The war with Iran and Hezbollah has entered its fourth week, and it is already clear that this is not another short, decisive round of fighting. Unlike previous confrontations, this war began with insufficient planning and a significant underestimation of the adversary.
It now compels military planners in Washington and Jerusalem to do what arguably should have been done from the outset: redefine the war’s objectives in light of what can realistically be achieved. As experience has repeatedly shown, the gap between ambition and capability is often decisive.
It is important to state plainly that this is one of the most consequential and justified wars in recent decades. Iran’s 60% enriched uranium suggests that it was not merely positioning itself for a potential nuclear breakout, but actively moving toward acquiring a bomb.
At the same time, Iran’s political reality – in which the leadership appears increasingly subordinate to hardline Revolutionary Guard elements advocating unconstrained warfare – underscores the scale of the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran.
Yet even wars deemed unavoidable must be grounded in clear, achievable objectives and informed by realistic assessments of risk. For example, the possibility that Iran would close the Strait of Hormuz - and its ability to do so even under heavy military pressure – should not have come as a surprise.
Iran’s advanced coastal missile systems, deployed in terrain that limits the effectiveness of airpower alone, make it likely that only a ground operation could neutralize this strategic lever over the global economy. The fact that such a force is only now being assembled reflects a widening gap between initial planning and operational reality.
Similarly, attacks on the energy infrastructure of Iran’s Arab neighbors, as well as the need for sufficient interceptor stockpiles in a prolonged conflict, were foreseeable risks. Iran’s long-standing strategy has not been to defeat its adversaries outright, but to deny them victory - by prolonging conflict, raising costs, and increasing uncertainty.
The Trump administration, encouraged by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, entered the conflict with the stated aim of addressing the nuclear threat – a challenge that might have been addressed through diplomatic means. In practice, however, broader ambitions appear to have been at play, including regime change and potential control over Iran’s energy resources – a move that could reshape global oil markets and influence energy flows to China.
Such divergences between stated and unstated objectives have often contributed to flawed military campaigns. If regime change is the true objective, history suggests that resources must be concentrated toward that goal, rather than dispersed across competing priorities.
Three Possible Outcomes
Scenario A: A Limited Ground Operation Leading to a Political Settlement
(Optimistic: weeks to three months)
A targeted US ground operation would seize key terrain along Iran’s side of the Strait of Hormuz, depriving Tehran of its primary economic leverage. Faced with this loss, the regime could seek a cease-fire in exchange for a mechanism to remove enriched uranium from the country. While the regime would remain in power, it would emerge weakened and more vulnerable to internal dissent.
Scenario B: A Prolonged War of Attrition
(Likely: months to over a year)
The US would deploy substantial ground and air forces to secure maritime routes while facing intensifying guerrilla warfare. Rising casualties and economic costs would fuel domestic opposition in the United States. Meanwhile, Iran would consolidate internal control and sustain pressure through ongoing missile attacks on regional targets, gradually eroding the stability of the US allies.
<strong>Scenario C: Withdrawal Without Strategic Gains</strong><br><em></em>
(Most dangerous: months to over a year)
Unable to achieve decisive results and under mounting domestic and international pressure, the United States could withdraw to restore oil flows. Such a move would leave regional allies exposed and allow Iran to retain – and potentially accelerate – its nuclear capabilities. This outcome would represent a strategic setback with long-term consequences.
To avoid this outcome, Washington must prioritize a rapid conclusion to the war that includes a political settlement. Achieving this likely requires a significant ground operation to neutralize Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz while weakening the Revolutionary Guards’ grip on power.
Even so, expectations should remain measured. While weakening Iran’s hard-line leadership could create conditions for internal change, regime change itself remains more aspirational than operational – a goal that limited military means are unlikely to achieve.
The writer has served, among other roles, as Head of Intelligence for Southern Command, Israel’s military attaché to NATO, and an intelligence adviser to the Israeli Prime Minister.