How, after the country’s worst massacre on October 7, 2023 – two and a half years of the longest-ever war against Hamas, the smallest of its rivals; two campaigns against Iran that have so far failed to topple its fundamentalist regime; and a continuous war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is taking lives daily – does the Israeli government look set to dissolve into early elections over a long-running draft law exempting 100,000 haredi men from enlisting in the IDF?
Israeli politics are said to revolve around security issues. But over the last decade, Israel has seen seven rounds of national elections, and none of them were focused on the Israeli-Arab conflict – or any of the other conflicts that surround us. So perhaps the focus of the next election is to be expected after all.
Internal strife
Early in May, the polarization index published by Agam Labs posed the question: “What is the greatest threat to Israel’s future?” In response, only 39% answered that it was external threats (i.e., Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas). Rather, 61% of Israelis said they believe that the greatest threat to Israel’s future comes from internal strife and polarization.
Therefore, a synopsis of the upcoming election must revolve around each of the two polarized political camps – the far-right coalition or the “believers’ bloc” vs the liberal opposition, or the bloc of hope.
When analyzing the forthcoming election, the following questions should be asked of the coalition: First, will Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu run for reelection?
The horrific events of the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on October 7, 2023, cast a long shadow over Netanyahu’s rule. It was his conception that by strengthening Hamas, he could dismantle the Palestinian Authority and focus his rhetoric on Iran. He insisted that Qatar continue to pass suitcases with millions of dollars to Hamas, despite warnings from Israel’s security apparatus that it would allow an infrastructure of terror to be built in Gaza.
Yet, despite that, Netanyahu estimated that by persuading US President Donald Trump to go to war against Iran, his legacy would be restored.
In fact, Netanyahu had hoped for a swift operation to bring down the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-led regime in Iran, allow Trump to visit Israel in late April to receive the Israel Prize, and endorse his campaign ahead of an early election in June, securing his victory.
However, this plan collapsed miserably. None of the goals designated by Netanyahu in the Iran war – the fall of the fundamentalist regime, destruction of the enriched uranium, debilitating Tehran’s long-term ballistic missile capabilities, and dismantling its regional terror proxies – was accomplished.
While military successes were tremendous, Netanyahu failed politically. He now argues that he needs another round with Iran, Gaza, and Lebanon to finish the job.
A Likud proxy
The second question is whether to establish a Likud B party. Recent polls indicate that between three to seven mandates that the Likud had in 2022 may go to opposition parties in the upcoming elections. A Likud proxy party, less embroiled in corruption and extremism, may keep them within the right-wing bloc and give Netanyahu his next victory.
However, such a party may also crash the Likud and bring it to under 20 mandates, causing it to lose its place as the country’s largest party. Would Netanyahu risk it?
The third question revolves around the voter turnout for the coalition parties. In a recent poll by Channel 12, 42% of Likud voters said they may not vote for Likud. This does not mean they will vote for an opposition party; voters might just stay at home and not vote at all.
The chances of a negative campaign – the major tool for mobilizing Netanyahu’s supporters to bring them out to vote – seem meager. Netanyahu is always one step ahead in campaigning, and now trusts AI videos to make the change. Israelis, however, are tired of hate and fake news. They long for security and normality. Such tactics may not work this time.
Opposition leader
As for the opposition, the questions are quite different. First, who will lead the opposition? Former prime minister Naftali Bennett hoped his swift unification with current opposition leader Yair Lapid might force MK Gadi Eisenkot, the former IDF chief of staff, to join him.
Bennett’s logic is based on victory momentum. The polls show an overall majority for the opposition but no feeling of victory since the Likud remains the largest party. However, if Eisenkot joins Bennett and Lapid, Bennett could find himself at the head of a 40-mandate party, allowing the sense of victory momentum to rise.
Eisenkot and MK Avigdor Liberman – the former defense minister and leader of the Yisrael Betaynu party, who is a potential partner – follow a different logic. They are considering which constellation might bring in more mandates, and whether joining forces with Bennett would actually mean fewer mandates for the liberal camp. Plus, all three – Bennett, Eisenkot, and Liberman – want to be prime minister, so thus far, there is no agreed-upon strategy to resolve this.
A second question for the opposition is whether the liberal camp can actually work as a camp. The three principles the opposition needs to follow are: uniting with any party that is dangerously nearing the threshold; ensuring an even number of parties; and enforcing a surplus agreement between them, including Arab parties, so no votes are lost. They must make sure smaller factions such as the Reservists Party, led by former communications minister Yoaz Hendel; Blue and White, led by former defense minister Benny Gantz; or a possible Likud B party do not take votes away from the liberal camp.
A final question for the opposition is whether they have an alternative vision to the nationalistic-religious, anti-liberal vision of Netanyahu’s bloc. For now, they are campaigning against the haredi exemption law, for a national public commission of inquiry into the October 7 massacre by Hamas, and against corruption.
However, they do not offer a sharp alternative to Netanyahu’s vision of Israel. Agam’s polarization index shows the rift between those who want a halachic religious state and those who want a secular state is among the strongest in Israeli society today.
While Netanyahu’s coalition is playing the believers’ card – vowing to create a Jewish supremacist state – the opposition has not yet put forward an alternative liberal, Zionist, Jewish-democratic vision.
Given that most Israelis see polarization as the greatest threat, and that Netanyahu’s rule is characterized by a negative campaign inciting against Arabs, leftists, Ashkenazim, elites, journalists, judges, and anyone who is not pro-Bibi, it seems the political battle will be between Netanyahu’s populist Jewish believers’ coalition and the liberal camp of repair and hope.
The coming election will determine Netanyahu’s legacy as well as Israel’s future.■
Gayil Talshir is a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her book, The Netanyahu Era, will be published in the fall by SUNY Press.