Around the end of August, the Houthis began another round of fighting against the Saudis, the most intense since 2022, by attacking the city of Mocha. This was not, of course, just a struggle over the city itself. Mocha lies on the Red Sea coast, south of Hudaydah and north of Bab al-Mandeb. As later events showed, its fall led to a chain of conquests that left the Houthis in temporary control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

This is just one part of a global struggle to control several critical maritime passages and straits that are decisive to the world economy. By seeking control of the straits in its vicinity, Iran is trying to influence its war with the United States and Israel, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf, and inevitably, future conflicts around the world. There is no doubt that Iran is behind the Houthi aggression and their effort to gain control of Bab al-Mandeb.

In recent days, the Saudis have decided not to exercise restraint anymore and have launched a heavy attack on the city of Sanaa and the Houthi rebels, in cooperation with the official government in Yemen, whose relative power is quite weak.

Most surprisingly, which still needs to be closely monitored and whose true significance on the ground should be checked, the countries that make up the recently signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) have declared that they are operating the alliance in practice, meaning that they will send armed forces to join Saudi Arabia's war against the Houthis, in light of the fact that they attacked one of the alliance's members, Saudi Arabia.

This article, and its intentionally ambiguous title, Between the Straits, explains where these exotic-sounding straits are located and the current impact and future danger of continuing to “yield” to Iranian and Houthi aggression. This is especially concerning as the perception of “American weakness” grows around the world, in the wake of the lack of an immediate response to this aggression, given the risk that other actors in conflict zones will imitate it.

What is said to be a missile is launched in what Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis say is an attack on the Red Sea port city of Mocha, Yemen.
What is said to be a missile is launched in what Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis say is an attack on the Red Sea port city of Mocha, Yemen. (credit: Houthi Media Center/Reuters)

Trump simultaneously threatens regime while open to talks

US President Donald Trump is still threatening to eliminate Iran’s current regime, while also saying he remains open to diplomatic talks, on his terms, of course. The Iranians rejected the President’s overture, and after meeting his envoys, Witkoff and Kushner, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, they sent an insulting proposal that amounted to a demand for America’s total “surrender.”

There is no doubt that some of Iran’s arrogance stems from the Houthis’ temporary seizure of Bab al-Mandeb and the lack of any meaningful American response to it. It also stems from the warm reception given to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi at the UN conference in New York by dozens of countries, including the entire European leadership and the American negotiating team, not to mention some UN representatives, who humiliated themselves by effectively bowing before the Iranian delegation.

This led the Iranians to conclude that the United States and the West did not want to confront them in an all-out war, so they set 7 humiliating conditions for the United States. The Iranians set out seven humiliating conditions for the United States as a prerequisite for opening the Strait of Hormuz. Trump immediately rejected the conditions, which resemble those Iran has presented in the past in exchange for opening the strait. But the fact that Iran presented them at all reflects its view that it and its allies are choking the world economy, not the other way around.

So, what straits is everyone talking about? This article presents some of the world’s main maritime passages, their importance to the global economy, and the nearby actors who could affect freedom of navigation through them.

The strait that has been in the headlines over the past year or more, and that everyone has been discussing since the war between the United States and Israel and Iran, is of course the Strait of Hormuz. It is one of the world’s most important chokepoints for oil and gas. Before the Iranians turned it into a bargaining chip, about 20 million barrels of oil passed through it each day, roughly 20% of global oil consumption.

Iran lies north of the Strait of Hormuz and has long influenced traffic through this strategic passage. It continues to try to block the strait by attacking oil tankers, while the US Navy carries out a counteroperation to protect ships, keep oil flowing to global markets, and bring down its price, which has remained relatively high for now.

According to the latest reports, including posts by Trump quoting Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Washington-based FDD, the United States has so far won this campaign because the Gulf is almost completely open to oil traffic, with the exception, of course, of Iranian oil. This is putting Iran’s leadership under great pressure, because closing the Strait of Hormuz was its main, and almost last, bargaining chip in its struggle against the US, short of entering an all-out war.

This makes it clear why I wrote that there is no doubt that the Houthi aggression, which led to their temporary control of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, was directed, pushed, and supported by Iran.

