As of now, the Yemeni Southern Transitional Council’s bold gambit to seize control of the Hadramawt and Mahra provinces in the eastern deserts of the country has failed. Forces associated with the Presidential Leadership Council, and backed by Saudi air power, have reversed the recent, very substantial, territorial gains made by the STC in its lightning December offensive.
The fate of the STC’s political declarations to hold a referendum for the renewal of South Yemeni independence within two years, made following its military advances, now appears unclear. Saudi-backed forces have now retaken the port of Mukalla. STC leader Aidarus al-Zubaidi appears to have retreated to his home province of Dhaleh, accompanied by his fighters.
The short but significant clashes reflect sharply divergent regional strategies between the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates (the latter is the main backer of the STC). Despite the reversals suffered by the STC, these differing strategies are unlikely to change as a result of events. The STC will also certainly not abandon its ambition to reestablish south Yemeni independence.
What are the main dynamics driving the divisions between the Saudi and Emirati strategies?
Firstly, it should be assumed that the STC offensive was backed and authorized by the UAE. The STC is not a “proxy” of the UAE. It is an authentic local movement with deep roots in the society and politics of south Yemen. At the same time, the UAE is its main patron, and it is not feasible that the STC would have undertaken its offensive into Hadramawt and Mahra without Emirati support and approval.
The Emiratis evidently failed to anticipate the strength of the Saudi reaction. On the ground, the disciplined forces of the STC might have been able to hold their ground (though their lines of supply were probably overextended after the rapidity of their advance). But Saudi Arabia’s complete domination of the airspace made the STC’s position untenable. The Saudi bombing of Emirati targets in Mukalla signaled the seriousness of Riyadh’s intentions. What followed – namely, Emirati and STC retreat, was inevitable.
The recent events in Yemen have significance beyond the specifically Yemeni context. They showcase a parting of the ways between the two most powerful Western-aligned Gulf states, and their preferred regional strategy.
The UAE has pursued a consistent approach over the last turbulent decade and a half in the region. Abu Dhabi has emerged as a key opponent of Islamism, and a supporter of forces seeking stable government and ties with the West. This agenda to a great extent overlaps with Israeli regional strategy, and led to close cooperation between Israel and the UAE even before the official establishment of diplomatic relations.
A significant difference in the regional analysis and strategy of the two countries has been the ordering of the list of dangers. For decades, Israel placed Iran at the pinnacle of its list of threats. The UAE, by contrast, prioritized the fight against Sunni Islamism, particularly in its Muslim Brotherhood version. Given the subsequent trajectory of events, it is arguable as to who was the more prescient. Certainly, the priorities of each country meant that they had different blind spots, or areas of weaker clarity and vision.
In any case, Abu Dhabi has pursued this approach consistently. This led to its backing of the STC, and similarly to its support for the now-realized aspirations for independence of Somaliland, on the other side of the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
Earlier, the UAE was instrumental in supporting the military coup in Egypt that removed the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013. Abu Dhabi also backed the forces of Khalifa Haftar in Libya against the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned government of Fayez Sarraj.
Alongside the consistent opposition to Islamism, the UAE has sought to promote its own vision of Arab administration – paternalist and authoritarian, but committed to economic growth, stability, and prosperity. Currently, it offers probably the most positive and achievable model for successful Arab governance.
The STC advance, had it succeeded, would have given the southern separatist forces control of all the frontlines facing the Iran-supported Houthis to the north and west. This would have turned the STC’s desire for a renewed state of “South Arabia” into an achievable reality.
It would also have created a basis for building a force capable of undertaking a ground offensive against Houthi control of the vital Hodeidah port, and perhaps for a more general operation with Western backing against the Iranian-supported Shi’ite Islamist group that controls the Yemeni capital. Such an operation is a strategic imperative, from the point of view of the ongoing contest against the Iranian regime and its regional alliance.
The Houthis have yet to pay a serious price for their successful blockade of the Gulf of Aden-Red Sea route during the recent Middle East war. The unification of the fronts could have formed the beginning of such a move.
This, clearly, was not to be. The Emiratis and the STC over-reached. But what caused the Saudi reaction?
If, at one time, the related dangers of Iran and insurgent political Islam might have served to preserve some level of unity among these Gulf countries, those twin dangers are somewhat more distant now.
The Iranian regional alliance has been weakened by Israel in the course of the last two years of war. The prospect of a new wave of revolutionary Sunni political Islam, meanwhile, seems a lot more distant than a decade ago.
Sunni political Islam today is, for the most part, not an independent, insurgent force. Rather, it is mainly a tool of an emergent Mideast power alliance led by Turkey and Qatar, states that themselves profess support for this ideological and religious current. Riyadh, in the Yemeni context, is working closely with al-Islah, a party and militia affiliated with Muslim Brotherhood-type of Islamism.
Mahra, Hadramout, and Shabwa, the eastern Yemen regions disputed between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are rich in oil and gas (Hadramawt contains 80% of Yemen’s oil and gas reserves). So the competition between the Saudis and Emiratis is about control of resources. But it is also about differing regional alignments, divergent ideological priorities, and different preferred models for governance.
While the UAE works with local anti-Islamist and pro-stability forces in both south Yemen and Somaliland (on the other side of the Gulf of Aden), the Saudis appear to be orienting toward a closer alignment with the emergent Sunni Islamist camp of Turkey and Qatar. This is likely to have implications beyond the specific Yemeni context.