US President Donald Trump’s decision to suspend his plan to attack power stations in Iran and instead open negotiations with it was reportedly achieved through the mediation of Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. At first glance, the alignment of these three countries appears odd and surprising. However, an analysis of developments in the region since October 7 shows that this is not a new phenomenon. It is based on shared interests and signals a new regional alignment that should concern Israel.
Its origins lie in a summit of 22 Arab states and 57 Islamic countries convened in Riyadh in November 2023, shortly after October 7, with the aim of formulating a collective Arab-Islamic position on the war in Gaza.
One outcome of this summit was the establishment of an “octet” – a joint delegation including Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Palestinians tasked with maintaining contact with the major powers to promote a ceasefire and humanitarian aid for Gaza. Nigeria and the Palestinians soon withdrew and were replaced by Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.
The involvement of these countries during the Gaza war was reflected in joint meetings of foreign ministers and joint statements. In September, they expressed support for Trump’s plan to resolve the situation in Gaza; in November, they issued another statement backing the implementation of the first phase of the plan. While harmony did not always prevail among the members of the octet, what united them was the desire to resolve the Gaza crisis through the implementation of Trump’s plan, with the aim of strengthening regional stability.
The two rounds of war against Iran heightened these countries’ concerns about a deterioration of regional stability into chaos, particularly regarding the security and economic implications of the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
On March 18, Riyadh hosted a meeting of 12 foreign ministers from Arab and Islamic countries – Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain – most of them located near the war zone and exposed to Iranian attacks.
The statement issued condemned Iran’s strikes against Gulf states, Turkey, and Azerbaijan; expressed support for the Lebanese government’s decision to enforce state control over weapons; and also condemned Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and its expansionist ambitions in the region.
New regional security alignments
During the meeting, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan discussed an agreement to establish a new security platform to address regional challenges and promote cooperation in defense industries. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising to find Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan attempting to mediate between Iran and the United States in an effort to bring the war to an end.
What connects these countries? The answer begins at the bilateral level. For example, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defense agreement in September, including military cooperation and a commitment to treat an attack on one as an attack on both.
Yet, in the moment of truth, Pakistan did not come to Saudi Arabia’s aid when it was attacked by Iran. Bilateral rapprochement has also taken place between Egypt and Turkey, and between Turkey and Saudi Arabia: on February
4, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Riyadh, and the following day, he visited Cairo. Beyond joint statements indicating agreement on the most pressing issues, both visits produced numerous agreements in the fields of trade and security.
The connection between these countries is, of course, based on interests – some shared and others purely bilateral.
All of these states have political and economic interests in maintaining and strengthening ties with the United States.
It is, therefore, no surprise that they are all members of the Peace Council established by Trump.
They are also interested in reducing the regional influence of Iran, Israel, and perhaps even India. In fact, the war has strengthened a school of thought in the Middle East that views both Iran and Israel as agents of regional chaos.
However, while Iran has been significantly weakened – even if its regime remains in power – Israel has demonstrated its military and intelligence strength. Moreover, Israel’s image as a regional bully, as reflected in strikes in Qatar and Iran, as well as the policies of the right-wing government in the West Bank and Gaza, in Syria, and in Lebanon, reinforces the perception that Israel seeks to achieve regional dominance.
This seemingly new regional realignment has regional implications and perhaps even global ones. The combined population of Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia approaches 500 million (Pakistan alone has over 250 million inhabitants).
Furthermore, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons; Saudi Arabia is the world’s third-largest oil supplier and holds the second-largest reserves, with a central status in the Muslim and Arab world as the guardian of Islam’s holy sites; Turkey is a NATO member with a developed economy and an advanced defense industry; and Egypt controls the Suez Canal.
Israel should be concerned about this alignment. The main fear is Israel’s growing isolation in the region. Although there appears to be no immediate danger to the peace and normalization agreements that have survived the Gaza war, the deterioration in Israel’s relations with regional states – especially Egypt and Jordan – will also affect the prospects of advancing normalization with additional countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia, in the war’s aftermath.
Another concern is the strengthening of Turkey’s position in the region as a result of Iran’s weakening. In light of Saudi Arabia’s restrained military response to Iranian attacks and Egypt’s declining regional standing over the years, Turkey remains the primary contender for regional Muslim leadership. Israel is undoubtedly perceived as an obstacle in Turkish eyes.
Israel should expect that, following the war, calls will intensify in the Muslim and Arab world – and perhaps globally – to resolve the Palestinian issue, first in Gaza, and subsequently in the West Bank. There is little doubt that this new Arab-Muslim grouping will find here a shared basis for cooperation.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University, is a board member of Mitvim, and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.