In 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022, major protests in Iran shook the Islamic regime but were put down by a combination of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij stormtroopers willing to beat and kill their fellow citizens without a second thought.
The coming days will likely dictate whether the ongoing protests – which began on December 28 – will finally be the wave that drowns Khameni’s 36-year rule or whether the demonstrators will meet the same fate as in prior rounds.
There have been two major advantages for the protesters this time, as opposed to prior rounds.
One is that the regime’s military power is at a decades-long low.
After Israel attacked Tehran in June 2025, Khamenei not only lost most of his nuclear program, but also half of his ballistic missiles, 80% of his air defense, and over 30 top military and IRGC commanders. The IRGC and the Basij also took specific hits from the IDF in the final days of the campaign.
This included striking the infamous Evin prison, facilitating some prisoners' fleeing, and forcing the Islamic Republic to relocate 1,500 prisoners elsewhere.
Finally, Khamenei himself hid for much of the war, harming his brand of having absolute control.
In that sense, Khamenei is at his weakest militarily, having lost many assets of repressive power, and psychologically, regarding his perceived status.
The second is that the protests have been spurred on by broad economic problems which impact all Iranians, including the regime’s Shiite supporters and the bazaar merchants – traditionally viewed as an influential collective in political trends.
This is as opposed to some protests which involved mainly Sunnis, Kurds, reformers and other minorities, and weaker critics of the regime.
People are protesting high fuel prices, inflation, and a lack of running water.
In other words, no one really disagrees with the arguments of the protesters or considers their complaints invalid.
Possibly because of all of the above factors, while Khamenei has started to use some IRGC and Basij oppression, to date, crackdowns have not yet reached the viciousness of earlier protest periods.
Despite these positives, there are plenty of reasons to think that the chances of regime change are even smaller this time than in some prior protests.
No central leader
The current protests have no central leader or figures.
This makes it difficult to achieve a specific outcome.
Merely protesting in public with no defined end goal and no specific program to reach it is usually a recipe for not achieving much.
Further, the protests, while widespread, have been relatively small.
There have been no protests yet of hundreds of thousands or even close to that.
There is little potential for protests to achieve regime change, if they don’t reach the hundreds of thousands or more level, as some prior rounds did.
Protesters need to start reaching much higher numbers in the coming days if they want a real chance to topple the regime and to maintain momentum.
Next, paradoxically, the war with Israel, or its aftermath, may have strengthened Khamenei’s hand.
There really was a brief moment after the war ended on June 24, 2025, when Khamenei and his supporters were terrified that they might lose control.
Had the world and the Iranian nation taken advantage of that moment, Khamenei might have been much weaker.
But when Khamenei saw that no one, global or domestic, was seeking to topple him, he ordered one of the widest and most brutal crackdowns in years.
Many regime opponents were killed, beaten, or detained indefinitely.
This is likely one of the reasons there is no central leader this time.
Many of the figures who might have taken charge were dealt with by Khamenei this past summer, immediately after the war.
No one came to their aid in those critical moments.
Moreover, while having the bazaar involved in the protests is helpful, this is not the first time they have helped with demonstrations, and there have been other times that this did not turn the tide.
Instead, the protesters would need elements of the Iranian military to defect to their side of the conflict in order to protect them from crackdowns by the IRGC and the Basij.
All signs after a recent speech from Khamenei, who waited out the first week before commenting publicly, are that a crackdown is on the way.
It seems he wanted to size up and analyze the protests, as well as show some flexibility and sympathy to the economic anger underlying them, before launching his crackdown.
If he launches the crackdown now, and if some Iranian military elements finally defect to help protesters for the first time since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, those actions could be decisive.
There is a twist with recent comments by US President Donald Trump that he would intervene if Iran starts cracking down on its protesters, and some are taking this seriously after he bombed the Islamic Republic in June 2025 and abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro on Saturday.
But those excited by Trump’s statement should recall December 29, when he was asked about the chances of regime change, and he implied that they were low because he expected Khamenei to crack down on the protesters – giving no hint that he would intervene.
Yes, Trump ordered the bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites this past June.
But that was when Israel was doing the lion’s share of the work, including eliminating Iranian radar and air defenses.
Israel has no plans to intervene for Iranian regime change, so Trump would be on his own this time, risking American lives against an enemy far more formidable than Maduro and Venezuela.
Also, right or wrong, Trump has framed his conflict with Venezuela as a counterstrike in a quiet, steady drug war that it and other Latin American countries are conducting with the United States.
In contrast, Trump has run in the other direction any time someone mentioned helping build democracy or nation-building in the Middle East.
It is hard to see him using sufficient and sustained US power to prevent the regime from a domestic crackdown within its own territory.
All of this makes the coming days critical for the protests.
Either they will increase in size, focus, leadership, and gain some kind of military support, or they will likely begin taking a much harsher hit from the regime, which will cap their size and momentum, eventually leading to them petering out like prior protests, even if that process may take time.
ize, focus, leadership, and gain some kind of military support, or they will likely start taking a much harsher hit from the regime, which will cap their size and momentum, and eventually lead to them petering out like prior protests, even if that process may take time.