The December 13, 2025, terrorist attack on the US delegation in Syria’s Palmyra region, which resulted in the deaths of two American service members and a civilian interpreter, underscores an imminent risk and a more troubling reality that Washington continues to overlook.
While US officials attributed the attack to ISIS, images of the assailant circulating on social media indicate a direct connection to Syria’s newly established security apparatus. Ultimately, it is largely irrelevant whether the assailant acted explicitly under the ISIS banner or as part of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led Syrian government.
Syria’s jihadist groups are all part of the same ecosystem, despite their different rhetoric and methods of violence. They share a common ideological foundation rooted in radical Islamism, rejection of ethnic and religious pluralism, profound hostility toward gender equality, and deep anti-Western sentiments.
Ignoring this fact by tacitly legitimizing jihadist power in Damascus threatens stability in Syria and entrenches extremism and risks renewed cycles of violence. This risk is already evidenced in attacks perpetrated this year by government-affiliated forces against ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Alawite and Druze communities. These threats to peaceful coexistence also jeopardize Israel’s security and wider Western interests in the region.
Rebranding jihadists in Syria as “integrated,” “moderate,” or “transformed” does not change their fundamental worldview. Even if factions led by Ahmed al-Sharaa have undergone partial transformation, credible reports suggest that ISIS members have infiltrated government-affiliated forces and that ISIS symbols, narratives, and ideological commitments persist.
Sharaa’s remarks at the Doha Forum, implicitly accusing Israel and the US of “state terrorism” while downplaying jihadist attacks on civilians in Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Western societies, cast further doubt on claims of his genuine transformation and rehabilitation.
Washington’s policy of distinguishing ISIS from other jihadist factions, legitimizing HTS, and offering diplomatic support to Sharaa does not amount to effective counterterrorism. Instead, it reinforces extremism and destabilizes Syria and the entire region.
Understanding the jihadist threat in Syria requires our attention regarding the evolution of global jihadism. In the 1980s, mujahideen were US partners to combat the Russians in Afghanistan, yet they proved to be unreliable allies and marked the emergence of modern Salafist-jihadism.
In the 1990s, jihadist ideology gave rise to al-Qaeda, culminating in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In the 2000s, we witnessed the emergence of al-Qaeda-Iraq (AQI) under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, characterized by extreme sectarian violence. ISIS represented the fourth and most radical manifestation of jihadism, seizing large parts of Iraq and Syria while exporting terrorism globally.
Despite ISIS’s military defeat in 2019, its members dispersed into numerous splinter groups. In Syria, these include al-Qaeda-linked groups, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Hurras al-Din, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jaysh al-Islam.
Criminal and jihadist groups trained in Turkey
With financial support from Qatar, Turkey has recruited, trained, and deployed various criminal and jihadist factions, later incorporated into the Syrian National Army (SNA). These include the Sultan Murad Division, Hamza Division, Levant Front, Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, and Failaq al-Sham. Despite their differing sponsors and structures, these groups share the same ideological core.
International media and human rights organizations have documented widespread criminal and genocidal practices by these factions, including mass killings, torture, rape, extra-judicial executions, and forced displacement.
Kurds have long been their main targets, and attacks on Alawite and Druze populations have become more common recently. These abuses are not one-time events but part of a pattern of ongoing and planned violent behavior.
Despite their rebranding efforts, these jihadist groups adhere to a radical Salafist ideology, justify violence by appealing to strict interpretations of Sharia (Islamic) law, reject secular governance, and deny any form of pluralism. Their distinctions between “moderate” and “extremist” jihadist factions are largely cosmetic.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) represent a fundamentally different model. Despite existential threats from forced integration into a new jihadist-dominated Syrian order and from Turkey, which accuses it of affiliation with the now largely defunct Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and conducts targeted assassinations and airstrikes targeting civilians and infrastructure, the SDF has played a unique role in militarily defeating ISIS in Syria. It has also performed the difficult task of rehabilitating and containing former ISIS members.
While primarily composed of Kurdish forces, the SDF has evolved into a broad multi-ethnic and multi-religious alliance that includes autonomous women’s units, Sunni Arab tribes, Assyrians, Christians, Armenians, Turkmen, and Circassians. In addition to its military success, the SDF has institutionalized pluralism through inclusive governance and local self-administration in the territories it controls.
Its commitment to stabilization, secularism, gender equality, and coexistence across ethnic and religious divides stands in sharp contrast to jihadist rule.
A sustainable strategy to eliminate radical Islamism, both ideologically and militarily, lies in promoting a genuinely pluralistic political order in Syria. The SDF has positioned itself as a credible advocate for this vision.
With disciplined forces and local legitimacy, it has fostered peaceful coexistence among all Syrian communities, upholding their cultural and religious rights. Therefore, US policymakers should recognize that empowering and legitimizing inclusive local actors under the SDF’s banner offers a far more viable path to stability than collaborating with rebranded jihadists. Such a strategy would also better protect Israel’s security and Western strategic interests.
Drawing lessons from the flawed partnership with the mujahideen in Afghanistan, Washington might consider a radical policy shift. Rather than supporting a centralized Syria, dominated by jihadists in Damascus, US policymakers should prioritize a decentralized Syria based on inclusive power-sharing among all components.
Inviting SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi to Washington to engage directly with US President Donald Trump and senior policymakers would signal a meaningful change in strategy. Such a revised strategy could protect minority rights in Syria, enhance long-term regional stability alongside Israel’s security, and establish a reliable and sustainable partnership with the West.
This vision can only be sustained by a disciplined, reliable, and loyal partner like the SDF, one that has consistently cooperated with the Western forces, defied both Sunni and Shi’ite jihadism, and remains committed to inclusive governance.”
The writer is a research fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.