begins to tighten. That psychological effect matters just as much as the operational one.

Moreover, enforcing a no-fly zone tightens the noose economically. It deters airlines, drives up insurance premiums, and reduces trade flows—all of which increase domestic pressure on a regime already squeezed by sanctions, inflation, internal discontent and youth unrest. Iran’s middle class—already weary of geopolitical brinkmanship—will understand exactly who is to blame when the air routes close and the economy contracts further.

Yes, a no-fly zone over Iranian territory is a bold move. But bold doesn’t mean reckless.

This should be a coalition-enforced action—ideally including Gulf partners, NATO members, and regional stakeholders who have the most to gain from a de-escalated Middle East.

It can be enforced using a combination of high-altitude Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms—such as drones, satellites, and radar aircraft—to monitor and detect violations in real time.

These systems provide persistent aerial coverage without the need for constant manned fighter patrols, reducing operational strain while maintaining airspace control. Stealth-capable aircraft stationed in allied territory would remain on standby to respond only when needed.

We’ve already seen parts of this done. Israeli jets have intercepted Iranian weapons flights over Syria and Iraq. US aircraft have denied air access to hostile drone operators in Syria. These are not hypotheticals—they are precedents.

This is not about regime change. This is about strategic containment through air dominance. Iran must understand that there is a cost—not just in blown-up centrifuges or collapsed buildings, but in lost sovereignty, stalled military plans, and weakened control over its own territory.

The Middle East does not need another war. It needs tools that deter without escalation, pressure without provocation, and contain without committing boots on the ground. A no-fly zone over Iran’s eastern and western airspace fits that profile. It is legal, feasible, and high-impact—if we have the political will to do it.

If we are serious about stopping Iran’s nuclear ambitions and protecting regional peace, we must finally move beyond one-off strikes. We must think strategically. And we must be willing to use the tools of air control not just as punishment—but as leverage.

This is not war. It is disciplined pressure, applied in the skies, designed to protect lives and prevent greater conflict on the ground.

And perhaps, just perhaps, with the right balance of strength and restraint, even this moment of confrontation can be transformed into one of opportunity—for Iran, for the region, and for the generations watching from below.

Now is the time.