After more than two years of war and diplomatic negotiations, have Israel’s choices of who will police Gaza in the near future, other than Hamas, narrowed to: 1) a group of foreign Muslim and European countries with the involvement of the Palestinian Authority, versus 2) Turkey?
And if the seemingly endless number of choices for who would run an upcoming Gaza International Stabilization Force (ISF) have come down to these two options, why is there no clear public debate about it as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flies to Washington?
In 2023 and for much of 2024, Netanyahu and many other Israeli officials were relatively vague about what a post-war Gaza would look like.
There was frustration for much of 2024 when former defense minister Yoav Gallant and former war minister Benny Gantz made proposals on the issue along with the Biden administration, and Netanyahu refused to engage, other than rejecting nearly all proposals.
Yet, to his credit, Netanyahu in recent days has made it clear that he is willing to forego normalization with Saudi Arabia at this time, given that such a step could require a binding timeline toward a Palestinian state.
Much of the defense establishment disagrees with him on this judgment call, but there are still many who do agree with him. Within the Israeli populace, Netanyahu either has majority support for his position or the question is unsettled.
This is to the extent that Netanyahu is doing all he can to undermine any amount of involvement of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. While the defense establishment has heavily criticized him for this, Netanyahu has, if nothing else, been transparent about his principles.
Frankly, it is understandable why much of the country does not want to “reward” any Palestinians, even the PA, for the October 7 massacre.
What peacekeeping options does Israel have for Gaza?
But the question should be: what is the alternative?
Originally, the alternative to Hamas or the PA was rallying a group of Gazan tribal sheikhs together. However, Israel let this plan leak in early 2024, and, in response, Hamas quickly killed a number of the sheikhs in question.
Likewise, when Israel pulled the IDF out of the Hamas half of Gaza in October, it did nothing to keep its potential Gazan allies safe from Hamas. Predictably, many of those allies were once again slaughtered by Hamas.
In theory, there could be a Gaza peacekeeping ISF run by Egypt, the UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Italy, and others who have expressed interest.
But, to date, none of them have signed up. Most of them have stated that they would only do so if the PA was also involved, which would give them legitimacy with the Palestinian public.
Netanyahu had hoped that, eventually, one or more of these countries would drop the PA as a condition. As it turns out, however, most or all of these countries’ fear of their soldiers being killed by Hamas outweighs their care for the suffering of Gazans
They may also object because they want the PA involved, but a part of the bar is their fear of Hamas.
In fact, the pivotal question is whether they would commit troops if Netanyahu allowed the PA a foothold in Gaza, or whether they would still balk, deciding that even with the PA in the picture, Hamas would still kill their peacekeeping forces.
Unless US President Donald Trump forces Netanyahu’s hand on the issue, we may never know.
And maybe leaving that question open could be tolerable for Israel if the alternative was not Turkey.
Turkey has repeatedly said that they are happy to send peacekeepers without the PA involved.
This is not shocking. Turkey is as part of the Muslim Brotherhood as Hamas is – and they are a core supporter of Hamas.
What Turkey is against is the more secular PA. Besides that, they want their own foothold in the area, so that they can levy their strength against Israel.
One would think that the possibility of being stuck with Turkish peacekeepers in Gaza would push Netanyahu into accepting the PA’s involvement.
Turkey is a regional powerhouse. Giving them a direct border with Israel would be like giving Iran a direct border with the Jewish state.
Until now, Turkey has not used terror directly against Jerusalem. But they have hosted Hamas for many years, and actively supported a variety of efforts to break Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza, which would make it far easier for Hamas to obtain deadlier weapons.
Turkish “peacekeepers” might openly take Hamas’s side in a gunfight.
If they did, would Israel be able to shoot back at Turkish peacekeepers? Or would Israel need to worry that firing on Turkish soldiers could lead Ankara to respond with the full brunt of its formidable military?
It is even possible that Turkey wants its soldiers in Gaza to make such an incident more likely, which could become their excuse to intervene in the Israel-Gaza conflict in a more drastic manner.
This would be a strategic disaster, given that Ankara could more readily match Israel’s military might than Tehran.
So, when Netanyahu rejects the PA, which means rejecting non-Turkish options, why is no one discussing that this could force Israel into accepting Turkish peacekeepers – something that Trump and Israeli officials have increasingly implied?
There is still time for Italy or some other country to send peacekeepers without the PA. Perhaps the US has suggested the Turkish option as to pressure Netanyahu into accepting the PA.
Theoretically, Netanyahu could also convince Trump to step away and just let Israel and Hamas face off indefinitely, with either the IDF or Hamas running Gaza, or splitting Gaza for an extended period. However, Trump is overwhelmingly likely to reject those options, as they go against his explicit goals and strategy.
So if the Turkey possibility is real, it would seem that debating Turkey versus the PA is a crucial debate to have, given the potential long-term impacts on the Jewish state.