Israeli Air Force unveils new rapid-response unit to stop October 7-style ground invasions

The new unit is part of a larger transformation led by Brig. Gen. Gilad Bar Tal, shifting significant aspects of the IAF’s helicopter units from other tasks to border defense.

This shift also involves increasing the volume of helicopters, drones, and fighter jets, which are constantly ready for border defense and are more broadly assigned to border defense efforts.

In addition, the number of air force platforms that can act within several minutes, and the volume of bombs that the IAF can drop within an hour, is much higher than before.

Moreover, the rules of engagement for helicopters now give much more discretion to open fire based on each individual pilot’s assessment of the threat on the ground than was the case prior to October 7.

According to the IDF, before the October 7 invasion, the IAF helicopter unit was due to be reduced to around 20.

Because of October 7 and the new approach, that helicopters are critical to future border defense, the helicopter units will remain around 50, meaning double what they would have been, but still half of what they were a decade ago.

There are several aspects to the transformation led by Bar Tal. Some of the changes started soon after October 7, 2023. The IDF has acknowledged that the air force had no plan ready to prevent a mass ground invasion, and would only have been able to fully modify the air force’s deployments, resources, and assignments over a few months.

However, at this point, the IDF noted, it has had multiple years working with the land forces in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria to learn how to better defend the borders and how to better work jointly with Israeli ground forces in general.

Next, the air force analyzed maps and the specific topography for each potential invasion area: South, North, West Bank. Israel also has borders with Jordan and Egypt.

Each border has its own specific challenges.

For example, if the IAF bombs specific potential invasion routes in the North, it can immediately slow an enemy invasion, whereas the same strategy in the South will not prevent a continued invasion as quickly, since the topography is flatter and invaders can more easily continue their invasion even using off-road trajectories.

Also, the air force will work differently with Divisions 210 and 91 in the North, based on those divisions’ firepower and maneuvering capacities, than it will with Division 143 in Gaza, or Division 877 in the West Bank.

The air force has complemented those involved in IDF probes of their unit as well as non-air force officials involved in ensuring that the lessons learned to avoid a future disaster will be implemented. These processes have helped the air force push through a variety of changes.

As part of the change, the air force formally added defending the borders as part of its primary mission – whereas before, striking in enemy territory and especially against distant enemies was more of the focus.

In addition, the IAF drafted directives for the new approach covering a variety of scenarios that had been ignored until October 7.

By this past February, Bar Tal, who also handles other missions related to helicopters, had selected a new commander who has the role, on the day of any theoretical invasion, of directing the air force operational response to land-based threats.

On December 9, the IDF held a conference about the air force’s defense of the borders, including all of the relevant ground forces with brigadier general and colonel ground force commanders.

Part of the process has included building a new target bank oriented around stopping land invasions as opposed to targeting top enemy leaders and new mission parameters.

During the October 7 massacre, the air force attacked many targets in Gaza, which were part of its pre-war target bank, and these attacks did harm Hamas, but did not harm its invasion forces.

In terms of rapid reaction helicopters, there are twice as many ready at all times as pre-October 7, and even more during daylight hours.

Likewise with drones, there are three to four times as many available for rapid deployment as before the war, and there are also a small number of additional fighter jets available for rapid land attacks.

If the helicopters and drones can be used to fire directly on individual invaders, the fighter jets would be used to drop larger bombs on invasion routes, blow up groups of invaders, or deter those invaders from proceeding when they see a huge bomb blow up on the exact trajectory where they have been ordered to advance.

Currently, the number of bombs that the IAF can drop in the first hour has jumped from around 16 pre-war to around 60.

Next, the air force also has large C-130 aircraft available to transport larger numbers of infantry reinforcements to an invaded border at a much more rapid pace.

The IDF is also now regularly training for all of these eventualities in its drills.

Regarding the rules of engagement, as soon as the brigadier general in charge of a particular front announces the country is at war or that the number of attacking forces is larger than the number of defending IDF forces, the whole entire new arm of the air force is set up to jump into automatic action.

The IDF Southern Command only understood this around three hours later, severely slowing the response of sending reinforcements, including from the air force.

Regarding the IAF, most units that came to the Gaza border did very little against Hamas because they believed that in firing on Hamas from inside Israeli territory, they might strike Israeli civilians.

In contrast, the new rules of engagement mean that once the brigadier general front commander has said the enemy has more forces than his own, individual pilots have the authority and duty to fire on invaders within Israeli territory.

There are still dilemmas about what to do if the invaders have already taken hostages.

If the invaders have already taken hostages, then the air force is against firing on the hostage-takers lest they harm the hostages themselves.

This was not a theoretical concern, as there had been cases where the air force had accidentally killed IDF soldiers in the West Bank.

But even in that case, the air force pilots have clear orders to fire on any open area which the invaders might use to return to their territory – with the goal being to trap them in Israel until more ground forces arrive and surround them.

Specifically relating to the West Bank, the IDF said that it can now rapidly add 500 soldiers to help existing forces using air force assets to move them there.

In addition, in the time that it once took to evacuate and rescue six soldiers, the IDF now has larger capabilities to evacuate and rescue closer to 100 soldiers.

Finally, if there are communications problems between land and air force units, there are now five alternate channels for those units to communicate in the event of a crisis, so that they will not be cut off from each other as occurred on October 7.

The number of aircraft is still not huge, and the number of standing ground units has not risen significantly on some fronts.

Despite learning the topography, many mid-level commanders are switched frequently in and out of a given area, such that they may not really have sufficient expertise in the topography of a given front when an attack may start.

There are also places where Israeli villages are so close to Palestinian or other foreign villages that the air force’s firepower may not be able to come into play fast enough to make a huge difference in the event of an invasion.

However, the concept that the air force would be ineffective in a few villages for an hour is still far different from being ineffective for three to six hours in dozens of villages, both those on the border and those at a distance.