Still, the most revolutionary step in the overhaul has always been amending the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. In recent weeks, under the public radar due to the public’s attention being on the hostage deal, the Levin-Sa’ar framework has been progressing through hearings in the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee and is expected to be ratified within weeks.
Although it is less extreme than Justice Minister Yariv Levin’s original plan, the framework still poses a real threat to Israel’s democracy. The primary reason is its outcome: the complete politicization of judicial appointments. The committee will no longer function as a professional body, and judicial appointments to the Supreme Court and the lower courts will become highly political.
Under the proposed framework, Bar Association representatives would be replaced by coalition- and opposition-appointed lawyers, and a seat would be reserved for an opposition MK. In practice, this would result in a committee comprising four coalition representatives and two opposition representatives. The framework eliminates the current supermajority requirement for appointing Supreme Court justices and replaces it with mutual veto power for the coalition and opposition. This means the coalition would only need one additional opposition vote to block a judicial appointment. If no agreement is reached for over a year regarding a Supreme Court appointment, each side would be able to make, once per term, appointments unilaterally. In other words, the delicate professional and political balance that currently characterizes the judicial selection process would become entirely political.
Supporters of the framework claim that this ensures balance in appointments. However, a “deal” based solely on political considerations – without transparency regarding possible backroom promises in exchange for judicial appointments – is still a political deal. Professional considerations will inevitably be sidelined in favor of political ones. The result will be a polarized and less professional judiciary. In Israel, where the Supreme Court handles thousands of criminal and civil appeals annually, this would be particularly damaging. Judicial independence would be compromised, and public trust in the courts would erode.
Additionally, the proposed opposition veto could be more harmful than beneficial. One need only imagine a highly combative opposition effectively preventing all judicial appointments. Every single judicial appointment in Israel would require the consent of an opposition representative. Thus, strengthening the opposition’s role in the committee is not a magic solution. It is important to reserve an opposition seat, but granting a veto over every appointment in every lower court could backfire.
It is true that the law will come into effect only in the next Knesset. However, this framework benefits both political sides, giving them endless opportunities for political nominations. Expecting politicians to relinquish their power over judicial appointments in the future is naïve. Politicians rarely give up power, even if they initially opposed the framework. Hoping for such a reversal is one thing, but relying on it is unrealistic.
Therefore, this amendment in its current form should be blocked immediately, as it will only become more difficult later. Reaching a compromise is not impossible (for example, the one that President Isaac Herzog proposed). But the current proposal is not a compromise; it is a bad framework that will ruin the only independent “check” in Israel’s democratic system.■
Amir Fuchs is a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute.
