Israel must leverage recent events and call for regional dialogue involving local and global powers to settle the Syrian issue diplomatically, while maintaining the safety of minorities and combating extremism and sectarianism
The recent cycle of violence between Druze and Bedouin communities in southern Syria has reportedly claimed hundreds of lives. The conflicts stem from sectarian differences, resource competition in the periphery of a country that ceased to exist 15 years ago, and disputes over smuggling routes. Additionally, there is historical Islamist enmity towards the Druze community, considered a “heretic” sect. These evolved into civil war, providing a test case for Al-Sharaa navigation of interests, with worrying results.
While many hoped for a new peaceful era between Israel and Syria, violence against Syrian minorities over recent months showcased Al-Sharaa’s limited abilities to consolidate and control his forces.
Examples are aplenty: the March Alawite massacres, with at least 1,000 dead; the June suicide bombings at Mar Elias church in Damascus, claiming dozens of Christian lives; and now the massacres, kidnappings, and humiliations against the Druze, leaving hundreds dead.
Sharaa's rule is not devoid of antisemitism. In February, IMPACT-SE issued a report showing dozens of examples of antisemitic rhetoric in new Ministry of Education textbooks. Some Syrian ministers have promoted anti-Jewish discourse, though Al-Sharaa supposedly attempts to distance himself from such views.
Similarly, anti-Jewish tropes are constantly weaponized on social media and on the ground by jihadi militants to justify sectarian violence, accusing their victims of conspiring with Mossad or the Jews in order to demonize them and rationalize violence against them.
Israel’s Intervention
Israel’s decision to intervene represents a fascinating case study in how minorities can leverage their position to influence regional affairs. With 150,000 Druze in Israel compared to 750,000 Druze in Syria, the Israeli Druze community mobilized its resources in defense of their Syrian brethren, displaying remarkable power that few minorities can achieve.
The immediate results are twofold: on the positive side, Al-Sharaa promised accountability for crimes against the Druze and began withdrawing forces following American demands, originating from Israeli pressure. This may have sent a broader message about the consequences of targeting Druze communities and potentially opened space for future dialogue.
On the other hand, Israel’s intervention may carry significant strategic costs. It has complicated President Trump’s Middle East peace vision, set back potential Israeli-Syrian normalization, created friction with Turkey, sparked criticism from friendly states like the UAE, and provided ammunition for critics who portray Israel as solving problems through force.
Most concerning, the intervention may have branded Syrian Druze as “collaborators,” potentially endangering them further. On social media, many Druze are accused by Islamist supporters of being Israeli or Jewish agents, invoking centuries-old tropes including aspirations for global domination and attempts to corrupt society through drug trafficking.
The Broader Syrian Context
Despite the costs, Israel’s intervention occurs within a unique strategic moment. Al-Sharaa finds himself in a regional auction, with various Middle Eastern powers offering their wares to pull Syria in their direction. And he appears open to these overtures rather than limiting himself to support from Turkey or Qatar.
If Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US can outcompete Turkish and Qatari influence in Syria, the country’s trajectory will follow accordingly. This isn’t simply about whether Al-Sharaa is a jihadist or pragmatist, but about the international community’s interest in preventing jihadist rearmament and state collapse.
Rather than rush into peace agreements that might collapse quickly, Israel should consider a phased approach: security arrangements, non-aggression pacts, and trilateral coordination with Jordan to prevent Iranian smuggling. Eventually, this might include local cooperation on agriculture and construction, particularly with Druze populations, and working groups to prepare groundwork for future comprehensive agreements.
Any meaningful future peace agreement between Israel and Syria must include non-negotiable elements: protection for minorities, including Druze, Kurds, Christians and Alawites; full recognition of Israel and the Jewish people as an integral piece of the Middle East which it is; a demilitarized buffer zone preventing Islamist entrenchment on the border; Al-Sharaa’s explicit renunciation of HTS’s jihadist ways and antisemitism; and de facto Syrian abandonment of Golan Heights claims. The hasty lifting of US sanctions should also be conditional on the protection of minorities.
Whether Israel’s intervention was effective or not, it’s been done– and now is the time for Israel to rise above its usual reactiveness and leverage recent events to promote dialogue, disavow extremism, and combat sectarian hatred.
A summit of local and global powers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, the US, India, the EU, and Turkey – could peacefully resolve the Syrian issue based on these principles. As recent history shows, should Israel miss this train, the world will make do without it and may force an undesired reality on the Jewish state.
The path forward requires patience, strategic thinking, and recognition that lasting regional stability emerges from careful construction of international agreements that address core security concerns while acknowledging political realities and rejecting hatred. Israel’s intervention in Syria to support the Druze may prove a strategic masterstroke or cautionary tale; the outcome largely depends on what happens next.
The author is a researcher and analyst in the regional program at MIND Israel, a strategic consulting nonprofit focused on national security issues.
This op-ed is published in partnership with a coalition of organizations that fight antisemitism across the world. Read the previous article by David Collier.