On January 28, 2020, US President Donald Trump stood in the White House’s East Room beside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and unveiled what he called the “Deal of the Century.”
Five years later, once again alongside Netanyahu but this time in the State Dining Room, Trump rolled out what might best be described as the “Deal of the Millennium.”
If the first plan promised to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (it didn’t), the new one aspires not only to end the Israel-Hamas War but – in Trump’s telling – to deliver the peace that he said has eluded the region for more than two millennia.
“This is a big, big day, a beautiful day, potentially one of the great days ever in civilization,” said Trump, not one for understatement. “I’m not just talking about Gaza. Gaza is one thing, but we’re talking about much beyond Gaza. The whole deal, everything getting solved. It’s called peace in the Middle East.”
Trump has spoken in such grandiose terms before. His new Gaza initiative echoes not only in substance but also in style the ambitious “Deal of the Century” he unveiled five years earlier.
That plan, formally titled Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People, was three years in the making. Drafted by his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, who was also involved in shaping the current proposal, it was released in two stages: an economic workshop in Bahrain in 2019 and the 181-page political framework presented in Washington in January 2020.
The plan proposed a demilitarized Palestinian state on roughly 70% of Judea and Samaria, connected by bridges and tunnels, with Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital.
Israel would annex all settlements and the Jordan Valley. In return, Palestinians would receive promises of $50 billion in international investment.
The Palestinian rejection was immediate and absolute. PA President Mahmoud Abbas branded it “the slap of the century,” declaring, “a thousand times no.” Abbas cut ties with Washington, calling the plan a conspiracy designed for rejection.
Even Arab states that were increasingly open to relations with Israel offered only tepid support. Many Europeans, led by France, Germany, and the EU’s foreign policy chief, were highly critical.
Several flaws doomed the proposal, the most glaring being the exclusion of Palestinians from the negotiations. It was as if the US negotiating with Israel would be enough.
The timing also raised suspicion: The release coincided with Trump’s impeachment trial and one of Netanyahu’s election campaigns, raising questions about political motives.
Dead on arrival as a peace plan, this deal nevertheless became the stepping stone to something else: the Abraham Accords – normalization agreements with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Instead of resolving the Palestinian question, Trump shifted the axis to Israel’s relations with the wider Arab world, bypassing Ramallah and embracing a regional approach.
Five years later: Trump's Gaza peace plan
NOW, FAST-FORWARD five years. Trump is back in the White House, Israel is just days away from marking two years of war in Gaza, and the conflict has spilled into Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran. Against this backdrop, Trump unveiled his 20-point plan for Gaza.
Unlike the 2020 Deal of the Century, which was explicitly framed as a comprehensive end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Gaza plan is built around the immediate urgency of ending an active war.
Its provisions focus on demilitarizing Gaza, establishing a “Board of Peace” headed by Trump himself (with Tony Blair in an undefined role) to temporarily oversee day-today governance, and bringing in an international Arab- and Muslim-backed force to eventually replace the IDF as the temporary International Stabilization Force. Reconstruction would transform Gaza into “New Gaza,” featuring special economic zones and attracting outside investment.
While the focus is on ending the war and on Gaza, Trump has cast this initiative in grandiose, sweeping terms as the first step toward “peace in the Middle East,” not just Gaza.
On paper, its scope may be narrower, but in Trump’s telling, it is every bit as ambitious as his earlier effort.
However, unlike in 2020, Trump presented this plan with strong regional backing.
Eight Arab and Muslim nations – Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan – issued a joint statement welcoming the effort, even though they attributed specific provisions to the plan that were not actually in it.
For instance, the 19th point of Trump’s plan is the only place where a future Palestinian state is hinted at. “While Gaza redevelopment advances, and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian people,” the plan read.
The foreign ministers of these countries, in a joint statement welcoming the plan, turned that “wink” into an outright embrace, saying they reaffirmed their joint commitment to a plan that “creates a path for a just peace on the basis of the two-state solution, under which Gaza is fully integrated with the West Bank in a Palestinian state.”
Their statement also mentioned a “full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza” – something absent from Trump’s plan, which envisions a permanent Israeli security perimeter. Still, the very fact that Arab states issued a statement welcoming the plan is notable. That did not happen in 2020. Even the Palestinian Authority, while wary, praised Trump’s “determined efforts.” This was a far cry from 2020, when it severed ties with the president.
THE SIMILARITIES between the two plans are striking.
