Hamas’s attack on October 7 was a manifestation of Israel’s failure on the intelligence, military, and political levels. What began as a war between two sides – Israel and Hamas – soon escalated into a multi-front conflict that also involved Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi’ite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and even Iran. Syria, though indirectly involved, was also part of this axis and did not escape the fallout of the campaign.
These actors were part of what they defiantly and proudly called the “Axis of Resistance” (Mihwar al-Muqawama in Arabic). Led by Iran, the axis’s ultimate goal was the elimination of Israel. However, assuming that this ambition is unrealistic, the more immediate objectives were at the very least to inflict military blows on Israel, diminish its influence on the regional and international stage, and – most importantly – to resolve the Palestinian issue.
But what began as a failure gradually turned into a success, albeit with varying degrees of achievement. Hezbollah suffered a severe blow and lost its chain of command, a development that led to a ceasefire, withdrawal from the border, and the beginning of a stabilization process in Lebanon’s political system. The campaign against the Houthis also yielded gains, although the group has neither been defeated nor ceased its attacks.
The confrontation with Iran has thus far resulted in impressive accomplishments. The American strike of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan further exposed Iran’s and its proxies’ weakness.
Ironically, it is against a relatively small and underestimated organization – Hamas – that Israel is struggling. Hamas continues to hold dozens of hostages and refuses to raise the white flag after 20 months of war.
The success is a result of Israel’s military and technological superiority over all members of the Axis of Resistance. However, it is also tied to a strategic decision to separate and isolate the various fronts, concentrating efforts on each theater individually at a given time. In this regard, had all members of the axis acted in coordination, the outcome would likely have been different.
The success also stems from unforeseen developments. One of the most unexpected outcomes of the war – rooted in a long process that began with the civil war – was the overthrow of the Assad regime and the rise of a Sunni-led government under Ahmed al-Sharaa, who views Shi’ite Iran as nothing less than an enemy.
This development led to Syria’s “defection” from the Axis of Resistance. Not only was a central and significant state removed from the axis, but Iran’s operational continuity in what was known as the “Shi’ite Crescent” was severed, dealing a severe blow to Hezbollah’s capacity to recover during the ongoing conflict.
The overall assessment is that the “Axis of Resistance” has taken a serious hit. In fact, Iran’s axis of proxies has become an axis of the weak: Hezbollah did not respond to the attack on Iran; the Shi’ite militias in Iraq remained outside the fighting; and the Houthis continued their largely ineffective rocket fire at Israel.
A severe blow does not necessarily mean a fatal or irreparable one. The problem lies in the fact that what is perceived as a resounding victory by one side is interpreted as a humiliation by the other – a deeply emotional dimension that the injured party will find difficult to accept and will therefore seek, sooner or later, to avenge.
Israel's shifting image in the Middle East
These outcomes are significant not only in terms of Israel’s national security but also with regard to its status and standing in the Middle East. In this context, Israel’s shifting image in the region carries great importance. While its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005 was perceived as a sign of weakness and as a victory for Hezbollah and Hamas, in the current war Israel is viewed as a regional power, while Iran is increasingly seen as a “paper tiger.”
Moreover, unlike the Palestinian issue – which tends to unite Arab and Islamic publics in opposition to Israel – Israel’s confrontation with Iran has garnered it supporters and partners, even if their backing is expressed primarily behind the scenes.
This partnership is based on two anchors: the first is a genuine fear over the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. This concern is shared primarily by the Gulf states, but also by all countries in the region that dread a nuclear arms race.
The second is the Sunni distaste – shared by Islamists as well – of the growing Shi’ite power in the Middle East. In this sense, Israel is essentially “doing the dirty work,” as the German chancellor put it, on behalf of all the actors in the Middle East who seek the elimination of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and the weakening of Shi’ite influence.
Collapse of the Axis of Resistance
The collapse of the Axis of Resistance is undoubtedly good news for Israel and for the countries that have signed peace and normalization agreements with it. The question now is how to leverage this achievement into the consolidation and institutionalization of a regional coalition.
The answer is closely tied to ending the war in Gaza – a front that has now been pushed to the margins but remains central to Israel’s regional standing and to the way its coalition partners perceive it.
Naturally, the government may wish to bask in the successes against Iran rather than remain bogged down in the Gaza quagmire. Yet hubris is not a policy, as we have already witnessed in the aftermath of the Six Day War. Moreover, if the prevailing view until now was that each arena should be dealt with separately, it seems the current imperative is to connect the fronts.
If October 7 ultimately led to a war against Iran, then the war against Iran must now lead to the closing of the circle by “eliminating the traces of aggression” from October 7. This term was coined by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser after the Six Day War, but it may be no less relevant to the present moment.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is a board member of Mitvim and a member of the Coalition for Regional Security.