The United Nations Security Council has formally approved the Gaza stabilization plan originally drafted under the Trump administration, a roadmap based on a phased ceasefire, deployment of an International Stabilization Force, and the complete demilitarization of Hamas.
The framework assumes that armed groups in Gaza will eventually agree to disarm in exchange for reconstruction, political guarantees, and international oversight.
Hamas’ response was immediate and categorical: It will not hand over its weapons.
That rejection comes as Israeli and international media outlets quote unnamed security sources claiming Hamas has already begun shifting sophisticated weapons from Gaza to Yemen and parts of Africa “in the final weeks of the ceasefire,” allegedly to preserve its military capabilities before any stabilization force takes hold.
Egyptian officials and analysts dismiss these claims as “geographically and technically absurd.” Others argue that Hamas does maintain overseas stockpiles, but that these were built gradually over the years, not rushed out during the latest pause in fighting. For Israel, the very existence of such networks is proof that Hamas is not committed to any ceasefire framework at all.
To unpack this, The Media Line spoke with Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies and the Misgav Institute, and a retired Egyptian Brigadier.
Why Hamas rejects UN plan and prepares for possible 'next massacre'
Gen. Samir Ragheb, president of the Arab Foundation for Development and Strategic Studies, and Italian security analyst Daniele Garofalo, who has studied Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad networks for years.
Their insights point to a common conclusion: The UN-approved plan is entering a landscape where trust is minimal, narratives are conflicting, and Hamas’ intentions are deeply contested.
For Daniele Garofalo, Hamas’ rejection of the UN plan and of disarmament was entirely predictable.
“On the question of disarmament, I had no doubts. Neither Hamas nor Islamic Jihad has any intention of losing its control over Gaza, and for them, armed struggle is the only way to maintain strong authority. Hamas will do everything possible to avoid disarming, even at the expense of the civilian population,” he said.
He argued that the group sees its weapons not only as a tool of resistance but as the foundation of its political hold on the Strip.
“For Hamas, giving up its arsenal would mean accepting that its leverage over Gaza, Israel, and the broader region disappears. In their logic, the armed struggle is the guarantee of relevance; that is why they are so determined to preserve it,” he added.
Kobi Michael was equally skeptical that the UN-backed framework could succeed as long as Hamas remains central to Gaza’s power structure.
He noted that while Washington is investing heavily in diplomatic pressure and regional coalitions, the basic assumption that Hamas can be induced into a demilitarized political arrangement is flawed.
“The Americans still believe they can implement the plan by having the Turks, Qataris, and Egyptians pressure Hamas. They are convinced that with an international force and Arab involvement, Hamas will eventually comply. I think this is naive and wrong. Hamas does not intend to comply,” he said.
For Michael, Hamas’ behavior during and after the fighting shows that it sees any ceasefire not as an end state, but as a tactical pause.
“They continued recruiting people, training them, rebuilding tunnels, and reconstructing their capacities from the first day of the ceasefire. They butchered opponents in the streets, they appointed new governors, and they operated ministries. They are reconstituting their governmental and military capacities since day one. This is not the behavior of a movement preparing for demilitarization,” he added.
He was blunt about the prospects of the current ceasefire framework.
“As long as Hamas remains in control and is committed to another Oct. 7, the American ceasefire framework will not get anywhere. You cannot build a stable peace with a partner that openly prepares for the next massacre. At some point, the United States will have to recognize that Hamas is the obstacle, not part of the solution,” he noted.
That, he said, will force Washington toward what he calls Plan B.
“Israel has to give the Americans the time and space to try their way, so that the responsibility for the failure of the plan falls on Hamas. But in the end, I believe they will move to Plan B, securing the eastern Gaza Strip under IDF oversight, expanding it gradually to the west while crushing and dismantling Hamas if it continues to violate the agreement,” he added.
Alongside the political debate over disarmament runs a technical, highly charged question: Did Hamas move weapons out of Gaza during the latest ceasefire?
Israeli media, quoting security officials, say yes, pointing to an alleged acceleration of smuggling toward Yemen and African countries as international discussions on Hamas’ disarmament intensified.
