Carl von Clausewitz famously wrote that “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.” His insight remains as relevant today in the Middle East as it was two centuries ago.

Military operations are not ends in themselves; they are instruments for achieving strategic objectives. By that standard, America and Israel have won impressive tactical victories against Iran but have yet to translate them into lasting strategic success.

With the United States expanding its strikes and fears growing that the region is sliding back toward all-out war, there remains a profound misunderstanding of how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which effectively controls Iran, interprets this escalation. 

Rather than seeing it as an existential threat, the regime appears to believe the conflict is time-limited and that it can absorb a higher level of military pressure.

From Tehran’s perspective, political constraints on US President Donald Trump and the United States ultimately work in Iran’s favor, reinforcing its belief that it can outlast Washington’s resolve.

Donald Trump over a backdrop of an Iranian flag. (Illustrative)
Donald Trump over a backdrop of an Iranian flag. (Illustrative) (credit: Canva, RAHEB HOMAVANDI/REUTERS)

The United States’s confrontation with the Islamic Republic entered a new phase in June 2025, when it joined Israel in the 12-day campaign, Operation Rising Lion, inflicting severe damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The operation demonstrated overwhelming American-Israeli military superiority and significantly degraded Tehran’s capabilities.

Yet the campaign ended before the regime’s strategic capacity and political will were broken. Trump halted additional Israeli strikes, including those against key regime leaders, believing Iran had received the necessary message.

It did, but not the one Washington intended.

From Tehran’s Shi’ite martyrdom perspective, the lesson was not that continued aggression would bring unbearable consequences. Rather, the regime concluded that the United States lacked the strategic patience to sustain pressure long enough to alter the supreme leader’s calculus. During the second half of 2025, Iran quietly rebuilt elements of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs while waiting for American pressure to subside.

Recognizing the growing missile threat, Trump agreed in December 2025 to allow Israel to prepare a unilateral strike against Iran’s missile production infrastructure. Before those plans unfolded, events inside Iran created an unexpected opportunity.

In January 2026, according to Trump, the regime killed more than 40,000 innocent Iranian citizens in a matter of days. Soon afterward, Israeli intelligence identified a gathering of Iran’s senior political and military leadership, presenting a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Contrary to claims that Israel drew America into war, the decision to strike was Trump’s. Israeli intelligence supplied critical information, but the US president made the final decision.

The military achievements during Operation Roaring Lion showcased the extraordinary capabilities of the American-Israeli alliance. Iran’s military infrastructure and leadership suffered severe setbacks, yet Tehran continued launching attacks. Many observers confused a military that remained operational with one that had been fundamentally degraded, understating the battlefield successes while obscuring the larger strategic challenge.

Failing to win the war

As operations began in late February 2026, Iran sought leverage by threatening freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Faced with rising oil prices, Washington chose a ceasefire rather than sustained military pressure. 

Months later, it signed a memorandum of understanding reflecting Tehran’s priorities more than America’s. Only in July 2026, after concluding that Iran was using negotiations to buy time, did Trump terminate the MOU and restore the economic blockade.

Negotiating during operational pauses squandered much of the leverage created on the battlefield.

But Washington missed an even greater opportunity inside Iran.

As military pressure mounted, Washington reportedly planned to support Iran’s beleaguered population, which overwhelmingly opposed the regime. Kurdish, Baluch, Arab, Azeri, and Persian opposition groups were expected to challenge the IRGC and Basij.

Instead, Washington reportedly accepted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s lobbying, advancing Turkish rather than American interests while abandoning its greatest source of leverage: threatening the regime’s survival by supporting the Iranian opposition.

This reflects a recurring American pattern. Washington often wins battles but fails to create the political conditions necessary for lasting success. Persian patience has repeatedly outlasted Western impatience.

Henry Kissinger captured this dynamic: “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” Although Iran is not a guerrilla movement, the principle still applies. Simply surviving sustained American pressure can constitute victory if the United States abandons its broader strategic objectives.

Winning the battle for the Strait of Hormuz remains essential, but military pressure alone is insufficient. It must be integrated into a sustained strategy that compels meaningful negotiations or, preferably, accelerates regime collapse by supporting the Iranian people through secure communications, opposition coordination, and the provision of arms so they can determine their own future.

The IRGC believes American political resolve will expire before Iran’s strategic will does. That is the central element of the regime’s historical approach to conflict. It is up to Trump to explain this to the American people.

America and Israel have repeatedly demonstrated that they can win battles against the Islamic Republic. The challenge is ensuring those victories achieve the political outcome Clausewitz described: using military power to accomplish enduring policy objectives.

Winning battles is important. Winning the war requires translating battlefield success into a fundamentally different Middle East.

The writer is director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network, and the senior security editor of The Jerusalem Report.