Israel’s Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir has been managing the war in Gaza for six months since the January ceasefire broke down in March and fighting resumed. Zamir took over from Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, who resigned in January and left his post in March.
Zamir has had to manage a complex multi-front war. He has succeeded on all fronts. The IDF is operating almost daily in Lebanon, Gaza and Syria, as well as striking the Houthis in Yemen. The military also hobbled the Iranian regime in June. However, Zamir has also come up against challenges with Israel’s political leadership, as well as the future of the Israel-Hamas War.
The crossroads in Gaza are clear. Israel launched Gideon’s Chariots in May. The offensive was timed in an odd way. Israel’s political leadership cut off humanitarian aid to Gaza in March when the ceasefire fell apart. It was supposed to enter a second phase, which would have meant most of the hostages would be home by now. However, members of the coalition government have opposed a ceasefire and said that it wouldn’t enter the second phase.
Why didn’t they want the second phase? Because they don’t want to end the war in Gaza. Most of the Israeli public wants the war to end and the hostages to come home. However, an end to the war would mean that politicians who promised “victory” would have to justify how leaving Hamas in power and leaving some hostages in the Gaza Strip is “victory.”
The Israel-Hamas War has always suffered from these contradictions. While the IDF is expected to continue fighting, the issue of a hostage deal is handled directly by Jerusalem.
There is also interplay with the Trump administration, which was initially able to get a deal in January. It also brought home the last living American hostage, Eden Alexander. Israel’s government has never been able to get a deal on its own, and the intense opposition to a deal among some on the religious Right has meant the coalition has a hard time making clear decisions on Gaza.
Israel is heading toward military rule over Gaza
Zamir has
warned, according to reports on September 1, that if the IDF continues to control more of Gaza, Israel will be heading toward military rule over the Strip. The military currently controls around 70% of Gaza. These are areas that it conquered last year – but then mostly gave back to Hamas. The IDF then had to reconquer those areas between May and July. The army chief succeeded at doing so with minimal casualties.
However, soldiers are still dying and being wounded. Also, the IDF has been asked to call up 60,000 reservists for a battle in Gaza City.
Meanwhile, 50,000 haredi (ultra-Orthodox) men continue to avoid being called up due to exemptions. This leaves the burden on only one part of society. The IDF is aware that it is calling up people again and again in an unprecedented way in Israel’s longest war. The battle for Gaza City was postponed until after the school year began so that parents would be called up while their kids were in school.
The reports that the IDF chief is warning of military rule in Gaza hold up a mirror to Israel’s lack of strategy. The Jewish state’s political leadership has no clear public vision for the future of Gaza and has refused to put forward a “day after” plan or an alternative rule to Hamas.
This leaves Gaza without a Clausewitz-style strategy or even a Powell doctrine, where the goals are obtainable and stated. The two million civilians in Gaza continue to be asked to evacuate to areas run by Hamas.
However, the warnings about military rule would seem to indicate that if the IDF moves into Gaza City, then Hamas could collapse and Israel might have to rule Gaza.
Yet, the IDF doesn’t seem to want to rule over civilians. However, the political leadership opposes bringing in the Palestinian Authority. The United States has banned members of the PA from attending the upcoming UN General Assembly, even as countries in Europe move to recognize Palestine.
Those countries say they want to boost the PA and also see the release of hostages, as well as an end to the war and to Hamas rule in Gaza. Because Israel’s current leadership opposes the PA as much as it does Hamas, there is concern about demands that the authority run Gaza.
If the PA runs Gaza, this will unify the Palestinian areas and strengthen the Palestinian claims.
Two decades of Israeli strategy has sought to divide the Palestinians and, for years, Hamas received funding from Qatar as a way to enable it to thrive in Gaza. This led to October 7, 2023, but the current trend in Gaza is not to replace Hamas, but to weaken its capabilities.
Lack of clarity about the road ahead is what seems to lead to the current reports of tensions in discussions between the IDF top commander and the cabinet. The current Israeli position consists of several “Nos” – a “No” to the PA in Gaza, a “No” to ending the war, and a “No” to a hostage deal.
What the IDF seems to be noting is that without a clear strategy, the upcoming battle for Gaza faces hurdles. Israel’s leaders have shifted their position from a staggered hostage deal to demanding that all the hostages be released. Hamas claimed it had accepted a staggered deal on August 18.
However, the overall story of the hostage deal talks is never clear, rather, the public appears to be consistently misled via leaks every few weeks, suggesting a “deal” is close. In fact, a deal has never even been close over the 22 months of war.
A leaked report that was noted on Channel 12 last week claimed that the IDF had assessed that Gideon’s Chariots had made many mistakes. A big question is why it didn’t begin in March when aid was cut off. Instead, it began in May and then took place as the international community became outraged about reports of famine in Gaza.
The Gaza Humanitarian Foundation also began operations in May, but this wasn’t the magic wand some thought it would be. The GHF can’t provide food to all of Gaza, and it was never intended to do so.
Additionally, it’s not clear how long-term the foundation can be in terms of how it distributes food. Can it last another six months?
With the UN General Assembly in September, pressure will build on Israel. If the IDF sees hurdles ahead in Gaza City and if Gideon’s Chariots didn’t succeed as well as planned, then it raises questions about embarking on Gideon’s Chariots II. It also raises questions about why the IDF assessed in January 2024 that Hamas was largely beaten in Gaza City, only for it to apparently regrow in strength.
The continued leaks that attempt to portray the IDF’s top general as at odds with some of the political leadership appear to either be a way to slow down the Gaza City plans or to prepare the road to blame the military for what comes next. Either way, they illustrate that Israel is facing a new crossroads in Gaza.