Recent media reports have exposed the internal ferment inside Hamas regarding its post-war future. These discussions involve the prospect of politicization, namely operating within the official Palestinian framework while retaining an Islamic-nationalist identity.
Merely entertaining such a notion suggests the group grasps the sheer upheaval enforced by the war. A return to the pre-October 7 era is no longer feasible. Shifting dynamics, alongside the redrawn boundaries within Gaza, are compelling the group toward a recalibration of its role in the Palestinian order.
In reality, this discourse cannot be divorced from the strictures imposed by facts on the ground, primarily the Yellow Line now delineating geography and influence within Gaza.
From my perspective, the group is not proposing this party concept out of introspection. Instead, the emerging matrix – featuring confined reconstruction zones, mass displacement to sectors behind the Yellow Line overseen by Israel, and the formation of limited Palestinian militias there – is driving the movement toward a different paradigm.
It is a model less capable of bearing arms and more submissive to the conditions of this new reality.
Observers suggest that this transition is not a voluntary choice but a natural reflection of the group’s altered function within a re-engineered Gaza.
It appears clear that the internal deliberation comes from a search for survival to preserve what remains of its structure and legitimacy – rather than true reform. The recent war targeted Hamas’s framework, leadership, and power sources, while regional patronage has receded.
Hamas’s official mourning of Abu Obeidah, identified by his real name, cannot be read as a routine media acknowledgment. It signals a deeper shift in the movement’s internal balance, where decision-making has increasingly migrated into narrow military and security circles. The timing reflects an organization no longer able to absorb symbolic leadership losses without structural consequences. Under such conditions, internal elections are not merely postponed but effectively stripped of meaning, as Hamas operates under an emergency management logic focused on control and survival rather than legitimacy or leadership renewal.
With international pressure mounting to completely redesign the Palestinian scene, talk of a political party is essentially an attempt to mitigate censure and appear as a containable entity rather than a rogue armed organization.
A familiar political masquerade
To clarify the dissonance between ambition and conduct, we must revisit a pivotal juncture in the history of the movement.
Hamas is no stranger to politics; it contested the 2006 elections, presenting itself as a reformist option. However, once it ascended to power, it betrayed its partners. It used every method of brutality, ranging from public lynchings to rooftop executions, to enforce its dominion over Gaza.
This behavior was certainly not a mere miscalculation but an expression of a dogma that views partnership as a situational necessity rather than a binding imperative.
Consequently, any new discussion regarding Hamas turning into a political party remains governed by a fundamental question that gains importance given current shifts: Can an entity that betrayed its national partner suddenly become a civil participant committed to the rules of the game?
The true problem, in my opinion, is that the underlying fanaticism underpinning the movement has not undergone any declared revision, neither in text nor in practice. The rhetoric of Hamas still presents the group as a resistance movement with a clear, extremist creed. It views the conflict with Israel as a permanent attrition and regards any Palestinian faction outside its fold as deviant or apostate.
This zealotry naturally makes any talk of partisan transformation conditional upon revisions whose characteristics have not yet surfaced.
Multiple reports speak of clandestine overtures being considered behind the scenes that go beyond a conventional cessation of hostilities to reach deeper arrangements regarding weaponry and security.
Some of these formulas were fielded by Hamas leader Mousa Abu Marzouk in a television interview, involving the surrender of heavy weaponry while retaining light arms, alongside a pledge to protect Israeli settlements in exchange for legitimacy in Gaza.
Moving from armament to terrain and restoration, a broader picture of the proposed transition becomes clear. These proposals can be viewed in a wider context, particularly if the movement accepts, whether explicitly or implicitly, a status quo based on the Yellow Line zone, which effectively divides Gaza into two distinct areas of administration and control.
While these scenarios may appear shocking, they truly reflect a survival instinct oscillating between pragmatism and demagoguery. From this specific viewpoint, understanding the behavior of the group in the context of a long truce becomes an analytical imperative.
In my view, the movement is frankly not seeking resolution as much as a protracted stasis, perhaps spanning decades. This approach reflects a strategy of regrouping rather than rebuilding politics. For such terror organizations, a truce is not the end of the conflict but a respite to reorganize ranks and await a change in circumstances.
Thus, the project of politicization becomes a mere maneuver between two phases: the stage of an armed movement facing targeting, and the stage of a political organization operating within institutions, feeding on power and funds, and cloaking itself in soft semantics that conceal its old core. At this point, it becomes necessary to evaluate the full picture before judging the viability of this transformation.
As I see it, what is being proposed today regarding remaking Hamas into a political party is a farce, or perhaps a crude attempt at deflection. It indicates that the movement seeks only to protect its gains and reposition itself. Evidently, Hamas will offer every possible compromise to survive, regardless of the magnitude of the concessions required.
The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.