The battlefield is changing dramatically. Instead of relying on expensive, fast, and sophisticated platforms, it is increasingly dominated by autonomous and unmanned aircraft (UAVs and drones) that are cheaper, simpler, and slower. This threat makes it possible to strike strategic targets at a remarkably low cost.
A drone costing only a few hundred dollars can shut down an international airport in Europe, or at Timna and Ben-Gurion, and harm dozens of civilians in Eilat. These systems have proved effective in arenas such as Ukraine, Israel, Russia, Iran, and Yemen, hitting airports, headquarters, logistics convoys, air defense systems, and, of course, civilians.
The aerial threat is unique because of a lethal combination of low price, ease of operation, and steadily improving accuracy. Drones fly low and slow with a minimal radar signature, which makes them highly stealthy and difficult to detect early. Some even operate in swarms, deliberately saturating defensive systems.
The result is a changing battlefield in which both the home front and military forces are exposed to costly damage by a cheap tool. Air defense systems themselves have become targets, so they must protect themselves in order to survive and still perform their mission. In other words, we now need defense of the air defense.
And here in Israel? Our systemic response has been late, something like a “Yemenite step” – one step forward, two steps back, a common Israeli folk-dance move and idiom for hesitant, zigzagging progress. Skill in defense keeps improving, but success is still partial.
Despite the Israel Air Force’s impressive interception rates, the IDF has not been able to perfectly defend targets such as the southern city of Eilat or Ramon Airport. The problem is not only technological, it is primarily conceptual.
Historical lessons on defense
History teaches that in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, we were surprised when the missile bent the wing of the plane; now, again, we are struggling to organize quickly against an airborne threat. It is no longer possible to defend the home front or fight at the front without accounting for dozens of cheap flying platforms that can loiter, attack, damage, and disrupt.
Effective defense requires a change in concept. Not more of the same, but a different approach that includes decentralizing force structure and connecting simple, low-cost sensors to advanced systems. Defense must be available at scale, not only in elite units or air defense batteries.
We need multilayer protection at very low altitude, close to the ground, combining diverse detection means, including radars, electro-optics, acoustics, and SIGINT (gathering intelligence by intercepting and analyzing electronic signals), together with varied interception layers. These should include soft kill – electronic and other – and hard kill; kinetic, using a missile, cannon, interceptor drone, loitering munition, or shell.
The key is decentralization and flexibility: dispersed systems operating on a single network, with advanced mission management, and the integration of artificial intelligence for classification and real-time decision-making.
We must also recognize the need to integrate offensive efforts as an inseparable part of defense, with immediate, semi-automatic strikes on the enemy’s production, launch and command sites to close the loop and reduce the threat before it arrives.
Overcoming bureaucratic barriers
Beyond technology, success depends on breaking organizational and bureaucratic barriers between branches and agencies. Who is actually responsible if Ben-Gurion Airport is hit by a flock of drones launched from a nearby city, or by a terror truck in Ramallah?
As lessons from Ukraine and from our own wars show, the question is not whether the threat will develop, but how we prepare for it in advance.
In the end, the small-drone test is a serious test of national strength. It confronts us with entrenched concepts, procrastination, and bureaucracy. The enemy keeps turning civilian toys into weapons, and we cannot afford to wait for the next surprise.
The writer, a Brig.-Gen. (res.), is a former commander of the IDF Air Defense Command and former IDF spokesperson.