Michael believed some of these movements could indeed have taken place in the recent period, and that Israeli data on smuggling attempts, especially involving drones, should be taken seriously.
“The IDF published data showing more than 2,000 smuggling attempts of heavy drones along the Israeli–Egyptian border in a short period. Israel has only intercepted a small percentage so far. Even when you control the maritime domain, the border, and the airspace, nothing is 100 percent sealed, since Hamas managed to maintain active networks with Bedouin tribes in the Sinai,” he said.
“When Hamas tries, at the end of the day, it will get something through. The attempts themselves, including those the IDF has detected, show that the infrastructure is active now, not only historically. The real issue now is not weapons going out of the Strip, but those that keep coming in,” he added.
By contrast, Garofalo argued that significant new transfers in the last weeks are highly unlikely, even if, crucially, he agreed that Hamas has long maintained external arms and components.
Garofalo focused on the time horizon.
“It is absolutely possible that Hamas managed over the years to move arms outside Gaza or create reserve stockpiles. This fits their long-term strategy. But this does not happen now or during the conflict. Their availability of weapons is extremely reduced because of the war, and controls on Gaza today make rapid smuggling during the ceasefire unrealistic,” he said.
“Hamas has, for years, operated procurement and criminal networks in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. These networks exist. My view is that the weapons were already stored abroad, and this will allow them to rearm in the medium to long term, as they did in past years, rather than through a sudden surge of transfers last month,” he added.
Egypt was even more categorical. Samir Ragheb said the idea of major arms flows in or out of Gaza in the latest weeks is not merely unlikely; it is geographically and technically absurd at the scale being suggested.
He started from a simple geographic fact: Every route, legal or illegal, must pass through the same 14-kilometer border between Egypt and Gaza.
“Every possible route crosses the same 14-kilometer border between Egypt and Gaza. On the Egyptian side, you have seismic sensors, thermal cameras, a militarized buffer zone, and continuous patrols. On the Israeli side, you have full IDF control of the Philadelphi Corridor, AI surveillance, and special forces. To pretend you can move large quantities of weapons through this environment is not just improbable; it is a fantasy,” he said.
On tunnels, he was equally blunt: “The longest tunnel ever found in Gaza was around 2.5 kilometers. To reach Sinai today, a tunnel would need to cross beneath the Israeli-controlled corridor, penetrate more than 30 meters of rock detectable by seismic technology, and exit in a closed military zone. Geology and surveillance together make that almost suicidal,” Ragheb added.
And on the broader routes sometimes described in Israeli reporting, Gaza–Sinai–Egypt–Libya–Sudan–Yemen, he was dismissive. “The idea that you can cross the Nile Delta, one of the most densely populated and heavily policed areas in the world, and then move toward Libya or Sudan ignores basic geography."
Ragheb highlighted, "The Suez Canal is monitored by Egyptian forces, EU naval patrols, drones, and smart checkpoints. Egypt’s borders with Libya and Sudan are reinforced with walls, sensors, and EU-backed operations like IRINI. To smuggle a rifle from Gaza to Yemen, you would need to cross four militarized borders, a sea, and a canal. It is not just improbable; it is geologically absurd,” he noted.
For Ragheb, the motivations behind the narrative matter as much as its technical flaws.
“Israel uses these smuggling myths to marginalize Egypt, justify renewed military operations in Gaza, and build a narrative that hints at displacement under a security pretext. Cairo has zero incentive to allow weapons in or out. Doing so would risk reigniting the Sinai insurgency we fought from 2011 to 2018 and destabilizing our own demographic balance,” he said.
Garofalo offered a hybrid picture of how Hamas has historically operated.
He acknowledged that the tunnel network, once the backbone of Gaza’s smuggling, has been severely degraded.
“Of course, they no longer have the tunnels they once had. Israel destroyed many, and those reaching the Egyptian side were destroyed earlier by Egypt. The Sinai tunnel network was, for years, the main smuggling route, and despite long Egyptian operations to destroy it, small segments, or microtunnels, could be reactivated or rebuilt."
