Israel continues to face multi-front threats even though there is a ceasefire in Gaza and also in Lebanon. Reports indicate that both Hamas and Hezbollah refuse to concede and give up or disarm.
This means that both groups will be a challenge in the future. In addition, the Houthis in Yemen have not been weakened very much. Iran, which suffered setbacks in the 12-day war earlier this year, is also hinting that it is rebuilding its arsenal.
This means that any dreams Israel has had of what Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu once referred to as “total” or “complete” victory are still a distant goal. It may be a goal that is not attainable because of the complex challenges Israel faces.
Why Israel will not have a full victory in Gaza
For instance, Hamas was allowed to put down roots in Gaza over the last several decades. Israel’s current leadership has opposed having the Palestinian Authority control Gaza. This has resulted in the Palestinian areas being divided and cementing Hamas’s rule. No alternative to Hamas rule has been put forward.
During the two years of war against Hamas, the policy was to evacuate civilians from many areas of Gaza and concentrate them in areas run by Hamas, essentially keeping Hamas in power.
The result of the Gaza war has therefore been to keep Hamas in power and return Israel to the years before October 7, when the policy was to manage the conflict or “mow the grass.” It is unclear if the US-backed ceasefire and UN resolution can lead to the disarmament of Hamas. While Israeli officials have said Hamas can be disarmed, they have not explained how this will happen.
In Lebanon, a similar problem exists. Hezbollah was dealt major setbacks in the conflict last year. This was especially true from September to November 2024, when the IDF launched increased operations against the group, eliminating key commanders and weapons stockpiles.
However, Hezbollah is not completely de-fanged. As with Hamas, history shows that both groups have a habit of coming back.
Israel's policy on Damascus
Now Israel faces an unwelcome prospect of having to manage the conflict in Lebanon and Gaza, while also dealing with daily challenges in the West Bank. Another new emerging challenge is the issue of arms smuggling from Egypt and other borders.
Israel’s Prime Minister led a large number of officials to the Syrian border this week. He said that holding on to the buffer zone, which Israel seized on December 8, 2024, is very important. This has set up Israel for a course of rising tensions with Damascus.
Some Israeli politicians refer to the leadership in Damascus as “jihadists.” However, the US and most of its allies in the region back the new government in Syria. Rather than Israel trying to make new friends, the policy since December 2024 has been to try to make relations cold or even sabotage the new government in Syria. This isolates Israel instead of leading to more agreements with neighbors.
From the standpoint of Israel’s leadership and many of its commanders, the decisions to continue this policy of managing conflicts in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria via the use of precision airstrikes or threats to return to fighting are seen as a way to keep enemies weak and off-balance, so as not to have another October 7.
However, there is a saying that armies tend to prepare for the last war. An October 7-type attack is unlikely today on any border or in the West Bank. The next threat may be different. Therefore, the policy of continued airstrikes and threatening to return to fighting to ostensibly prevent a new October 7 may be a sunk cost of diminishing returns for Israel.
The question then becomes how Israel might extricate itself from the endless multi-front conflict zone. Some would argue Israel has always had to face this challenge, going back to 1948. In fact, there is a book titled Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-1956. One could argue that Jerusalem is merely going back to the 1950s tactic.
On the other hand, there might be a strategy that could change Israel’s position rather than leave the next generation with more endless wars. Reports indicate that some 80,000 Israelis left the country last year, and that around 50,000 Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men continue to avoid army service.
As such, there is a growing trend of reservists and their families leaving, while those who don’t serve are growing in number. Israel’s education ministry reportedly will increase yeshiva stipends for foreign students, essentially bringing in more people who don’t serve.
At the same time, another report said the IDF will need about 60,000 reservists to serve for months in the army next year due to potential conflicts on multiple fronts. Is this model sustainable, when one segment of society is asked to serve more, another is rewarded for not serving, and those who do serve are increasingly choosing to leave?
The crisis is not upon Israel yet, but it is slowly growing. Avoiding the endless multi-front low-level conflict could be a strategy for setting Israel’s house in order. The other option, of more managed conflicts, may not be good in the long term.