Voices from the Arab press: Hezbollah in state of crisis, Strait of Hormuz paralyzed

One of the enduring complexities of war is that its defining concepts often only take shape after it ends.

This latter claim, though bold, is overly optimistic. Fundamentalist ideology is not easily eradicated; it can be weakened, contained, and even crushed, but declaring the imminent arrival of a post-Islamist era is premature.

The intellectual roots of this idea are closely associated with sociologist Asef Bayat, whose work on post-Islamism suggests that Islamist movements can evolve under pressure into more pragmatic, civil, and institutionally integrated actors.

Bayat argues that post-Islamism reflects a process of disengagement from rigid ideological frameworks while maintaining religion as a component of public life, combined with a degree of secularization in governance.

He traces early signs of this shift in Iran’s urban life during the 1990s, particularly in Tehran, where social and cultural transformations challenged the austere, exclusionary Islamist model and produced a more open, modern urban identity.

Yet this thesis has not held up.

First, it rests on an overly detached reading of reality: hopes that movements like Iran’s Green Revolution would usher in such a transformation proved unfounded, while Islamist organizations that splintered from groups like al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood have continued to expand rather than recede.

Second, fundamentalism is no longer confined to theory or activism – it has reached positions of power.

Assuming its disappearance risks weakening the resolve of governments that have invested in confronting it.

Speaking of a post-Islamist phase may even shift attention away from the ongoing struggle, allowing such movements to regroup.

The current war may slow the momentum of fundamentalist forces, particularly as they openly celebrate instability in developing states and seek to replicate the collapse seen in countries they once controlled.

The move was particularly striking given Hezbollah’s awareness of its own weakened position.

Its military capabilities have significantly deteriorated, its supply lines through Syria have been disrupted, and its operational effectiveness has declined.

For more than a year, it largely absorbed Israeli strikes without meaningful response, only to escalate when Iran’s interests demanded it – an act that appears closer to self-destruction than strategy.

This sense of disorder extends beyond the battlefield to Hezbollah’s internal discourse.

The organization no longer maintains a coherent narrative capable of persuading its own constituency, as contradictions in its messaging and the consequences of its decisions become increasingly visible.

At the same time, its security vulnerabilities have been exposed, with deep Israeli intelligence penetration undermining its image of strength.

The gap between rhetoric and reality has widened: a movement that once insisted that “actions speak louder than words” now faces expanding Israeli control over Lebanese territory and growing displacement of civilians.

Unable to provide convincing answers to its supporters about the devastation it has caused – destruction, casualties, displacement, and the possibility that many may never return home – Hezbollah has resorted to deflection.

Rather than acknowledging responsibility, it channels public anger toward critics, political opponents, media outlets, and dissenting voices within its own community.

This behavior reflects more than a temporary crisis; it signals a deeper collapse in its narrative and purpose.

The ongoing war has exposed a troubling escalation of division within Arab public opinion, as political disagreements devolve into unproductive and hostile exchanges.

No party benefits more from this fragmentation than Israel, which stands to gain from weakening the very concept of a unified Arab sphere and deepening tensions among its societies.

Preventing this outcome requires a conscious effort to focus on shared interests rather than internal disputes.

The situation is undeniably complex.

Sympathy for the Iranian people is understandable, given decades of repression, economic hardship, and political upheaval under a restrictive regime.

Opposing US-Israeli military action against Iran does not, however, necessitate support for the mullah regime, which has suppressed its population and interfered in the affairs of neighboring states.

Similarly, solidarity with Gulf countries does not imply alignment with Israel, but, rather, reflects recognition of shared Arab interests and the deep cultural, economic, and social ties that bind the region.

Hostile rhetoric from commentators on all sides should not be mistaken for the prevailing sentiment among Arab populations, which remains broadly supportive of mutual respect and cooperation.

The political and economic situation is already precarious, and further division only exacerbates the risks.

At a time when stability is under threat, allowing social media disputes to define relationships between Arab societies would be a strategic mistake.

The era of “strategic patience” in the Strait of Hormuz has come to an end.

With the waterway effectively paralyzed by Iran’s blockade, the international community faces a defining choice: either form a decisive coalition to reopen the passage or accept that the age of secure global trade is over.

The stakes are immense.

The strait carries roughly 20 million barrels of oil per day – about a quarter of global seaborne oil trade – and previously saw more than 150 ships transit daily, the vast majority of them oil tankers and container vessels.

Since the escalation, traffic has collapsed.

On March 11, only five tankers departed the region, while hundreds remain stranded in the gulf, and multiple vessels have been attacked, resulting in casualties among crews.

Major energy companies have been forced to halt production or declare force majeure due to their inability to export supplies.

Alternative routes, such as pipelines to the Red Sea, can only handle a fraction of normal volumes.

The consequences have rippled across the global economy: oil prices briefly surged to $125 per barrel, gas shortages emerged in several countries, fertilizer prices rose sharply, and food inflation intensified.

Iran, which is not a signatory to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, rejects the principle of unrestricted transit passage and instead asserts its right to regulate shipping under the concept of “innocent passage,” allowing it to stop and inspect vessels it deems a security threat.

While the strait remains legally open, it has become functionally inaccessible due to missile attacks, drone strikes, and naval mines, compounded by Iran’s demand that ships obtain prior permission to pass – widely seen as a violation of international law.

The crisis extends far beyond Washington.

More than 80% of the oil flowing through the strait is destined for Asia, making the disruption a direct threat to economies such as India, China, Japan, and South Korea, all of which face mounting energy pressures and potential recession risks.

The broader implication is clear: if emerging powers in Asia and the Global South remain passive under the banner of neutrality, they forfeit any moral authority to challenge future disruptions to global trade.