Criticism of new Shin Bet chief David Zini is more about Netanyahu - analysis

But to date, it seems that most of the criticism of a decorated member of the IDF General Staff and major-general is much more about suspicions regarding Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's agenda than anything else.

First of all, no one can doubt Zini's record as a top-notch commander.

He was not appointed to the IDF General Staff out of the blue or merely due to political pressure from Netanyahu as some of Zini's critics portray.

He continued in key posts in the Northern Command, including during the 2006 Second Lebanon War and commanded the 51st Battalion and the Egoz Unit at different points during the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict.

He also briefly commanded the Golani Brigade during the 2014 Gaza conflict, including during the intense Shejaia battle, after its prior commander was wounded.

Next, he was the operations officer of the Central Command from 2014-2015, and formed and commanded the Oz Brigade, also known as the Commandos Brigade, from 2015-2017.

Since then, his career has been less meteoric, with most of his posts, including as a major-general, relating to managing reservists and training, as opposed to the more sought-after large command roles.

In that sense, it is fair to say that he is an unorthodox pick for running the Shin Bet.

Not only is he not one of the current or recent former Shin Bet deputies, all of whom were thought of as eminently talented within the defense establishment, but he also has not been thought of as one of the stars within the IDF high command.

Ami Ayalon and Danny Yatom, two prior Israeli major-generals who were appointed to head the Shin Bet and Mossad respectively in 1996, both had somewhat more impressive commands in the IDF as navy chief and Central Command chief respectively.

But they are precedent for bringing in an outsider and after the October 7 disaster, Netanyahu has an argument for bringing in an outsider to disrupt the "conceptcia" (group bubble think) within the Shin Bet that Hamas was deterred and would not invade.

Zini does have some provocative aspects to his record.

There are some mixed and critical reviews of his being overly tough on some of his troops in 2007, leading them to mutiny in an embarrassing episode for the IDF.

And he and his family have a record of more hardline right-wing political associations than is typical for a top Israeli security chief.

But Zini was not shot down by the advisory committee led by former High Court chief justice Asher Grunis, a committee which has shot down candidates, was not shot down by Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, and was not shot down by IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir.

An argument could be made that they needed to give Zini a pass after successfully delaying Netanyahu from firing Bar for multiple months and after they made major public statements about the need for the agency to follow High Court limits.

But whatever the reason they endorsed Zini's nomination – and with whatever qualifications, such as Zamir being unhappy that Zini, while still an IDF officer, interviewed with Netanyahu for the Shin Bet role without first informing him – that fact gives him legitimacy until he acts in a way that draws his character into question.

All of this returns to the idea that the problems are less with Zini, and more with Netanyahu.

During the nasty fight between Netanyahu and Bar, the former Shin Bet chief disclosed Netanyahu making several alleged moves to get the Shin Bet to survail political opponents and to ignore the High Court if there were a constitutional conflict.

Given that the attorney-general, the former Shin Bet chief, top IDF officials, and many former top police chiefs have accused Netanyahu's National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Police Commissioner Daniel Levi of abusing their power in favor of the coalition, critics of Netanyahu are dreading that an outsider with right-wing politics like Zini might use the Shin Bet's much greater and more draconian powers against Netanyahu's political opponents in the name of "national security."

Certainly, if Netanyahu gave such orders, and if Zini or any other Shin Bet officials followed such orders, Israeli democracy would be damaged in all new ways.

There are also concerns that until now only the Shin Bet has kept up the fight against violent Israeli extremists who have been increasingly attacking Palestinians in the West Bank, and that Zini may roll that back.

Given that the Shin Bet, IDF, and attorney-general have all accused Ben-Gvir of preventing the police from cracking down on and facilitating the indictment of such violent Jewish extremists, if Zini were to follow Ben-Gvir's lead, that could worsen an already problematic West Bank crisis.

But none of this has happened yet.

To date Netanyahu has definitely pushed the envelope on restraints on his power, but he has almost always backed down prior to causing a true breaking point between the country's different political camps.

Bar got to stay in office for months and was only fired through a High Court mediated process.

Baharav-Miara formally was given a pink slip, but it seems clear she will not be removed.

Netanyahu has lashed out at some High Court rulings, but so far has followed all of them.

Many top defense chiefs have had some strong politics, but put those politics on the side while serving the state, and there are no open examples of Zini doing the opposite to date.

Finally, whether there will be early elections or not, there will be elections within around one year from now, so any excesses by Netanyahu, or Zini if such excesses might occur, will be addressed at the ballot box.

In the meantime, critics might give Zini a chance like Grunis, Baharav-Miara, and Zamir did.