Iran’s vociferous reaction to the US-brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal and Washington’s exclusive development rights to the Zangezur corridor reveal, yet again, the complicated interactions of strategic concerns and regional influences that dominate this part of the world.
The Zangezur corridor, now renamed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” after the US president brokered a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, is more than a simple transit route. For Iran, this 99-year US lease arrangement fundamentally alters the strategic balance in the South Caucasus, a region Tehran considers within its traditional sphere of influence.
The corridor would connect mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia, effectively bypassing both Iran and Russia, two powers that have historically mediated disputes in the area and maintained significant influence over regional connectivity.
The route will be operated according to Armenian law, and the United States will sublease the land to a consortium for infrastructure and management, the officials said.
Armenia and Azerbaijan have fought two conflicts, plus several minor skirmishes, over the Azeri region of Nagorno-Karabakh, with the last major flashpoint in September 2023, when Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive against the self-declared breakaway state of Artsakh, a move seen as a violation of the ceasefire agreement signed in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
Iran’s Foreign Ministry has adopted a measured but firm stance, welcoming the peace agreement in principle while setting clear red lines. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei emphasized Iran’s expectation to be consulted on developments affecting its interests, announcing high-level consultations with Armenia beginning Monday.
The ministry’s position reflects Tehran’s attempt to balance diplomatic engagement with strategic opposition, stressing that any regional projects must proceed “within the framework of mutual interests, with respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and without foreign interference.”
The response from Ali Bagheri Kani, secretary of Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations, stated, “The Islamic Republic will not easily overlook the issue of Zangezur.” The Strategic Council is responsible for formulating foreign policy strategies, and its members are appointed directly by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Bagheri Kani’s characterization of US involvement as “a challenge to regional security” highlights Tehran’s view that this development crosses established redlines in the region.
Iran poses unilateral threats in response to the Zangezur corridor's establishment
THE MOST aggressive response has emerged from figures directly connected to Khamenei. Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s senior adviser, issued what amounts to a direct threat, stating that Iran would stop the corridor’s establishment “even without Moscow’s help” and warning that “this passage will not become a gateway for [US President Donald] Trump’s mercenaries; it will become their graveyard.” Such language from Khamenei’s inner circle suggests Iran views this as a fundamental challenge to its position.
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has also responded dramatically. In a statement titled “Aliyev and Pashinyan on Zelensky’s Road to Misery,” IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani provided perhaps the most revealing analysis of Iran’s strategic thinking.
His comparison of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whom he accuses of inviting NATO into Russia’s security zone and precipitating conflict, reveals how Iran frames this development within broader great power competition. Javani’s warning that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan risk “similar consequences” by “provoking Iran, Russia, China, and India” positions the corridor dispute within Iran’s preferred narrative of resistance to Western expansion.
While Moscow said it supported the summit in Washington between the US, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, it proposed “implementing solutions developed by the countries of the region themselves with the support of their immediate neighbors – Russia, Iran, and Turkey” to avoid what it called the “sad experience” of Western efforts to mediate in the Middle East.
The hardline Iranian newspaper Kayhan, operating under the supreme leader’s supervision, has gone the furthest in suggesting concrete retaliation. Its proposal that Iran “invoke the Geneva and Jamaica conventions to ban the passage of US- and Israeli-affiliated vessels through the Strait of Hormuz” is a warning of significant escalation, linking the Zangezur issue to Iran’s ability to disrupt global oil flows through the Persian Gulf, one of the country’s most potent economic levers of leverage.
Iran’s opposition stems partly from geographic realities. The country currently serves as a crucial transit route between Russia and Armenia and hosts significant trade flows in the region. A US-controlled corridor bypassing Iranian territory would diminish Tehran’s economic leverage and strategic importance in regional connectivity projects.
IRAN’S RESPONSE must also be understood within the context of its broader strategic competition with the United States. Not only was Iran completely dominated by America’s military power during the brief conflict with Israel, but Tehran also views the corridor as part of Washington’s effort to establish a permanent foothold in a region traditionally dominated by Iran, Russia, and Turkey.
The exclusion of Russia from the mediation process, despite Moscow’s historical role and its border guards stationed on the Armenia-Iran border, helps to reinforce Iran’s perception that this represents a Western attempt to reshape regional power structures.
The Iranian response also shows the concerns within the country about the broader future for regional alliances. Iran’s emphasis on consultation with “neighboring countries” and its stress on avoiding “foreign interference” suggest Tehran fears the precedent of external powers gaining long-term strategic positions in the region without consulting traditional stakeholders.
However, despite the aggressive rhetoric from various Iranian officials, the Islamic Republic faces significant constraints on its ability to effectively oppose the corridor project.
Iran’s relationship with Armenia, while generally positive, provides limited leverage to prevent Yerevan’s participation in the US-brokered deal. Armenia’s decision likely shows its own calculations about balancing between local powers and securing economic benefits.
Iran’s current economic situation, complicated by international sanctions and domestic challenges, such as a failing water system, limits its ability to offer alternative economic incentives that could compete with US investment and development promises.
Too aggressive a response could also risk isolating Iran from both Armenia and Azerbaijan, the latter of which has a very strong relationship with Israel, potentially pushing it further toward Western alignment rather than preventing the corridor’s development.
Iran’s multi-layered response to the Zangezur corridor development reveals a country struggling to deal with what it perceives as a significant strategic setback. The range of responses, from diplomatic consultation to direct threats, would seem to suggest internal debates within the country about how best to respond while maintaining regional influence.
The escalatory nature of rhetoric from figures closest to Khamenei, while not surprising and in line with Iran’s harsh rhetoric but weakened reality, would indicate that Tehran views this development as more than a simple economic or infrastructure project. Instead, the upper echelons appear to see it as part of a broader Western strategy to diminish Iranian influence in its sphere of influence.
However, the gap between rhetorical escalation and concrete action capabilities may limit Iran’s ability to effectively prevent the corridor’s development. The challenge for Iranian leaders will be maintaining an apparent credible opposition while avoiding actions that could further isolate the country or provoke a larger confrontation with the United States and its regional partners.