As a witness to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 while serving as military attaché and head of the Ministry of Defense mission in Iran, I have since volunteered to lecture at the IDF, the Mossad, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency), and most academic institutions on the topic of the revolution, its causes, and the dramatic events that accompanied it.
Among other things, I discuss the life-threatening risks involved in rescuing 33 members of the Israeli delegation and transporting four Persian fallow deer from Iran to Israel (there are currently about 500 free-ranging Persian fallow deer in Israel's wilderness).
Although 47 years have passed since the revolution, which I experienced and witnessed at every stage, I am often asked: What conditions could lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime today?
It is clear to everyone that the regime will do everything it can to ensure its survival. It controls all government institutions and the state budget, enjoying significant support from the residents of tens of thousands of villages in Iran, a population that is significantly behind urban residents and, like the autocratic religious regime, opposes any process of modernization or profound change.
What conditions could lead to the regime’s collapse?
The question of whether and when the current regime in Iran may collapse has occupied researchers, politicians, and the public for many years.
Despite external pressures, sanctions, and international isolation, history shows that such regimes typically fall as a result of deep internal processes. A review of the Iranian reality points to several key conditions, the existence of which, separately or collectively, could significantly undermine the regime's stability.
In my opinion, the most important condition, similar to that which occurred in the 1979 revolution, is a prolonged general strike by the country's central sectors, primarily the oil and gas sector. Such a strike requires an organized economic system to ensure food supply and basic support for the strikers and their families, a necessary condition for the continuation of the struggle.
Another significant factor is the defection of security forces from the regime to the side of the people. This includes not only regular army soldiers but also members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), internal security forces, police, and local militia units.
Such a change in loyalty is not merely symbolic: it strengthens the protest by providing skilled manpower and weapons. It could even lead to the opening of weapon depots to the protesting public. This would strip the regime of its central advantage, the monopoly on violence, and leave it vulnerable to unprecedented attacks.
This is what happened in 1979, when Iranian officer Husayn Kharrazi secretly defected to the revolution to protect his family’s security, and used military law to prevent generals from sleeping at their bases.
On the eve of the revolution, he sent around 700 units to the homes of generals in the army, police, and SAVAK, arresting them one by one. As a result, the massive Iranian army, with all its branches, was left without a command structure and collapsed completely within about 20 hours.
Another condition is the continued economic and environmental deterioration. The decline of the currency, rampant inflation, and a sharp rise in the cost of living are already being felt.
Furthermore, serious structural problems, including water shortages, severe air pollution, and damage to agriculture, are creating conditions in which many families struggle to meet their children's basic needs, despite significant efforts. When this sense of helplessness extends across broad segments of the population, it can shift from a quiet protest into an explosive public outrage.
The next factor is the urgent need for leadership and organization. To challenge a centralized and violent regime requires internal leadership with broad public legitimacy that can unify demands, coordinate actions, and lead an ongoing struggle. Past experience shows that justified popular protests that failed to organize into a clear political force faded and did not bring about real change.
It is important to emphasize that none of these conditions is necessary for all to occur simultaneously. The realization of one or two of them with sufficient intensity is enough to shake the foundations of the regime and present it with an existential crisis.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the regime still enjoys stable power mechanisms within Iran and has proven its ability in the past to rely on pro-regime forces outside the country, from Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, and even mercenaries, if necessary.
Unlike historical exiled rulers, the Iranian regime has no alternative goal from which it can continue to rule or benefit from the country’s resources. Therefore, it is likely to seize all the power levers at its disposal and will remain only when it believes that all options have been exhausted.
Finally, although there is an internal split between the factions known as "reformists" and "conservatives," this should not be regarded as a serious threat to the regime’s survival. Both groups compete for control of the same governing structure, enjoy its fruits, and do not offer a truly different alternative system. Therefore, the split between them does not serve as a catalyst for deep regime change.
In conclusion, if change occurs in Iran, it will come from within, driven by a combination of public pressure, economic collapse, shifting loyalties, and organizational capacity. These are the key factors to watch to understand whether the country is on the brink of a historical turning point.
The author was a member of the last military attaché and head of the Ministry of Defense delegation in Iran during the Iranian Revolution, 1977-1979.