Ofer Winter on Thursday declared that his party belongs to the right-wing camp, that Benjamin Netanyahu is the leader of that camp, and that "we will only recommend him," in an attempt to put one question to rest, which actually raised several new ones.
Winter, leader of the People of Israel party, is seeking to remove from the agenda the campaign portraying him as a risk to the right, as someone who could help replace Netanyahu or siphon votes away from the bloc. Along the way, however, he also gave up some of the ambiguity that had served him until now.
Winter was careful in the statement to emphasize his independence from Netanyahu. "We do not work for any person," he said, adding, "We will not dance to anyone's tune." But several lines later came the sentence that will define him politically: "The leader of the right-wing camp is Netanyahu and only him will we recommend."
That is the sentence Likud, his opponents, and voters will take with them. The rest of the statement, regarding haredi enlistment, voluntary emigration from Gaza, moving from containment to decisive action, and the need for effective public diplomacy, was intended to sharpen what Winter offers right-wing voters that they do not currently have in other parties. But of everything he said Thursday night, his commitment to Netanyahu is what will follow him from now on.
Winter wants to open the door to Likud and right-wing voters who like him but fear that a vote for People of Israel could bring down a right-wing government. To them, he is saying they can vote for him without worrying that their vote will help install another candidate as prime minister. In the recommendations process before the president, he will be with Netanyahu.
Likud voters may be swayed to support People of Israel
The move could expand his support base precisely within the right. A Likud voter dissatisfied with the party list, with Bezalel Smotrich, or with Itamar Ben-Gvir could find a new address with Winter without giving up on Netanyahu as prime minister. Winter is seeking to take votes from the bloc without providing ammunition for the argument that he is weakening it: offering right-wing voters another option on the Knesset ballot while making a clear commitment regarding the identity of the prime minister.
It is possible that Winter's campaign team concluded that his greatest potential currently lies among the more right-wing electorate rather than among center-right voters who oppose Netanyahu. If their in-depth research shows this, it represents a deliberate political choice: giving up some of the audience outside the bloc in the hope of gaining deeper access to the pools of Likud, Religious Zionism, and Otzma Yehudit supporters.
But the declaration also gives Netanyahu a new option. Until Thursday night, he could attack Winter by arguing that he was not truly committed to the camp. Now he can put that argument aside and choose a strategy that may be far more effective: embracing him.
Against a small right-wing party, that could work well. "Winter is with us," Likud officials could say. "He will recommend Netanyahu, he will be a partner in the government, so anyone who wants Netanyahu to be prime minister should vote Likud." After all, Winter could still be met after the election, perhaps even around the cabinet table and in a senior position.
From here, Netanyahu can run the campaign against him on terrain that is comfortable for him. He does not need to argue with Winter over who is more right-wing. He can talk about Likud's size, the chances of forming a government, and the need for a strong governing party. There is also no need to portray Winter as a threat to the camp. It is enough to convince voters that they will get him anyway, even if they vote for a different party.
Netanyahu has done this before with Naftali Bennett. He presented Bennett as a certain partner and sought to convince his voters that the most effective way to guarantee a right-wing government under Netanyahu was through Likud. About a decade ago, during one election campaign when Bennett was polling in the double digits and even around 15 seats, the message was that Bennett would anyway be a partner and would even receive a senior position, so Likud needed to be strengthened. Bennett finished that election with eight seats.
Winter may not fall to tactics which worked on Bennett
If the same tactic works against Winter, the statement intended to protect him from attacks could help Netanyahu draw voters away from him. But in Winter's case, it is far from certain that the old tactic will work.
Winter is not the Bennett of those years. He is relatively new to politics, comes with a clear security background, and, after October 7 and the war, is appealing to an audience seeking decisive action, strength, and direct military language. He does not have a long history of political partnership with Netanyahu, and he still benefits significantly from the advantage of someone who has not spent years inside the political system.
Netanyahu also understands the danger of attacking too aggressively. In the past, when the battle against Bennett became personal and also touched on the rabbis and the Religious Zionist public behind him, the result was not always what Likud hoped for. In Winter's case, the risk is clear: after declaring that Netanyahu is the leader of the right-wing camp, an aggressive attack against him could provide Winter with a strong argument among voters: I am on the right, I recommend Netanyahu, but I do not work for him.
After this declaration, the question Likud will want to place before voters is no longer whether Winter is loyal to the camp. The question will be why they need him. If he supports Netanyahu for prime minister anyway, they will argue, it is better to give the vote to the party led by Netanyahu, which needs to form the government.
Winter's answer is already contained in his statement: It is possible to want Netanyahu as prime minister and still not vote Likud. That is where he is trying to position himself, as a clearly right-wing party that supports Netanyahu for prime minister but is not subordinate to him within the camp.
It is also necessary to read carefully what Winter committed to, and what he did not. He said he would recommend Netanyahu. He did not say he would only sit in a government led by Netanyahu. If Netanyahu does not reach 61 seats and fails to form a government, the wording Winter chose leaves him room to maneuver. He closed the question of his recommendation to the president, but not everything that may happen afterward.
If Netanyahu receives the mandate and fails to establish a government, Winter's statement does not commit him to staying out of any other government at all costs.