Both were unveiled amid great fanfare, wrapped in Trump’s characteristic showmanship. Both rely heavily on economic sweeteners, promising prosperity in return for political concessions. And both rest on the idea of outside supervision over Palestinian governance.
In 2020, the Deal of the Century placed that oversight squarely in Israel’s hands, with the IDF retaining ultimate security control and international donors managing the economic piece. In 2025, the Gaza plan envisions something different: a global Board of Peace chaired by Trump, an Arab- and Muslim-led security force to replace the IDF, and Gulf states and international specialists overseeing Gaza’s reconstruction.
In both cases, the deals offered terms the Palestinian side would be hard-pressed to accept, thereby highlighting Israeli flexibility while shifting blame to them – the PA, in 2020, and Hamas, today – for rejection.
However, there are significant differences between the two plans.
The first has to do with timing and urgency. The Deal of the Century was floated during a period of relative quiet; the Gaza plan was born of urgent wartime reality.
Israel has been fighting Hamas for nearly two years. With Gaza in ruins and the population suffering, the Palestinians cannot afford to reject every initiative out of hand this time. This alone creates a different dynamic.
Then, there is the matter of scope. The Deal of the Century aimed at final-status peace, tackling Jerusalem, borders, and refugees – issues that have defied solution for decades.
The Gaza plan is far narrower: It seeks to end hostilities, rebuild Gaza, and establish interim governance. Broader Palestinian aspirations are only tangentially hinted at, and narrowing the deal to Gaza may render it more workable.
Another difference has to do with regional support. The 2020 plan had little Arab backing; the Gaza plan has broad Muslim buy-in. The Saudis, in particular, are more open now, provided there is “a credible path toward a two-state solution.”
Even Qatar and Turkey, implacably hostile to Israel, signed onto the initial statement. This type of coalition did not exist five years ago.
As far as security arrangements, the earlier plan envisioned indefinite Israeli control of a demilitarized Palestinian entity. The Gaza proposal suggests an international Arabled force taking responsibility.
For the first time, Arab states are prepared to police Palestinians, a significant shift in regional dynamics.
The Palestinian response is also markedly different. Abbas slammed the door instantly in 2020, dismissing the Deal of the Century as illegitimate.
This time, the Palestinian Authority has taken a different approach, initially expressing a degree of openness.
Why? Because the circumstances have changed dramatically. After two years of war and devastation, Gaza’s population is desperate for relief, leading Ramallah to understand that its calculations this time need to be different.
THE COLLAPSE of the Deal of the Century offers lessons for the Gaza plan. Chief among them: A plan without Palestinian buy-in is unlikely to succeed – just as any plan without Israeli agreement would have little chance of success.
The original plan assumed Palestinians would eventually cave under pressure; they did not. The Gaza plan could meet the same fate, though this time the Palestinians – in this case Hamas – will come under intense pressure from some influential Arab and Muslim states to take the deal.
Another lesson, perhaps the most important, is that even failed plans can spawn unanticipated successes. Trump’s 2020 plan did not deliver peace, but it paved the way for the Abraham Accords, a historic regional realignment. The question is whether the Gaza plan, even if it does not materialize as envisioned, could lead to a similar transformation.
There are signs that it might.
The eight-nation Muslim coalition standing behind the Gaza plan suggests an unprecedented willingness to work with Israel, even if indirectly. Were Hamas to reject the proposal, these states – foremost Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Indonesia – may conclude that Palestinian leadership is incapable of compromise and move toward deeper ties with Israel regardless.
The Gaza plan faces some of the same structural problems that doomed its predecessor.
Yet, failure is not the end of the story.
Just as the earlier plan morphed into the Abraham Accords, this one could turn into something larger: an expanded normalization process, a new regional security framework, or deeper economic integration. In that sense, Trump’s overheated rhetoric may not be entirely misplaced. His plans may not solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but they may accelerate broader transformations in the region.
The US president has now twice promised to rewrite the script of Middle Eastern peace.
The first time ended not with Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation but with Arab normalization. The second time, Gaza is the focus, and the Muslim world is more deeply engaged.
Whether this week’s announcement becomes “one of the great events of civilization,” as Trump boasted, or merely another mirage remains to be seen. But one of the lessons of the Deal of the Century is that failure can still be consequential. Even if this plan does not end the Israel-Hamas War or deliver peace, it may, like its predecessor, reshape the region in ways its architects did not initially foresee.