The Houthis conquered Yemen’s southwestern coastline, giving them temporary effective control over ship traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The strait connects Europe and Asia via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and its strategic importance has grown considerably since the war with Iran and the Iranians' actions to close the Strait of Hormuz on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula.

The Houthis also attacked a Saudi Aramco facility at the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast. During the war with Iran, Yanbu has served as an alternative route for Saudi Arabia to export oil around the Strait of Hormuz, which is blocked. But this alternative route has already been disrupted by an earlier attack by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq on the strategic pipeline that carries oil from the eastern Arabian Peninsula to Yanbu on its western coast.

The most significant scenario is not necessarily the closure of a single passage, but the simultaneous disruption of several points along the route:

Hormuz → Indian Ocean → Bab al-Mandab → Red Sea → Suez Canal

This creates a series of pressures on the movement of energy supplies from the Persian Gulf to markets in Asia and Europe.

A disruption in the Strait of Hormuz affects energy supplies and prices. Further disruption at Bab al-Mandeb and/or the Suez Canal increases shipping sailing times, insurance premiums, and transport costs, putting greater pressure on the entire supply chain.

Other groups may attempt to imitate Iranian, Houthi approaches

Beyond these facts, as I have already noted, the main problem may be the risk of others imitating this approach, and the lessons America’s rivals around the world may draw from the ability to disrupt the global economy by closing straits, as well as from their perception of how this affects US military decisions.

Consider, for example, the Strait of Malacca or the Taiwan Strait (given the limited scope of this article, I will not discuss the other straits listed above). From conversations with officials in Singapore and Taiwan, it is clearly understood that closing the straits in their respective regions would pose an existential threat, and they would be unable to withstand the consequences of such an offensive move. The danger is that hostile states in the region will use this tactic, based on the lessons they draw from what has happened in recent years, and especially from what happens in the Gulf in the coming period.

The Strait of Malacca connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans and is a major route for energy supplies and East Asian trade. In the first half of 2025, for example, about 23 million barrels of oil passed through it each day, more than through Hormuz. Singapore depends entirely on keeping this strait open. A prolonged disruption could significantly affect the supply chains of China, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries, especially Singapore’s economy.

A similar analysis can be made of the Taiwan Strait. Possible Chinese actions, including a blockade, would significantly impact Taiwan’s economy and the global economy, which depends on Taiwanese supply chains for semiconductors and other products.

It is also important to highlight a point of relevance to Israel, which emerged recently after the Israeli Navy received its sixth submarine, significantly enhancing its capabilities.

In an interview, Israel Navy Chief of Staff Rear-Admiral Guy Levy emphasized the connection between the capabilities the new submarine adds to the navy and events in the Gulf. Here are several relevant quotations from the interview:

"Rear-Admiral Levy said in the interview that the submarine can operate independently and in close cooperation with other forces. It can carry special forces and provide an integrated response together with other branches of the military. The submarine fleet does not operate in isolation; the navy is undergoing a significant transformation in response to the threats on the ground. The Houthis’ actions at Bab al-Mandeb and the Iranians’ actions at Hormuz are emboldening terrorist organizations and other countries to turn their attention to the maritime domain, and we are seeing that clearly. We are now preparing a Navy that will be more lethal, have greater range, and operate with complete stealth ahead of the next rounds of fighting Israel will face.

"Look at what is happening in the world right now. This war shows us just how essential maritime control is. All the discussion around the submarine took place even before the war. Its importance is now clearer than ever, given what is happening in the Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb straits. I know the navy’s missions and the tasks the political leadership and the General Staff have assigned to us. These capabilities are critically necessary, and more than that, the navy needs to be expanded in response to the emerging threats from neighboring countries in the East."

What has happened, and is happening, in the Gulf, at Hormuz and at Bab al-Mandeb, as well as the way the conflict ends, will have a significant impact on global behavior in these areas. The United States and its allies therefore have no alternative but to prove to Iran and Houthi-backed terrorist groups that closing straits to influence the global economy and political and operational decisions will not succeed. There is simply no other choice.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Prof. Jacob Nagel is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at Technion. He served as National Security Advisor and as acting head of the National Security Council.