Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s current trip to Washington will likely provide the answer to one of the most-asked questions since Operation Rising Lion: how will Israel’s success in Iran impact the situation in Gaza?
The very fact that there is now intensified discussion about a ceasefire in Gaza and bringing the hostages home already shows that one event has influenced the other. That momentum was not felt to the same degree before June 13 and Israel’s attack on Iran.
But, unlike what many may have assumed, the change in heart has not come from Hamas. It has come from Netanyahu.
Until recently, Netanyahu was adamant about continuing the war, mainly due to an aversion to allowing Hamas any semblance of victory -- something they will claim by remaining in any capacity in Gaza after the war.
Yet following Israel’s stunning military success in Iran, the crippling of Hezbollah, and the destruction of much of Hamas’s infrastructure, it is hard to argue, credibly, that Hamas “won” the war it launched on October 7.
Instead, that war triggered a chain of events that brought about the dismantling of the so-called “axis of resistance,” an enterprise on which Iran mortgaged its future and spent an estimated half a trillion dollars over three decades building.
The result? Iran is left with little energy, scarce water, a basket-case economy, a proxy network that has largely gone up in smoke, and a nuclear program that has now been set back years.
This new lay of the land—not any newfound flexibility from Hamas—is what may now bring the war in Gaza to a close. And it may give Netanyahu the political space to show flexibility on terms he previously ruled out. For the first time in decades, Israel is not staring down an immediate existential threat. That changes the calculus.
In this strategic realignment, it’s hard not to recall a historical parallel drawn by Israeli thinker Micah Goodman, even before the war, in one of his podcasts with Efrat Shapira-Rosenberg as part of a series on Iran. One particular comparison between Netanyahu and Winston Churchill now seems more relevant than ever and merits revisiting.
In the early stages of World War II, Churchill came to one overriding conclusion: that only an American entry into the war would save Britain and ensure Nazi defeat. His primary strategic objective was to draw the US into the conflict.
The Atlantic Conference in August 1941, when he met Franklin D. Roosevelt in Newfoundland, made that clear: Churchill’s goal was, quite simply, to get the Americans in. When that failed, he settled for expanded aid and a united Anglo-American vision for the postwar world, enshrined in the Atlantic Charter.
The Charter itself was a monumental concession. Among its principles was the right of all peoples to choose their own government, a direct threat to British colonial rule. Churchill was concerned that this clause would legitimize decolonization movements, including those within Britain’s own empire. And he was right. The Charter also demanded the dismantling of Imperial Preference, Britain’s protective trade system, another blow to the British Empire.
Yet Churchill, deeply attached to the empire, made those concessions. Why? Because the strategic prize, the American alliance, was worth the sacrifice. This is a textbook case of strategic prioritization. For Churchill, the supreme goal was to get the US into the war. And to achieve that goal, he was willing to sacrifice other ambitions.
Goodman likened this to a game of chess, during which one sacrifices the queen, in this case, the British Empire, to save the king, Britain itself, and the free world.
Giving up in Gaza to win in Iran
That logic—the willingness to trade a cherished but secondary asset for a decisive strategic gain, resonates today. Just as Churchill gave up the empire to preserve the nation, Netanyahu may now be weighing a similar trade: “absolute victory” in Gaza for a decisive victory over Iran.
For Netanyahu, Iran has always been the king on the board, and the neutralization of its nuclear program -- an existential threat to Israel -- has been his lifelong mission. But to get that achievement, he needed US involvement in the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. Doing that, obviously, did not come without cost or calculation.
Much has been written about the role of Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer in persuading the Trump administration to approve the strike despite the objections of the isolationist wing of the GOP. Some have called it Israel’s most significant diplomatic achievement in decades. It is equally plausible, if not more so, that Gaza was a major piece in this puzzle.
Following the US strikes, Trump made it clear that he wanted the war in Gaza to end. On Sunday, in the runup to Monday evening’s meeting with Netanyahu in the White House, he also said that the US is “working on a lot of things” with Israel, including “probably a permanent deal with Iran.” The US and Iran are expected to restart talks in the coming days, and Trump has made clear that under any deal, Iran will not be able to enrich uranium -- a condition reinforced by the US strike.
This may all be part of a broader strategic bargain: that if the US took out Iran’s nuclear facilities, Netanyahu would agree to wind down the war in Gaza.
It’s the Churchill chessboard, modernized. Just as Churchill accepted American terms on decolonization to gain an ally against Hitler, Netanyahu may have already agreed to forgo “absolute victory” in Gaza to secure the far greater strategic win of neutralizing Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Which brings us back to the chess analogy. The “queen,” in this case, is the continuation of the war in Gaza and the maximalist objective of toppling Hamas completely. The “king” is neutralizing Iran. Just as Churchill gave up imperial glory to get the US into World War II, the coming days will show whether Netanyahu was willing to tamp down his conditions regarding a Gaza ceasefire in exchange for getting the US to act against Iran.
Critics will say Netanyahu is cutting a deal with a transactional American president at the expense of letting Hamas survive. Others will argue that if this was part of the price for getting US action in Iran -- if it was a calculated sacrifice in the service of a more important end -- then it was well worth it.
Through Churchillian eyes, the logic is cold and clear: sacrifice the queen, win the game.