The war with Iran has created a real opportunity for regional realignment – but how it plays out now may determine whether normalization moves forward or stalls.
For more than a decade, the Middle East has been shaped by two competing camps.
On one side stood what was often called the “moderate axis” – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan; states focused on stability, opposed to political Islam, and increasingly aligned with the United States and, over time, with Israel.
On the other side was a rival bloc led by Turkey, which supported Islamist movements and promoted a different regional vision.
This division defined regional politics after the Arab Spring. The Abraham Accords of 2020 appeared to reinforce it. The UAE and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel, and Saudi Arabia moved cautiously in the same direction. The expectation was clear: Normalization would gradually expand within a relatively cohesive camp.
But that structure began to weaken.
A series of shocks reshaped regional thinking. The 2019 Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and the lack of a meaningful American response raised doubts in Riyadh about its security guarantees. The aftermath of the October 7 massacre made normalization politically more sensitive, particularly given how Israeli policy was perceived in the region. At the same time, broader regional shifts reinforced a sense that the Middle East was entering a more fluid and uncertain phase.
As a result, key actors began to hedge. Saudi Arabia and Egypt did not abandon their traditional partnerships, but they reopened channels with Turkey and diversified their strategic options. The region became less clearly divided and more flexible, but also less stable.
This shift was visible even before the war with Iran.
In Yemen, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE resurfaced over the role of southern separatists. In Sudan, the two backed opposing sides in a civil war. In the Horn of Africa, the issue of Somaliland exposed bigger differences, with the UAE investing heavily in the territory, while Saudi Arabia supported Somalia’s territorial integrity.
These were not isolated disputes. They reflected a broader reality: What had once been a relatively cohesive camp was no longer acting as one.
Then came the war with Iran.
Alignment under pressure
At first glance, such a crisis should push the region back toward alignment. A shared threat, a clear adversary, and an urgent need for coordination create strong incentives for cooperation, particularly between Israel and the Gulf states.
And indeed, this moment creates a real opportunity for realignment.
The Iranian threat is no longer theoretical. It is immediate and shared. The need for effective security cooperation is clearer than it has been in years.
But the starting point is more complicated.
The war has unfolded in a region where alliances are already strained, and where alternative security frameworks are now being tested under pressure. Saudi Arabia’s defense ties with Pakistan have not translated into visible reassurance. China, often discussed as an alternative global partner, has remained largely absent.
The result is not a lack of options but a lack of reliable ones.
The first signals of this emerging struggle are already visible. Turkey has publicly blamed Israel for the escalation, framing the crisis through a familiar political lens. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, has taken a markedly different line. Its foreign minister has placed the blame on Iran and said that escalation will be met with escalation.
This is more than a difference in messaging. It reflects a deeper contest over alignment – a regional effort to pull Saudi Arabia, and with it the broader Arab center, in one direction or another.
All of these point to a deeper shift. The region is no longer balancing comfortably between camps. It is being pushed to choose.
This is what makes the current moment so significant.
Burden of power
For the first time since September 2023, normalization is not just a long-term aspiration but a practical strategic option. As regional actors reassess their security assumptions, new alignments become possible.
But this opportunity is not one-sided.
Over the past year, Israel has elevated its position as a regional power. Its direct confrontation with Iran in 2025, combined with more assertive diplomatic moves, has demonstrated a willingness to act, not just signal. In the Middle East, credibility is built through action, and this has not gone unnoticed.
However, with this shift comes a new expectation. Being a regional partner does not only mean deterring adversaries. It also means contributing, in a sustained and credible way, to the security of others.
For Israel, this represents a strategic evolution. It requires resources, long-term commitment, and political will. But it also offers significant potential. If Israel is perceived as a reliable security partner, capable of delivering in practice, the barriers to deeper regional integration could begin to erode.
Still, the constraints are real.
Public opinion in countries such as Saudi Arabia remains highly sensitive, particularly regarding Gaza. Regional leaders are cautious about overdependence on any single partner.
There are broader strategic concerns, such as the possibility of an overly dominant Israel, or longer-term shifts such as a future Iran that re-enters the regional system in a different form.
The result is a moment of strategic tension.
The old model, in which regional actors could hedge between competing camps, is becoming harder to sustain. The war with Iran is not just another crisis. It is a forcing mechanism.
For Saudi Arabia, and for much of the Arab world, the question is no longer whether to engage, but where to align.
However, that choice will not be made in a vacuum.
It will ultimately be determined by how the war itself ends. If the conflict concludes with a clear demonstration of strength and credible protection, it will reinforce the case for alignment with those who can deliver security. If, however, it ends in ambiguity or exposes further gaps in deterrence, regional actors are likely to continue hedging.
In that sense, the outcome of the war will shape not only the balance of power but also the willingness of states to commit to it.
The Abraham Accords are not guaranteed to expand. But they are once again central to the region’s strategic choices.
This may be the most significant opportunity for normalization since September 2023.
But it will not happen on its own.
It will require decisions, commitments, and a willingness to move from ambiguity to alignment.
And those decisions will shape the next phase of the Middle East.■
Shiri Fein-Grossman is the CEO of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute; board member of Forum Dvorah – Women in National Security; and former head of regional affairs at Israel’s National Security Council.