Hezbollah defies disarmament push as Israel maintains border buffer

The ceasefire agreement of November 2024, which was agreed after the severe pummeling that Hezbollah received at the hands of the IDF in the preceding months, includes the provision that the government of Lebanon disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its infrastructure throughout the country.

The Lebanese cabinet approved in early August a road map presented by Barrack in June, for the implementation of the disarmament of the Shi’ite Islamist movement, and the withdrawal of Israel from positions held in Lebanon.

The 11 objectives listed in the US proposal state: “The gradual elimination of the armed presence of all non-state actors, including Hezbollah, across all of Lebanon – both south and north of the Litani River – with adequate support to the Lebanese army and Internal Security Forces.”

Ministers affiliated with Hezbollah and its allied Amal movement left the meeting before the vote was taken. Hezbollah, for its part, has been adamant throughout that it has no intention of giving up its weapons. More than 400 of Hezbollah’s positions south of the Litani River have been taken over by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). But the organization retains its capacities further north and east.

Elsewhere, he has made clear that his movement has no interest in discussing a joint “national defense strategy” with the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for as long as Israeli forces remain on Lebanese soil and Israeli operations in Lebanon continue.

SO WHERE are things headed? Is a real attempt to end the existence of armed groups outside of state control in Lebanon about to finally get underway, 35 years after the end of the Lebanese civil war? The answer is, unfortunately, that all the indicators suggest that no such attempt appears imminent.

Rather, the Lebanese government appears to want to commence a negotiating process with Hezbollah and convince it to give up its arms voluntarily. Presumably, the economic benefits that will accrue to Lebanon as a result of Hezbollah’s agreement will be held out as an incentive.

This is not a completely absurd idea. Hezbollah is a political player in Lebanon, with a Shi’ite constituency whose interests it cannot totally ignore. There are no indications, however, that it will be willing to essentially cede its raison d’etre in order to provide short-term economic gains to its supporters.

There is an additional problematic element: the Salam government is likely to propose to Hezbollah that it be integrated as a unit into the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such a move, if implemented, would be likely to have the opposite effect from the one intended.

Rather than ending the holding of arms outside of the framework of the state, this would remove the possibility that the state might at some time impose its will on Hezbollah, and instead undermine the integrity of the armed forces.

Even in its current state, it is doubtful that the LAF would be able to act against Hezbollah. Probably around half of the LAF’s soldiers are Shi’ite Lebanese. About a third of the officer corps also belongs to this sect. Any effort to use the state as an instrument of coercion against Hezbollah would likely cause a split in the LAF.

There are multiple similar occurrences. Many LAF members are linked to Hezbollah, or prominent individuals within it, through family and clan ties.

Therefore, even if Salam’s government wanted to use coercive force against Hezbollah to force its disarmament, it is doubtful that it possesses the ability to carry this out.

In Lebanon, there is a deep and palpable fear of a return to civil war among all elements of the society other than those loyal to Hezbollah. This is likely to further militate against any serious effort to terminate Hezbollah’s independent military capacity.

This means that as of now, the most likely direction of events is that the Lebanese government will try to persuade Hezbollah to give up its arms, Hezbollah will decline to do so, and there the matter will rest.

It is presumably the expectation of the Lebanese government that at a certain point, the US administration and its envoy will realize that there is nothing to be gained from further effort at mediation, and will look elsewhere.

An Iranian, Hezbollah “deep state” has been inserted within the structures of the official Lebanese state – in its political, economic, and security iterations.

Hezbollah was defeated, hard, in combat with Israel in the last quarter of 2024. But this deep state was not destroyed in its entirety, and it remains in many ways as strong, or stronger, than the organs of the official state.

Hezbollah may have turned out to be much weaker than its propaganda suggested, and much weaker than Israel, but it is not weaker than its potential opponents in Lebanon, who, as a consequence, do not appear to wish to take it on.

From an Israeli point of view, the likely failure of the stated effort to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon is not necessarily disastrous.

As of now, Israel has imposed a modus operandi in Lebanon by which it is acting daily to frustrate Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild. It holds five positions on Lebanese soil and a de facto buffer zone along the border. It has freedom of action and uses it across Lebanese skies.

For as long as Hezbollah remains the dominant actor within Lebanon, Israel is likely to wish to maintain this situation. Plans, road maps, and cabinet votes notwithstanding, both Hezbollah’s armed capacity and Israel’s campaign to prevent the organization’s efforts to replenish it are unlikely to change any time soon.