Saudi Arabia’s accession to the Abraham Accords could become one of the most important diplomatic achievements in Israel’s history. Normalization with the largest and most influential kingdom in the Arab world could reshape the Middle East, open new trade routes, strengthen the moderate camp against Iran, and grant Israel unprecedented legitimacy in the region.
But there is one price Israel must not agree to pay for that achievement.
Allowing Saudi Arabia to develop an independent uranium enrichment capability should set off alarm bells in Jerusalem.
According to Reuters, the agreement would not require the kingdom to adopt the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which permits more intrusive inspections, including access to undeclared sites.
This would make it fundamentally different from the agreement signed by the United States and the United Arab Emirates, under which Abu Dhabi renounced uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.
There is nothing inherently wrong with Saudi Arabia’s desire to build nuclear reactors for energy production. Many countries operate such reactors, and the kingdom is seeking to diversify its energy sources as part of its Vision 2030 program.
The problem lies elsewhere. Uranium enrichment is not necessary to operate nuclear power plants. Nuclear fuel can be purchased from other countries, as many nations around the world already do.
The distinction between a civilian nuclear reactor and an independent enrichment capability is critical. The technology used to enrich uranium to low levels for use in reactors can, if a political decision is made and the necessary infrastructure is available, also be used to advance toward the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
The debate, therefore, is not about Saudi Arabia’s right to nuclear energy. It is about why the kingdom needs the most sensitive component of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The concern is not theoretical. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated that if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will also need to acquire one.
Following the confrontations with Iran and the efforts to prevent Tehran from establishing itself as a nuclear threshold state, it would be difficult to explain why an enrichment capability considered dangerous in Iran should suddenly become legitimate when it comes to Saudi Arabia.
Israel cannot base its security policy on the identity of the person currently occupying the palace in Riyadh. Regimes change, leaders are replaced, and alliances shift.
If the US allows one Mideast country to enrich uranium, what’s stopping others from aiming to achieve this as well?
An even greater danger is the potential domino effect.
If Saudi Arabia receives American approval to enrich uranium, why should Turkey forgo a similar capability? Why should Egypt agree to remain behind?
Cairo is already building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa with a combined capacity of approximately 4,800 megawatts.
Other countries in the region could argue that if Riyadh is permitted to control its own nuclear fuel cycle, there is no reason they should remain dependent on foreign suppliers of enriched uranium.
This is where the real danger of the Saudi precedent lies.
In the Middle East, the balance of power is determined not only by immediate security requirements but also by prestige and regional status. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey has sought for years to establish itself as an independent power, while Egypt regards itself as a leader of the Arab world.
If Saudi Arabia possesses uranium enrichment technology, pressure in Ankara and Cairo to obtain equivalent capabilities could intensify. Other Gulf states may also reassess their positions.
The result could be a race in which no country openly declares that it wants a nuclear bomb, but each seeks to possess the infrastructure that would allow it to move toward one should the need arise.
This may be the most dangerous scenario of all. Instead of a Middle East with a single nuclear power, the region could become home to several threshold states, where one leader’s decision could quickly trigger similar decisions by neighboring countries.
The path toward a Middle East in which several countries possess nuclear threshold capabilities could become significantly shorter.
It is possible to imagine a region in which Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey each possess infrastructure that would allow them to move relatively quickly toward a nuclear weapon if a political decision were made. Egypt, too, could eventually reconsider its policy.
In such a situation, the region would no longer be dealing only with a conventional arms race. It would face a system of mutual suspicion in which every regional crisis could take on a nuclear dimension.
For Israel, this would represent a dangerous strategic transformation.
For decades, Israel has sought to prevent the emergence of a hostile nuclear threat in the Middle East. The prospect of multiple nuclear threshold states is dangerous not only because of their governments’ current intentions, but because the knowledge, centrifuges, and infrastructure remain in place even after governments change.
Supporters of the agreement will argue that American cooperation offers the best way to oversee the Saudi program.
There is logic to that position. If Riyadh turns to China or Russia, Washington’s ability to influence the program could be significantly reduced.
But the solution is not to oppose a Saudi civilian nuclear program. The solution is to adopt the model used with the UAE: nuclear reactors, yes; uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, no; strict international oversight, absolutely.
Israel must make this clear, including to its closest ally, the US.
Peace with Saudi Arabia is an important strategic objective. It could create a new alignment of moderate states, strengthen Israel’s economy, and deepen Iran’s regional isolation. Israel should make a major effort to achieve it.
Better to wait years for normalization than risk multiple countries attaining military nuclear capability
But peace agreements are signed with governments. Nuclear capabilities remain for generations.
If the price of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords is Israeli acceptance of uranium enrichment on Saudi soil, Israel must be prepared to say no.
It would be better to wait several more years for normalization with Riyadh than to wake up a decade from now to a Middle East in which three or four countries are only a political decision away from a military nuclear capability.
Another Abraham Accords agreement would be a historic achievement. Preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is an existential necessity.
When these two objectives conflict, Israel must not confuse one with the other.
The author is the CEO of Radio 100FM, an honorary consul, deputy dean of the consular diplomatic corps, and president of the Israel Radio Communications Association. He previously served as a monitor for Israel’s Army Radio and as a television correspondent for NBC.