As soon as the sale of the F-35 advanced fighters to Saudi Arabia was publicly confirmed, some Israeli observers began to whine about the damage to Israeli security and its air force superiority in the Middle East. At first sight, this seemed logical, given that Israel is the only country in the Middle East (and one of the few in the world) to obtain this highly sophisticated aircraft; in fact, it is the only one to receive the F-35I, which incorporates more advanced (and strictly genuine technologies) that no other country has.
Still, Israel now will have to confront another potentially hostile country nearby with high-capability F-35s, which would, presumably, undermine its security and air superiority in the Middle East. Those who, albeit reluctantly, approve of the US-Saudi deal, point to the fact that it will take around six years for the Saudis to get the F-35s, by which time Israel would find, or create, proper defensive measures against them. Yet, this is only part of the story.
History shows that although Saudi Arabia regularly tops the global list of military spenders, this by no means implies that it is a regional, let alone a global military power, or a real threat to Israel. Quite the contrary.
Why the Saudis are not a threat to Israel
Although the Saudis allegedly participated in the 1948 and 1973 wars against Israel, their presence and contribution to the fighting were symbolic and marginal at best.
True, Saudi Arabia opposed the establishment of the Jewish state and has never recognized Israel nor maintained official relations with it. Yet, reportedly, since the 1980s, the two countries have maintained regular economic relations as well as secret negotiations, and there might have been an Israeli intelligence presence in Saudi Arabia.
In 1971, Israel objected to the sale of US AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. Washington tried to assure that it had nothing to worry about, saying that they were only “defensive weapons” – yet when Israel tried to sell China its own AWACS systems some 30 years later, they suddenly became “offensive weapons”).
Certainly, Israel had no need to worry about the Saudi AWACS planes, whose impact on Israeli security has been non-existent. In fact, since Riyadh opened its airspace to Israeli commercial flights in 2020, along with military flights – although both sides denied the latter, especially since the start of the Israel-Hamas War. Still, a potential Saudi threat emerged earlier.
In 1988, Saudi Arabia signed a deal with China to acquire the IRBM DF-3A (known in the West as CSS-2) missiles, reportedly approved by the United States. Indeed, by then, the liquid-fueled missiles were already outdated. Officially, Israel did not know about the sale, which was reported as a threat to its security.
Yet the Saudis have never used the missiles. They not only failed to deter Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from invading Kuwait and attacking Saudi Arabia (and US forces), but they also failed to retaliate and did not launch their China-made missiles against Iraq.
In March 2015, the Saudis led a coalition of Arab states against the Shi’ite Houthi terrorist group, which, supported by Iran, had occupied much of Yemen, seeking control of Bab al-Mandab and attacking Saudi Arabia. Headed by the Saudis, the coalition failed completely. Moreover, in September 2019, undeterred, Iran attacked Saudi oil facilities, destroying half of the country’s oil supply. Once again, the Saudis – and the US – failed to retaliate.
In short, there is little to write home about Saudi Arabia’s involvement in military conflicts, let alone its use of weapons. Still, Saudi Arabia has been one of the leading arms importers in the world, and, given its poor military performance and its protection, now official, by the US, the question is: “Why, and for use against whom, is Riyadh continuing to buy weapons, including F-35s?” Not against Israel.
Six or seven years from today, when the Saudi-acquired F-35s are slated to become “operational,” their threat to Israel will still be meaningless – and particularly if by that time relations between the two countries have been normalized.
By then, the IAF will probably still be the best air force in the Middle East, primarily because it will still remain the most experienced, not to mention its most sophisticated air defense system, as demonstrated in its performance against Iran in June 2025, as well as having the most advanced planes.
Given these considerations, as well as the fact that Saudi Arabia is extremely vulnerable, a Saudi attempt to confront the Israeli Air Force with its F-35s is highly unlikely.
This still raises the two basic questions. First: “Why is Saudi Arabia nonetheless buying the F-35s?” And second: “Why do most Israelis, including ranking officers, regard the Saudi acquisition a threat to Israel’s security?”
Saudi Arabia is like a spoiled and rich child whose generous uncle, let’s call him “Sam,” has a big toy shop and is glad to provide the child with all the toys he wants. The child, however, has no intention of playing with the toys. He thinks that just owning the expensive toys is enough for him to claim leadership over his classmates (Middle Eastern and Muslim countries) and be acknowledged for it. Unfortunately for him, such is not always the case.
Israel, which must be aware of the real situation, is exploiting the potential unlikely “threats” from the Saudis to demand handsome compensation from Uncle Sam.
The writer is professor emeritus in the departments of Political Science and Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.