Bungled diplomacy, not fate, led to Israel's isolation - opinion

The Abraham Accords enabled Israel to join the US Central Command (CENTCOM), which, along with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, played a crucial role in defending Israel against Iranian attacks.

Five years after the signing of the Abraham Accords, Israel now faces threats of boycott and ostracism by many countries around the world. The process of Israel’s transformation into a pariah state may reach its peak this coming September at the annual UN General Assembly in New York, where various states are threatening to recognize a Palestinian state and impose a series of economic sanctions if the war does not come to an end.

How did we get to this point?

In the Israeli media, the term “diplomatic tsunami” has taken root to describe this phenomenon. However, a tsunami, as we know, occurs unexpectedly, following an earthquake or volcanic eruption that generates massive sea waves, sometimes leading to severe damage and loss of life.

But there is nothing surprising about the current diplomatic collapse. The writing was on the wall, yet the Israeli government has consciously chosen not to enter a political process, opting instead for a policy of “if force doesn’t work, use more force.”

Paradoxically, it was Hamas’s heinous attack on Israel that led to a renewed revival of the idea of a Palestinian state. Before the war, 147 countries had recognized it; since the war, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Slovenia, and Armenia have joined them, and another 11 countries (including France, the UK, and Australia) have expressed willingness to do so this coming September if the Israel-Hamas War does not end.

It wasn't supposed to be this way. At the start of the war, Israel enjoyed broad international support, stemming from the deep shock caused by the horrors of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. The international community expressed solidarity with Israel’s right to defend itself and viewed it as the victim.

However, as the war dragged on, attitudes toward Israel began to shift. Harrowing images from Gaza, the scale of casualties, the humanitarian crisis, and the unusually prolonged fighting all led to a sharp erosion of support, including even in the United States, traditionally seen as Israel’s main ally.

The failure of these initiatives cannot be laid solely on the Palestinians, as many have convinced themselves, relying on Abba Eban’s immortal phrase that “the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”

Second, throughout the war, numerous proposals for the “day after” were raised, but all were rejected by Israel. For example, at the Arab League summit in March 2025, Egypt presented a plan for the reconstruction of Gaza; another plan was introduced in July by Saudi Arabia, France, and 17 other countries and organizations, which also included recognition of a Palestinian state.

While these plans contained elements that are unacceptable to Israel, they also included components that could serve as a basis for a future framework, such as the demand to end Hamas’s rule in Gaza and demilitarize the Strip; the dismantling of its military capabilities and transfer of weapons to the Palestinian Authority; and the establishment of an interim administrative body under the PA’s umbrella, among other measures.

The need to bring the military campaign to an end stems from the growing sense that it has exhausted its objectives. Moreover, the real and urgent concern for the lives of the hostages requires an immediate decision. To these longstanding factors, a new one has now been added: the diplomatic tsunami.

Although its timing is linked to Hamas’s fabricated campaign about Israel’s deliberate policy of starvation, which has gained traction among many audiences worldwide, it must be viewed in the broader context of Israel’s continued refusal not only to end the war but also to initiate or even respond to political plans for the “day after.”

A wide range of scenarios is now on the table, including political isolation, suspension of peace and/or normalization agreements, the expansion of economic sanctions to all of Israel (and not just to the settlements in the West Bank), arms embargoes, and harm to trade agreements.

Some of these developments have occurred in the past following the 1967 Six Day War, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Second Intifada, during which Morocco, Tunisia, Oman, Mauritania, and Qatar (temporarily) severed their relations with Israel.

Thus, what failed to happen during nearly two years of war is now unfolding before our eyes – and may intensify due to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, a flare-up over the Temple Mount issue, or a possible Israeli reoccupation of the Strip.

Conversely, ending the war would not only lead to the return of the hostages, but could also halt the ongoing diplomatic deterioration. Paradoxically, it is precisely the cessation of the war that may reduce the pressure on Israel to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Israel has achieved impressive military accomplishments on the battlefield against Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis. These achievements should have been leveraged into a political gain.

What is now at stake is the possibility that, on top of the existing tragedies – October 7, the hostages and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza – a further tragedy may be added: the unraveling of Israel’s diplomatic gains of the past decade.