Israel's target bank in Iran expanded after US showed interest in joining strikes, Katz reveals

There were a variety of ups and downs, debates, changes, and uncertainties, with significant aspects of Israeli and US attacks on Tehran evolving over weeks and months.

On November 11, 2024, only days after replacing Yoav Gallant as defense minister, Katz met with the IDF high command to be briefed on operations against Iran.

The other time period discussed for attacking Iran was October, with June not yet being mentioned.

At the time, Katz was concerned that the US would not join in on the attack and wanted the IDF to prepare for that eventuality.

It seems that if the US had not joined in, the IDF either would not have attacked the Fordow nuclear facility underneath a mountain at all or would have had much lower expectations for any damage to the facility.

Over time, that list of scientists was placed in a red, orange, or green category, with red meaning there was no plan yet to kill them, orange meaning there were aspects of a plan, but more progress was needed, and green meaning that a plan was already ready to go.

During both this meeting and earlier meetings, Katz inquired about lowering incident civilian casualties both as an ethical matter and to reduce Iranian motivation for targeting Israeli civilians – though that in the end seemed to have failed given Iran’s primary targeting of Israeli residential areas.

Also, Katz and the IDF discussed trying to get the US not only to attack Fordow but also deep underground portions of the Isfahan nuclear facility.

There were concerns that even the US could not destroy these areas, but at least the hope was that they could cause heavy damage.

On January 23, Katz had a meeting with the IDF high command where he told them he wanted the war plans to eliminate enough of Iran’s nuclear program for a long enough period of time to force them to reconsider whether rebuilding the program would be worthwhile.

Then on February 23, the defense minister was part of a meeting focusing more on the need to harm Iran’s ballistic missile program, elevating the need to specifically damage the Isfahan nuclear facility, and the need to try to make further progress to bring the US into any attack.

By March 27, Katz was discussing home-front defense issues and harming Iran’s top commanders’ communications and control capabilities with Israeli defense officials.

As of April 17, Katz ordered that the IDF move to a “P+14” level of readiness, meaning that if the order was given, the IDF would be ready to attack Iran within two weeks, or by May 1.

At this point, there was significant doubt about US involvement, and, at most, Washington was assisting with critical components of the operation.

Also, at this point, the “Narnia” operation to kill top Iranian officials all at once was still not part of the opening shot of the operation, but only meant as a response to a particularly deadly Iranian response.

There was also a specific focus on destroying the uranium metal conversion facility that was part of the series of facilities at Isfahan.

It seems that Israel did not focus on the new as yet not operating Natanz facility, which is under a different mountain (from Fordow.)

In addition, many Republicans in Congress started to go public with their support for Israel’s position that Iran not be allowed to enrich uranium as part of any nuclear deal, though President Donald Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff had played with compromising on this issue.

On April 27, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir asked CENTCOM Commander Gen. Michael Kurilla if the US had shifted to joining an Israeli attack, and Kurilla still had not green-lit.

By May 4, Katz and the IDF were again focused on home-front preparations.

On May 20, Katz and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu moved the IDF to “P+7,” meaning the air force needed to be ready to attack Iran with only one week’s notice.

The Jerusalem Post was shown a copy of the official letter setting this down.

Also that day, discussions of the “Tornado” portion of the operation for striking strategic sites in Tehran to increase pressure on the regime got more serious and detailed, though it had not been a concrete part of the operation until then.

On May 22, Israel and the US conducted war games relating to worst-case scenarios and going to war with Iran.

On May 27, top IDF intelligence and air force officials gave Katz a resounding reassurance that they were truly ready to initiate the grand operation against Tehran.

On May 29, the “Tornado” portion of the operation for striking strategic sites in Tehran to increase pressure on the regime, if necessary, was approved.

By June 4, Netanyahu and Katz had moved the war with Iran to “P+3.”

The Post was also shown a copy of this letter.

On June 5, Katz and IDF officials addressed various moving pieces relating to US defensive help in the event of a war with Iran.

Finally, on June 9, Netanyahu and Katz ordered the war to be set for June 12-13.

The final date was selected partially because on such a Friday morning, and based on moving pieces of top Iranian officials, it would be the most opportune time to strike.

During the war, Trump made it clear that Israel’s success was drawing him closer to acting.

On June 18 earlier in the day, Trump announced he would give Iran two weeks to agree to proper nuclear and other terms before deciding whether to attack.

However, later that evening, he told Netanyahu that he had already decided to attack.

On June 24, Netanyahu and Katz asked Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer to reach out to Trump as Israeli aircraft were bearing down on Iran to retaliate for an Iranian violation (however minor) of the ceasefire.

As Katz was getting reports that the Israeli aircraft were only four minutes, then three minutes, then two minutes away from firing – Trump ordered Israel to stand down.

Netanyahu decided to suffice with a symbolic attack of two minor radar platforms and called most of the aircraft back without attacking