Israel’s attempted assassination of Hamas leaders in Doha was surprising and audacious. The action appears to have failed, but even if it had succeeded, the cost-benefit analysis suggests that the drawbacks outweigh the advantages. This is not merely hindsight; most of the consequences of the operation could have been foreseen.
Israel as an untrustworthy partner: Over the years, a certain trust has been built behind the scenes between Israel and several Gulf states, including Qatar. Senior figures from the Mossad and the Foreign Ministry worked hard to cultivate these ties. It is therefore not surprising that the head of the Mossad reportedly opposed the assassination operation, at least at this juncture.
Beyond the damage to Israel-Qatar relations, harming a mediator who enjoys immunity by virtue of its role is not expected or accepted diplomatically. Moreover, Israel already has a track record of trust violations: the failed 1997 assassination attempt of Khaled Mashaal in Jordan; the assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in the United Arab Emirates in 2010; and, in a different vein, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leak of his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Neom in 2020.
Unlike strikes in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen – states considered outright enemies – these were states with either peace treaties (Jordan) or clandestine ties (UAE and Saudi Arabia) with Israel. As such, these operations were perceived as betrayals of trust and resulted in significant damage.
Growing fear of Israeli regional hegemony: Middle Eastern states, including those with peace or normalization agreements, fear Israel’s hegemonic role in the regional system. When Shimon Peres promoted his vision of a New Middle East after the Oslo Accords, he encountered Arab resistance over concerns about Israeli economic dominance.
Following Israel’s military successes and belligerent statements by some ministers, the mythic belief that Israel seeks to establish “Greater Israel” from the Euphrates to the Nile gained traction. This, in turn, may push regional actors to seek alternative alignments.
Ending the war, releasing the hostages
From the outset, it is unclear how the strike in Doha was meant to contribute to ending the war or securing the release of hostages. If the logic was that assassinating Hamas leaders would soften the organization’s stance, that assumption lacked foundation. Just as plausibly, the action could have hardened Hamas’s resolve to fight to the bitter end.
Furthermore, had the operation succeeded, it might have led to the execution of hostages; if the war continues to the bitter end, their death may come anyway. On the other hand, the strike sent a message to Hamas, and possibly to other enemies, that they are not immune anywhere, not even in safe havens.
Putting the US in a bind: As is well known, both Qatar and Israel are US allies. One alliance is not meant to come at the expense of the other. Yet the attack placed US President Donald Trump in an awkward position, as though he had to choose between the aggressor and the target; he “chose” Israel, having been informed in advance of the operation.
No wonder his response was cautious and hesitant – an attempt to hold the stick from both ends. To remove any doubts, he quickly announced a meeting with the Qatari prime minister and reaffirmed that Qatar remains a solid US ally.
A boost to Arab solidarity: Arab and Islamic leaders were quick to respond to Qatar’s call for convening an emergency summit. In this sense, the attack has added prestige and influence to this small monarchy that was, not long ago (2017-2021), isolated and subject to a regional boycott.
Some of the visitors are themselves rivals and competitors of Qatar, but Israel’s breach of its sovereignty is seen as a dangerous precedent that could one day target them as well.
Damage to Israel-Qatar relations
It is currently difficult to measure the full extent of the damage to Israel-Qatar relations, but past examples suggest that violations of trust are usually met with suspensions of ties. Some argue that Qatari mediation or contacts are ultimately harmful to Israel, especially considering Qatar’s double game – Al Jazeera’s hostile broadcasts, and Qatari funding of “charity” organizations and academic institutions in the West with the aim of promoting extremist Islamic propaganda.
Qatar has maintained ties with Israel since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1996. Although those official relations were severed following Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), contacts continued behind the scenes, particularly when Qatar began transferring funds to Gaza and Hamas with Israel’s consent.
While Netanyahu viewed Hamas as a useful tool for maintaining Palestinian division, the Mossad and security establishment regarded Qatar as a vital – if not always fair – mediator between Israel and Hamas, especially given the deadlock in the Palestinian arena.
Though Netanyahu originally supported Qatari involvement, it is not inconceivable that the allegations against him in the “Qatargate” affair pushed him toward this move, as part of an effort to rid himself of this burden.
At this stage, it appears that Qatar does not intend to give Israel the “gift” of halting its mediation efforts. Clearly, it is in no rush to give up the role that has granted it access to all the rival parties, particularly the United States, and that has enhanced its international prestige.
In sum, the disadvantages of the operation appear to outweigh its benefits. One may speculate that the hubris generated by Israel’s military successes in other arenas also played a role.
Qatar will likely remain a “complex” state, as termed by Netanyahu, as it will continue hedging. Placing it in the resistance camp with Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – and consequently designating it as an enemy – not only fails to serve Israel’s interests and lacks US support, but in my assessment, it is also simply incorrect.
Israel-Qatar relations best fit the model known in international relations as “frenemies, ”a mix of hostility and cooperation shaped by shifting interests.
Trump’s close ties with both Israel and Qatar, combined with the need for mediation to end the war and release the hostages, may shorten the current cold spell between the two states. Nevertheless, feelings of humiliation, insult, and distrust on the Qatari side will likely continue to cast a shadow over the relationship.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of the Mitvim Institute.