In his coming visit to the White House, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must address five main arenas: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. Across these issues, there are gaps, even tensions, between the American and Israeli positions.
That does not mean his meeting with President Donald Trump must lead to a crisis. On the contrary, if Netanyahu is wise, he will show flexibility on at least two issues and find ways to agree on the others, without compromising Israel’s vital principles.
Recently, warlike rhetoric has echoed on the Israeli side, both from politicians, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, for example, and from security officials, regarding Lebanon. Those who advocate resuming the war against Hezbollah draw their lesson from October 7, namely that Israel must not allow organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas to build up power.
According to the Israeli view, since Hezbollah is trying to rebuild its strength and the Lebanese government has failed to disarm it completely, it would be better to renew the war. The American position is the opposite. The Trump administration believes that a combination of political and economic pressure on Beirut, together with Hezbollah’s postwar weakness, will ultimately neutralize the group as a threatening military force. On this, it is right to accept the American view, and it should not be seen as a concession. Israel’s interest is also to avoid another unnecessary war on this front.
Gaza: Do not compromise Israel’s core interest
Unlike Syria and Lebanon, in Gaza, Israel must not accept all the American demands. The United States is eager to move to Phase II of Trump’s ambitious plan for Gaza’s future.
The plan has three clauses: (a) dismantling Hamas’s weaponry and ability to rule; (b) rebuilding Gaza under a grand plan costing 112 billion dollars; (c) withdrawing IDF forces from most of the areas they hold inside Gaza. The problem is the sequence. The Americans want to start with reconstruction.
The mediating states, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, demand IDF withdrawals in parallel. Israel’s supreme interest is to oppose both of these before Hamas is disarmed. On this, Netanyahu must not ease up or compromise. Conceding would mean that most of Israel’s achievements in the Gaza war would be lost.
The Iranian ballistic missile threat
Like Israel, the United States is determined to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. There is no dispute on that. But Israel is no less troubled by Tehran’s investment in producing large numbers of accurate ballistic missiles and launchers.
Each missile carries a half-ton warhead with impressive precision and caused Israel significant damage in the war six months ago. Iran now seeks a capability far larger than it fielded in that war. For Israel, this is an existential threat that must be prevented from materializing, and Netanyahu will have to work hard to convince Trump and his team that this is the case.
The Turkish threat
The widest gap between Israel and the United States concerns Turkey’s conduct and ambitions. Trump admires strong, authoritarian leaders, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan fits that image in his eyes.
Trump is also inclined to believe Erdogan’s sweet talk about seeking stability in the Middle East, and in Gaza in particular. Netanyahu must present the threat Turkey poses not only to Israel but also to Cyprus and Greece. He should stress that on Hamas’s future, Turkey will certainly act against the American interest, namely, dismantling the terror organization.