Garofalo added, "Historically, it has been the most difficult method to eliminate completely. But in recent years, Egypt’s destruction of tunnels has made this option much more complicated,” he said.
Beyond tunnels, he pointed to the sea: “Past operations show that small boats, fishing vessels, or cargo ships were used to deliver shipments in the eastern Mediterranean. Weapons could be dropped at sea and recovered by fishermen or small vessels. This is a route that exists, but it is heavily monitored today by the Israeli navy,” he added.
And above all, he underlined the importance of components and dual-use materials rather than “ready-made” weapons.
“Hamas has often imported harmless components, tubes, fertilizers, electronic boards, commercial motors, and then assembled rockets or drones inside Gaza. For that reason, some of the weapons exported abroad may not return as finished weapons but rather as mechanical parts, electronics, or civilian-use materials. Reconstruction can become an opportunity for this, if there are not enough controls on dual-use goods,” he noted.
Ragheb agreed on this point: Even if he rejects the idea of large, recent clandestine convoys, he acknowledged that small-scale, long-term flows are harder to monitor completely, which is why, from Egypt’s point of view, tightening control over the past two years has been a strategic priority.
An Israeli military official told The Media Line that, not only is there a significant threat from UAVs crossing the border, but the general staff has launched an initiative to counter the growing threat, with a formal decision to invest in long-term force buildup.
The plan includes new defensive and response technologies, expanded intelligence-gathering, and dedicated manpower, alongside preparations for a special operational team in the 80th Division that will work with the IDF, the Israel Police, the Shin Bet security agency, and relevant government ministries.
The official said the drone-smuggling phenomenon along the Israel–Egypt border has expanded sharply since the start of the war, forming a clear pattern of cross-border trafficking. “The items sent over the border range from drugs and cigarettes to a growing number of weapons,” he said.
“The division has been working for a long time to confront this, and the IDF continues to operate nonstop against what is defined as a hostile act of terrorism, with every person involved posing harm to the security of the state and its residents.”
Recent operations by the 80th Division, which oversees the 140-kilometer frontier down to Eilat, have led to the seizure of large quantities of weapons and a marked drop in weekly drone crossings.
To confront the threat, the official said, “Various technological systems are deployed along the border area, operated by the Technology and Logistics Directorate and the Israeli Air Force, to counter the drone threat in the regions that smugglers cannot reach.”
An air force operations center in the division is tasked with spotting, warning about, and intercepting drones, with about 130 interceptions recorded in the past month. He added that a joint operations center with the Israel Police and Shin Bet is set to open next week to fuse intelligence and coordination.
“At the same time, forces continue to carry out actions to foil smuggling attempts through intelligence collection and by pursuing smugglers inside Israeli territory.”
The UN’s approval of the Trump Gaza plan was intended to provide a clear path forward: a ceasefire, demilitarization, an international force, and, eventually, a different political order in the Strip.
Garofalo warned that there is still a gap between political frameworks and operational realities, and it is precisely where future crises tend to incubate.
“If reconstruction proceeds without serious, coordinated controls, the same dual-use channels that Hamas exploited in the past will reappear. Even if large movements did not happen in the latest weeks, the risk of rearmament over the medium term is very real,” he said.
Ragheb, meanwhile, saw a looming humanitarian and strategic dilemma for Cairo if the ceasefire breaks down.
“If we close the border, Gaza faces catastrophe. If we open it, we face a security and demographic crisis in Sinai. A renewed large-scale war in Gaza would not stay in Gaza. It could trigger escalation with Hezbollah and Iran, and even disruptions in the Suez Canal, which is critical both for global trade and for Egypt’s own economic stability,” he noted.
For Michael, the stakes are equally stark on the Israeli side.
“Hamas will regroup simultaneously in Gaza, the West Bank, and other countries, rebuild its capacities, and look for the second opportunity for another Oct. 7. This is exactly the reason we have to crush them and dismantle them. As long as they hold on to their weapons and ideology, no ceasefire framework, American or UN, will produce real peace,” he concluded.
For now, the gap between the plan on paper and the situation on the ground remains wide and is widening.