The head of Israel’s National Security Council, Tzachi Hanegbi, was quoted as saying that Syria and Lebanon are candidates for normalization with Israel. A few days later, reports surfaced of an alleged meeting between an NSC representative and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa during his visit to the United Arab Emirates. However, both sides denied the meeting had taken place.
Talk of normalization agreements with Arab and/or Muslim states has recently been voiced primarily by President Donald Trump, US envoy Steve Witkoff, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and others.
Following the Abraham Accords, the term “normalization” gained traction in political discourse and rhetoric, as it carried the promise of new and warm relations – unlike the “cold” peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan.
The use of the term “normalization” to describe potential relations with Syria and Lebanon may be misleading, as it suggests scenarios that currently seem beyond the horizon. A Syrian official told Al Jazeera that “statements regarding the signing of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria at present are premature. It is impossible to speak of negotiations on new agreements unless Israel fully commits to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement and withdraws from the areas it invaded.”
The contacts that have developed between Israel and Syria following the fall of the Assad regime and the rise to power of Sharaa in December 2024 are surprising for two main reasons: First, the organization led by Sharaa, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, is jihadist with a clear Islamist ideology that sees Israel and Zionism as enemies to be eradicated.
Second, Israel’s military response to the regime’s collapse – including the annulment of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, its seizure of the demilitarized zone, Mount Hermon, and other areas, as well as aid to the Druze – could have led to radicalization, heightened tensions, and hostility. However, the new regime adopted a moderate stance in both its statements and actions toward Israel. This included avoiding condemnation of Israel during its attack on Iran and tacitly permitting Israel Air Force overflights of Syrian airspace.
These moves strengthened the thinking that the regime’s radical image might no longer be relevant. The fact that Trump quickly met with Sharaa during his visit to Saudi Arabia and lifted sanctions on Syria also played a role.
A review of Israel-Syria relations
Nevertheless, a brief historical review of Israel-Syria relations reveals that although Syria was a staunch adversary – having fought four wars with Israel (1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982) – it engaged in negotiations with Israel on several occasions and even came close to signing a peace agreement.
Thus, after the War of Independence, a military officer named Husni al-Za’im, who seized power in 1949, proposed peace with Israel and the resettlement of half the Palestinian refugees in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from half of Lake Kinneret. Some view this episode as a missed historic opportunity, but Za’im was assassinated three months after taking power, and the initiative was never realized.
Another officer, Adib Shishakli, held talks with Israel in the 1950s, but they, too, did not materialize.
Conditions for an agreement ripened only after Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970 and following the Yom Kippur War. It was US secretary of state Henry Kissinger who succeeded in brokering the first (and last) disengagement agreement between the two countries in 1974 – a deal that held until recently.
More serious attempts at a peace agreement were made in the 1990s, after the Oslo Accords. The Assad regime conducted direct negotiations, with US mediation, with prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak. Barak came the closest to reaching an agreement – only a few dozen meters from the Kinneret shoreline separated the sides.
Under Bashar al-Assad as well, at least two serious attempts at an agreement were made: one during Ehud Olmert’s term and another during Netanyahu’s, just before the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. It is worth noting that there is historical evidence that Netanyahu, during his 1996 and 2010 terms, secretly expressed willingness to withdraw from the Golan Heights.
During the Syrian civil war (2011–2024), Israel maintained contacts with rebel organizations in southern Syria and with Druze representatives following the fall of the Assad regime.
Sharaa’s immediate interest is to put Syria on a path of reconstruction while addressing the concerns of minority groups (Kurds, Druze, and Alawites) and combating rogue jihadist factions. This process is only in its early stages. Stability and calm would attract significant investments and loans from the international community.
A realistic analysis suggests that full normalization with Israel could harm Sharaa’s legitimacy – which is in any case uncertain – especially if it entails conceding the Golan Heights. On the other hand, a limited agreement restoring the status quo would be viewed positively by Syrian public opinion. So far, contrary to expectations and public discourse in Israel, Syrian media has not focused much on the issue, though there are initial signs of preparing public opinion for the benefits of peace.
New types of normalization
A renewed security agreement between Israel and Syria – if achieved – could lead to a new kind of normalization.
To date, I have identified three types of normalization: first, behind-the-scenes contacts without a formal agreement, as with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman; second, formal ties primarily at the government level, such as with Egypt and Jordan – what we often refer to as a “cold peace”; and third, warmer relations that include engagement with civil society organizations, such as with Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain (the so-called “Abraham Accords”) – at least until the war.
The new type of normalization would be less than a peace agreement but would include a security arrangement potentially enabling covert cooperation on a range of shared regional interests vis-à-vis Iran and other mutual threats.
Such an agreement could lay the groundwork for an Abraham Accords-style normalization after a period of trust-building. One example of such confidence-building was the appearance of Shadi Martini, a Syrian businessman and political activist who was involved in humanitarian aid provided by Israel during the civil war, at the opening conference of the Knesset lobby for promoting a regional security arrangement, held last week.
Yet, the issue of the Golan Heights will remain contested: on one hand, peace with Egypt and Jordan entailed Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it captured in 1967, setting a precedent and creating expectations on the Arab side; on the other hand, since 1939 Syria has had to swallow the loss of Alexandretta to Turkey, yet this issue has not hindered the flourishing of relations between the two countries.
The Hamas attack of October 7 had many unintended consequences; the fall of the Assad regime was one of them. Any agreement between Israel and Syria would fall into that same category.
The writer teaches in the department of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a board member of Mitvim and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.