During the Israel-Hamas War, the IDF operated thousands of commercially available drones manufactured in China. These systems provided an immediate operational advantage, with rapid surveillance, real-time intelligence, and improved tactical data collection on the battlefield. However, alongside these benefits, a problematic reality emerged. A significant portion of intelligence gathering is conducted using technology controlled by a state defined as a major geopolitical rival.
This dependency is not merely an economic or industrial issue. It directly impacts information security, technological sovereignty, and the ability to operate independently on the battlefield
The global drone market is currently dominated to a large extent by Chinese manufacturers. According to various estimates, the Chinese manufacturer DJI alone currently controls over 70 percent of the global drone market, and in certain segments more than 90 percent. Even in the United States, despite regulatory restrictions, the company’s drones constitute a significant share of those used by local security agencies. More broadly, Chinese manufacturers account for approximately 80% of global commercial drone production.
This dominance is not accidental. It is the result of deliberate government industrial policy, the “Made in China 2025” initiative, which identified drones as a strategic domain where China seeks global leadership.
The result is a situation in which Western countries, including Israel, rely on technology originating from a state with different, and at times conflicting, geopolitical interests. The primary concern is not limited to technical vulnerabilities, but also stems from China’s legal framework, which blurs the line between civilian companies and the state.
The Chinese legal framework
Several key laws require Chinese companies to cooperate with state intelligence mechanisms. The National Intelligence Law of 2017 stipulates that any organization or citizen must support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence work.
China’s Cybersecurity Law enables authorities to conduct security inspections of information systems and to require companies to transfer data collected within their systems. The Data Security Law and the Personal Information Protection Law obligate companies to store data within China and make it available for governmental review. The definition of personal information includes location data, video, and audio, which are precisely the types of data collected by drones.
In this reality, Chinese companies cannot refuse requests from authorities. When a drone collects video data, GPS coordinates, and flight plans, it is gathering information of significant intelligence value.
Technical vulnerabilities and data collection in drone systems
Beyond the legal dimension, there are also technological risks. Cybersecurity research has found that certain drone control applications collect data that is not necessary for operation, notably device identifiers and communication data.
Additionally, software update mechanisms allow new code to be installed directly from manufacturer servers. This means that in some cases, software can be modified even after the system is already in operational use.
Further vulnerabilities have been identified in wireless communication protocols, enabling access to data stored within the system. Such weaknesses may expose images, videos, and operational data.
There is also a critical operational issue. Some systems broadcast identification signals that include the location of both the drone and its operator. This information can be intercepted by hostile actors and used to locate drone operators in real time. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the war in Ukraine, where drone signals were used to geolocate operators on the battlefield.
The operational reality in Israel: Dependence on Chinese drones
The discussion surrounding Chinese drones is not theoretical. In recent years, Israel has developed a broad reliance on commercially available drones manufactured in China.
During the Israel-Hamas War, thousands of off-the-shelf drones were procured for various IDF units and reserve forces to bridge surveillance and intelligence gaps. These drones provided a fast and cost-effective solution, while also creating dependency on external technology.
These systems are typically operated using applications connected to the manufacturer’s cloud infrastructure. In such cases, the manufacturer has the ability to influence system operation through software updates, system restrictions, and even geofencing or no-fly zones.
Although the IDF performs sterilization processes on commercial drones, experts emphasize that this is only a partial solution that does not address vulnerabilities at the hardware level or within the supply chain.
The American drone industry
The United States recognized these risks several years ago and began taking action to reduce dependence on Chinese drones. The US government implemented a series of measures, including restrictions on the use of certain drones within federal agencies, legislation limiting imports from specific companies, and the establishment of the Department of Defense Blue UAS program.
This program created a list of approved drones that underwent rigorous security testing and do not include critical Chinese components.
This policy has enabled American companies to develop local alternatives and build an independent technological ecosystem. The American model demonstrates how government regulation can simultaneously strengthen national security and foster domestic industry.
Israeli independence in the drone domain
Israel is a global UAV powerhouse, yet many of its advanced capabilities are directed toward export markets. At the same time, low cost commercial systems continue to fulfill a significant portion of operational needs.
To address this challenge, a strategic shift is required across several dimensions.
First, a clear national objective must be defined to reduce dependence on Chinese technology in sensitive systems used by the defense establishment and government agencies.
Second, investment must be increased in small- and medium-sized Israeli drone companies developing ISR systems, sensors, and control software.
Third, a local supply chain must be encouraged, including component manufacturing, software development, and communication infrastructure, to reduce reliance on imports.
Choosing technology solely because it is cheaper often serves as a mechanism for market penetration and long-term technological dependency. What appears inexpensive in the short term may prove extremely costly in the long term.
Similar lessons have been learned in other domains. The Hezbollah pager incident illustrates how an uncontrolled supply chain can ultimately be turned against its user.
Israel possesses the knowledge, capabilities, and human capital required to build local alternatives. Technological sovereignty in the drone domain is not an industrial luxury; it is a fundamental condition for national security and for Israel’s ability to operate independently on the battlefields of the future.
The writer is a former commander of the IDF's Unit 414.