Since the end of the 12-Day War between Israel and Iran in June, the Islamic Republic’s leadership has repeatedly sent out the message that the ceasefire with Israel is little more than a brief reprieve, to be resumed at a later date.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei set the tone in mid-July, warning that Iran remained fully prepared for renewed confrontation and could hit Israel “even harder” than during the 12-Day War should hostilities resume.
His message was reinforced by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who cautioned that any further Israeli or American strike would trigger a “more decisive” Iranian response. A response, Araghchi stressed, that would be impossible to obscure or downplay.
Iran’s senior military and political establishment soon sharpened the message. In August, Mohammad Reza Aref, Iran’s First Vice President, described the post-war situation not as a meaningful ceasefire but merely a “cessation of hostilities,” warning that a new war with Israel could erupt “at any moment.”
Top army officers echoed the same view, insisting that the current quiet is temporary and urging Iran to adopt a more offensive posture in expectation of renewed fighting. Perhaps the loudest voice has been that of Maj.-Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, Khamenei’s influential military adviser, who declared repeatedly that Iran is “not in a ceasefire but in a stage of war.”
He predicted that another confrontation with Israel was likely and has stated that the Islamic Republic must duly prepare its missile and drone capabilities. All of this, coming from within the Supreme Leader’s circle, presents an Iranian narrative that war with Israel has not yet ended, that there is more to come, and that Tehran will be ready.
Concurrently, the domestic situation in Iran is verging on untenable. The country is facing one of its worst modern water crises. At the same time, inflation remains crushingly high.. Food prices have soared, and unemployment continues to climb.
Add to this widespread power outages, and general discontentment with the rule of the ayatollahs, coupled with growing public anger over corruption and mismanagement, and Iran’s internal pressures are close to reaching a breaking point.
So while its leaders pose for another confrontation abroad, things seem to be collapsing internally. Is there a chance that Iran could see war with Israel as a way out? Is it possible that the ayatollahs could use conflict to distract a dissatisfied population to maintain power? To “wag the dog” or “rally around the flag” as it is known?
"One of the lessons [the Iranians] have to learn from the 12-Day War is that on the one hand, we certainly saw some kind of rally around the flag during the war, although it was more about being mobilized around Iranian nationalism and patriotism due to the fact that Israel and the United States initiated a strike against Iran," according to Dr. Raz Zimmt, Director of the Iran and the Shiite Axis research program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
"Having said that, even after the war, they couldn't really provide solutions to the very difficult challenges the Islamic Republic is dealing with. If it was very difficult for the Iranian regime to mobilize the population, even after a war initiated by Israel and the United States, I would assume that they realize by now that it's going to be even more difficult to mobilize the population in case of a preemptive attack initiated by Iran itself.
"Even after the war, we immediately saw how most Iranians went back to dealing with ordinary difficulties and shortages of water and the economic crisis. So war doesn't provide any solution. On the contrary, what we actually saw was more and more criticism inside Iran of the shortcomings and the incompetence of the regime to deal with the daily problems in Iran. In addition, they have to concentrate right now mostly on rebuilding their capacities, particularly in aerial defense and ballistic missile capabilities.
'It's going to be very difficult for Iran to trigger a war'
"And as long as they don't do that, it's going to be very difficult for Iran to trigger a war. It's very risky,” Zimmt told The Jerusalem Post. “So we're still left in a situation where the main concern would be either some kind of miscalculation between Iran and Israel, which means that neither side really wants to engage in a war. The likelihood for a decision by Iran to carry out a preemptive attack out of nowhere seems to be very, very unlikely."
And what about the larger role of geopolitics in the Middle East? With increased talk of normalization between Saudi Arabia, long a Sunni enemy to Shi’ite Iran, and Israel, or a resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, is it possible that such a scenario could emerge that pushes Iran into a corner?
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated on Tuesday that he would like his country to be part of the Abraham Accords, but also make sure to secure a path to a two-state solution, during his meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House
Trump ALSO addressed Saudi-Israeli normalization, saying he spoke with the crown prince about the Abraham Accords and that he received a positive response.
“I certainly think that [the Iranians] consider normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a very negative scenario,” Zimmt explained. “But it's nothing that could make them make a decision which could trigger a new round of war, certainly not in a situation where they're still not fully prepared for that.
Regarding Hezbollah, Zimmt stated that, “[Iran] certainly continues to try and rebuild Hezbollah. I don't see Iran retaliating to any Israeli decision to engage in a limited war against Hezbollah, even if that involves some kind of attacks against Hezbollah infrastructures in the Beqaa Valley or even in Beirut. What Iran will do is to increase, as much as possible, its support for Hezbollah."
Despite Israel’s military success against both Iran and Hezbollah, and the fall of Iran-ally Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria last December which removed an ally directly positioned on Israel’s border and allowed a smuggling route through to Lebanon, a November 6, US Treasury report stated that, “Since January 2025, the US-designated Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) has transferred over $1 billion to Hizbollah, mostly through money exchange companies.”
“Lebanon has an opportunity to be free, prosperous, and secure—but that can only happen if Hizballah (sic) is fully disarmed and cut off from Iran’s funding and control,” said US Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley in the report.
"The balance of power between state and non-state actors in the region, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, is still a balance of power which provides Iran with opportunities to continue its efforts to support its so-called Axis of Resistance," Zimmt told the Post.
"We should not overestimate Iran's capabilities. We shouldn't have done that before the war, but certainly today, after two years of regional war and the defeat of Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime, and the 12-Day War with Iran. But the Iranian threat is very much still there. The nuclear program has not been obliterated, and the missile capabilities are being reconstituted. And Iran's support for its allies is still going on, so we still have to deal with that."
Down but not out seems to be the message. Whilst Israelis may not lie awake at night awaiting the next barrage of ballistic missiles from the Islamic Republic, that is not to say it won’t come. Israel did considerable damage to Iran’s military and nuclear installations in the June war, and after the shock of October 7, it has done much to regain its military reputation. But the threats still remain, and as long as the ayatollahs can hold on to power in Iran, they will see Israel as the eternal enemy.