Exactly a year ago, the "Nagel Committee on the Defense Budget" submitted its recommendations to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He approved them in principle and instructed that they be implemented (a significant portion of the recommendations, particularly those related to manpower, were implemented in 2025).
Ahead of the Netanyahu–Trump meeting at Mar-a-Lago, it is worthwhile to revisit those recommendations that most of them remain valid, despite having been issued before the 12-day war, especially the chapter about the new Memorandum of Understanding on security assistance and cooperation between the US and Israel, which I had the honor of leading and signing the previous one, on behalf of the State of Israel a decade ago, with the Obama administration.
The central issues expected to be on the table include: Iran and its attempts to rebuild their capabilities that have suffered a severe blow, particularly air defense systems and ballistic missile production capacities; Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah; Gaza and the dangers of moving too early to phase II; Syria and the conduct of Mohammad al-Julani (Ahmed al-Shaara); Turkey’s aspiration to enter the vacuum left by Russia and Iran in Syria and to become a dominant force within any future governing structure in Gaza; the Houthis; Qatar; the Muslim Brotherhood; and a wide range of additional issues across all arenas that remain active, despite the fact that Israel’s security situation is far better than it was before.
Beyond these critical topics, which may not receive sufficient time for in-depth discussion, this article will focus on the urgent need to begin and conclude, as soon as possible, discussions on the next MOU between Israel and the US, which will follow the current agreement set to expire in 2028.
Shaping the next Israel-US MOU
As recommended by the Nagel Committee, the next agreement cannot be identical to the previous one in its approach, content, or method of implementation. It involves a different president, whose views on grants are well known, and Israel’s situation has fundamentally changed during the last decade (for better and for worse). Despite voices from various “experts on American politics and President Donald Trump,” the cost of error is far too high to gamble. At worst, the answer will be negative; I assume it will not be if presented with the right arguments. Netanyahu should present Israel’s acute need for American main platforms over the next decade: various fighter aircraft, aerial refuelers, helicopters, munitions, and thousands of light armored vehicles for the ground forces.
The next agreement must include a full implementation of all assistance within the US, thereby creating thousands of American jobs. It should focus solely on the main platforms and eliminate all other uses that characterized previous decades only in part.
There are talks about the need to reduce Israel’s dependence on the US. Still, it is important to understand that aerial platforms do not increase Israel’s dependence, since Israel would purchase them from the US regardless. Building Israel's DIB (Defense Industrial Base) to enhance Israel's munitions independence was strongly recommended by the Nagel Committee, and it will receive billions of shekels in investment over the coming decade. However, it will not include the development and production of these main platforms in Israel.
Purchasing the main platforms with US assistance will allow Israel to allocate its own budget to building a stable DIB in areas where Israel must be independent. At the same time, Israel will use these aerial platforms to carry out missions vital not only to Israel but also to the US across the Middle East, at the lowest cost President Trump could find, and at the same time, helping to build the US DIB.
Irresponsible claims that the pressure the Trump administration exerts on the prime minister to make diplomatic concessions stems from the security assistance demonstrate complete ignorance and a lack of understanding of the global "balance of power." The US is Israel’s central, and at times sole, ally, but as the world’s leading superpower, it will exert legitimate pressure on its allies, including Israel, to support American interests, even if the security assistance will be reduced to zero.
Striking Iran’s nuclear program using F-35, F-16, and F-15 aircraft alongside aerial refuelers served both American and Israeli needs and interests. Iran’s nuclear program threatens the US and the world no less than it threatens Israel. Funding these platforms by Trump, who joined the strike with B-2 bombers that Israel does not possess, serves US interests alongside Israel’s.
The Defense Budget Committee recommended an additional NIS 233 billion over a decade, very close to the amount recently approved by the prime minister (NIS 350 billion, of which NIS 250 billion is an increase and NIS 100 billion from internal sources). These recommendations assumed a new MOU of similar scope (with or without inflation) to the previous one. Any agreement on a new MOU that does not include approximately $38 billion over a decade, or is not worth it, would require a waiver of the grant component, which would require a comparable increase in Israel's defense budget. About half of the new MOU (not yet agreed) has already been committed to procuring new AF squadrons, based on the assumption that a new, similar-sized MOU would be signed.
Many in Israel and abroad point to Israel’s impressive GDP per capita ($60,000, higher than Germany, France, and the UK). There is no doubt that Israel’s economy is strong and that the shekel demonstrates resilience, and we should be proud. However, none of these countries has endured a war costing approximately $100 billion, nor are any of them threatened on seven fronts, including existential threats. Consequently, they do not spend 5–6 percent or more of their GDP on defense.
Israel's economy would not collapse without the new MOU. Still, Netanyahu should make every effort to convince Trump that such assistance is vital to the US and recommend that he establish a team of experts to promptly propose ideas for a new agreement based on the above-mentioned rules. The agreement must include direct American assistance for the main American platform procurement, at a level no lower than the previous agreement. Only then could the agreement be enhanced by adding technological cooperation in areas where Israel has knowledge and capabilities that can benefit the US, without causing the leakage of technologies critical to the independence of Israel’s defense industry. In addition, Israel could commit to directing a larger share than in the past of its shekels defense budget (in addition to the assistance) toward direct procurement in the US. My FDD colleague, Brad Bowman, has written a detailed article on this matter, which I recommend reading.
Alongside discussions of the assistance agreement, the leaders will address the “fragile” regional situation across all arenas, none of which has yet achieved peace. In Gaza, the destruction of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Strip have not been completed, including the return of the last hostage. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has suffered a severe blow. Still, it has retained some capabilities and, despite its withdrawal and the ceasefire agreement, is seeking ways to rearm and produce precision weapons. In Syria, Julani has yet to prove that he has abandoned his terrorist worldview. The Houthis, Turkey, Qatar, MB, and others are far from becoming “lovers of Zion.”
The prime minister faces a critical mission at Mar-a-Lago, and we all wish him success.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a professor at the Technion. He served as national security adviser to Prime Minister Netanyahu and as the head of the National Security Council (acting), chaired the "Nagel Committee for Reviewing the Defense Budget and Force Structure," and led the signing of the 2016 US-Israel security MOU.