IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir stormed onto the world stage leading Operation Rising Lion, Israel’s massive strike on Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles program, radars and air defenses, top military officials, and some of the symbols of the regime’s power.
Over 200 Israeli aircraft attacked more than 100 high-value sites, including nuclear plants at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, IRGC command bunkers in Tehran, and missile factories at Yazd and Mashhad.
Over 12 days, the air force struck 900 separate targets, killed at least 30 senior security officials and 13 nuclear scientists, and destroyed more than half of Iran’s 400 ballistic-missile launchers, according to senior IDF briefings.
By Day 3, Israeli jets had achieved “full operational freedom” in Tehran’s airspace after suppressing local air defenses, a milestone top IDF officials called a “political and military game-changer.”
Friction with Netanyahu
In May, Zamir launched another invasion of Gaza.
But this one was different from the several earlier ones. Within less than two months, the IDF had taken control over 75% of the Strip and was prepared to hold onto those areas as leverage to get Hamas to return the Israeli hostages.
Following that operation and preparations to take over Gaza City, Zamir’s moves led Hamas to accept the partial hostage deal that Israel had said it had wanted since March, including returning 10 live hostages and some deceased hostages in exchange for around a 60-day ceasefire.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu then pulled a 180-degree turn on Zamir and told him he wanted to ignore the Hamas offer and invade Gaza City anyway.
At this point, Zamir made public what sources close to him had already privately told The Jerusalem Post, that he was opposed to invading Gaza City and in favor of taking the partial deal from Hamas.
Further, Zamir made it clear that he believed invading Gaza City could seriously endanger some of the remaining living hostages Hamas was holding.
This was the end of his honeymoon with Netanyahu and defense minister Israel Katz, who seemed to have thought that he would not exercise his independent judgment and be a rubber stamp for their orders. They did not like the surprise.
But Zamir held his ground, and while Katz retaliated by freezing some of Zamir’s military officer appointments, eventually the IDF chief negotiated to get most of his appointees through.
He also ultimately agreed to carry out Netanyahu’s decision to move forward with the Gaza City invasion. But he did so more on his terms, with greater restraint and a more gradual process to try to avoid harming hostages, IDF soldiers, and Palestinian civilians.
Regarding terror emanating in the West Bank, Zamir is plagued by Palestinian terror, including the terrorists who killed six Israelis in Jerusalem in early September. He has tried to order harsher crackdowns on certain more problematic Palestinian areas, with some success, but nothing close to stopping the threat.
There have also been ongoing events where masses of up to 70 Jewish extremists have attacked both Palestinians and soldiers alike. So far, Zamir has been patient with Col. (res.) Avichai Tenami (the special project manager to handle the topic of “hilltop youth”), hoping that time, resources, and personnel will improve the situation with some of these Jewish extremists using dialogue and a more social welfare approach toward bringing them back onto more normal and nonviolent tracks, said sources close to him. He has not fought with Katz to restore administrative detention of violent Jews, a tool the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) has consistently demanded be returned to them for use.
But he has approved new rules outlawing anyone, including Jews, from traveling in public in Judea and Samaria with their faces covered, to make it harder for violent persons to hide their identities.
The biggest questions hanging over Zamir are how long he will continue the Gaza war and whether he will need to act again against Iran.