Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf chose Sunday to stand at the Majles (Iranian Parliament) podium and warned that parliament may be “forced” to initiate impeachment proceedings against President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet if the government fails to curb runaway prices.
The warning came against the country’s bleak economic and environmental backdrop. The rial continues to slide, the dams and reservoirs are dry, air pollution is at disastrous levels, the cost of basic goods has surged as inflation has continually increased, and public discontent is palpable throughout Iran.
After expressing thanks for urgently-needed rainfall to quench the Iran’s drought, the speaker stated, “What is more important for us to address today are the concerns and anxieties of the people regarding the runaway rise in the prices of basic livelihood goods, especially the increase in the prices of foreign currency and gold, which constitute either part of the reasons for, or pretexts behind, these price hikes. Therefore, the Majles will pursue this issue seriously.”
Ghalibaf said, “It is self-evident that if these measures do not yield results, then in order to achieve the fastest resolution with the least tension, priority will be given to cabinet reshuffling by the government. And if the necessary reforms are not carried out by the government, representatives will be compelled to initiate the impeachment process.”
But can Iran actually impeach its president? And if Pezeshkian were to fall, would it change anything at all?
Impeachment in Iran does not resemble the American model.
The Majles cannot simply remove a president through a single vote. What it can do is summon the president for questioning, block any legislation the government tries to pass, and, most importantly, impeach individual ministers. In practice, sustained parliamentary pressure can paralyze a presidency, reducing its government to a hollow vessel until it becomes politically untenable and elections are needed.
In extreme cases, a president can be removed, but only with the backing of the judiciary and, ultimately, the approval of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In today’s Islamic Republic, talks of impeachment against a president are more of a warning than a legitimate political course of action. However, earlier this year, in March, Iran’s parliament voted to impeach and remove Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati from office, so there is a recent precedent. There was also a push by hardliners in Iran’s Parliament in October to impeach Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi, Roads and Urban Planning Minister Farzaneh Sadegh, Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri, and Labor Minister Ahmad Maydari.
Ghalibaf’s comments are significant not because Pezeshkian is about to be removed tomorrow, but because of who is applying pressure and why.
Is Pezeshkian really to blame?
Pezeshkian is not the architect of Iran’s economic disasters. He does not control foreign policy, Iran’s nuclear program, or the continued siphoning of Iranian assets that have long propped up terror groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis, which have drained Iran’s resources. He does not command the Revolutionary Guards’ vast economic empire, nor does he dictate sanctions-defying strategies that have repeatedly backfired.
Those decisions lie with Khamenei.
Iran’s president works within a tightly constrained system. Pezeshkian may speak the language of reform and moderation, but he remains a figurehead navigating red lines drawn by others. When policies fail, it is politically convenient to target the government, but nearly impossible to attack Khamenei for the government’s failings.
It is a paradox of the Islamic Republic and its dual system of politics.
The talk of impeachment seems to be an attempt by the Majles to channel public anger away from the system itself and instead toward disposable politicians.
The problem is that nobody is buying it. Nobody is convinced, knowing that the real decisions and real power lie behind Khamenei. Iran has often tried to convince those on the outside that there are “reformists” in the government, possibly even holding the office of the president itself, but “reformists” inside Iran and outside Iran have two very different definitions.
What happens next?
In the short term, Pezeshkian is likely to reshuffle his cabinet, offering ministers up as sacrifices to appease parliament and buy time. The Majles is likely to continue its rhetoric, and hardliners will keep waving the banner of impeachment. And above it all, Khamenei will keep a close watch on proceedings.
Whether Pezeshkian survives politically doesn’t matter anymore. There is a deeper problem within Iran, and making the president the fall guy may be a public attempt to divert the blame, but everyone in Iran knows the true cause of their problems.