In recent weeks, Lebanon’s government, led by President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, has repeatedly called for direct talks with Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed the shift, saying, “In light of Lebanon’s repeated requests to open direct negotiations with Israel, I have instructed the cabinet to begin such talks as soon as possible,” less than a week ago. While Netanyahu stressed there is no ceasefire in Lebanon, Lebanese officials appear to be relying on negotiations to secure one.
The talks were held for the first time in the United States, bringing together Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, and Lebanon’s ambassador, Nada Hamadeh Mouawad, under American mediation. This marks the first open, direct negotiations between the two countries since the 1980s, aside from the indirect maritime agreement in 2022. A sense of cautious optimism emerged from the meeting, with the Israeli ambassador describing the discussions as “excellent” and conducted in a “very positive atmosphere,” adding that both sides are aligned on the need to free Lebanon from Hezbollah.
The key question is why Lebanon, which until recently boycotted Israel, labeled it an enemy and avoided any form of public engagement, is now actively seeking direct talks. The answer, in short, is a desire for a ceasefire and growing fears that the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah could escalate further, threatening Lebanon’s already fragile state.
It is important to note that, beyond the Shi’ite community, much of Lebanon’s political establishment and broader public do not view Hezbollah as a priority worth defending. In fact, weakening Hezbollah aligns with the interests of both the Lebanese state and much of its population. Southern Lebanon has already suffered extensive destruction, but it has long been neglected by successive governments and holds limited importance for the country’s elite. However, as Israeli strikes have expanded to Beirut and warnings have been issued about targeting strategic sites across Lebanon, leaders in Beirut appear to have concluded that an immediate ceasefire is necessary, not out of sympathy for Israel or its northern residents, but out of concern for the country’s survival.
Two fundamentally different approaches
Lebanon is already grappling with a severe socio-economic crisis, and the war, sparked by Hezbollah’s decision to join the conflict in October 2023, has caused widespread devastation in the south, heavy casualties, and significant internal displacement toward Beirut and the north. The Lebanese leadership, including Aoun, Salam, and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, hopes to restore state sovereignty, curb or weaken Hezbollah, end the fighting, and secure international assistance. They view direct negotiations as a way to separate the Lebanese state from Hezbollah and prevent total collapse. Hezbollah, led by Naim Qassem, has strongly opposed the talks, calling them a “humiliating surrender.”
Two fundamentally different approaches are now evident. From Israel’s perspective, Netanyahu has emphasized that negotiations should focus on disarming Hezbollah and potentially achieving a historic agreement, rejecting the idea of a ceasefire as a precondition. In contrast, Lebanese officials insist the talks are solely aimed at securing a ceasefire, nothing more. Normalization with Israel has not been raised on their side.
A preliminary security arrangement may still be within reach. The core disputes are relatively limited, with Lebanon seeking a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, and adjustments to existing border demarcations. Around 13 to 14 disputed points remain along the land border, including Rosh Hanikra, the Shebaa Farms, Mount Dov, and the village of Ghajar. While not an immediate priority, these issues could resurface in later stages of negotiations.
From the perspective of someone familiar with Lebanon’s internal dynamics, there is a segment of the population that supports normalization with Israel, while others hope Israel will help free them from Hezbollah’s influence, as they believe occurred during the 1982 Lebanon War. However, the outcomes of that period, and the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel, remain a cautionary tale.
Israel, the argument goes, must approach these negotiations differently. Even if Hezbollah is the primary adversary, the Lebanese state ultimately bears responsibility for its actions. One proposal is that Israel should demand compensation from Lebanon for damages caused by Hezbollah in recent conflicts, both as a matter of accountability and as a deterrent.
More critically, Israel should insist that Lebanon formally designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. While dismantling the group may be beyond the Lebanese government’s immediate capabilities, issuing such a designation would be a significant step. Without it, the argument concludes, negotiations risk becoming an exercise in ambiguity, allowing Lebanon to maintain a dual approach, something its adversaries have historically exploited.