In his speech at the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to the ongoing talks regarding an agreement between Israel and Syria. According to earlier reports, the deal currently being discussed is strictly a security agreement, brokered with American involvement. Ahmad al-Sharaa, until recently the leader of al-Qaeda in Syria, his security forces were responsible in recent months for massacres against Druze and Alawite minorities in Syria.
The concern is that signing an agreement with him is akin to signing an agreement with ISIS. Nevertheless, it is evident that the international community—led by the United States—has embraced him, while disregarding the warning signs regarding both the fragility of his rule (he survived an assassination attempt only weeks ago) and his enduring ties to extremist Sunni ideology, including the fact that the Syrian security leadership today is overwhelmingly composed of figures with a jihadist background.
Still, if the reported clauses indeed find their way into the agreement, the deal could present an opportunity to improve security realities along the Syrian-Israeli border and will have positive strategic implications for the security and stability of the entire region.
Should both sides adhere to the terms—certainly not a given in the Middle East—Israel may be positively surprised. Al-Sharaa could end up establishing an Islamic state in Syria, but one that more closely resembles Saudi Arabia: maintaining close ties with the West and serving as a relatively moderate player within the current Middle Eastern political landscape.
Reports indicate that, in contrast to the previous Syrian regime that conditioned any agreement on Israel’s full withdrawal from the Golan Heights—territory captured in 1967—the current agreement postpones the matter altogether. In 2019, President Trump recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan. The territory was annexed by Israel in 1981 and is considered of strategic importance for Israel’s territorial integrity. Some 20,000 Jews and a similar number of Druze reside there, with a growing portion of Druze in recent years applying for—and receiving—Israeli citizenship. Their plight made headlines last year following Hezbollah’s rocket strike on a soccer field in the Druze village of Majdal Shams, which killed 12 children.
Shared threats, shared opportunities
One of Israel’s key demands has been to expand the buffer zone on the Syrian side of the border. After Assad’s regime collapsed, Israel established nine military posts in this zone, which extends from several hundred meters to just a few kilometers inside Syrian territory. According to the 1974 disengagement agreements, the area was meant to remain demilitarized under UN supervision. Yet, throughout the civil war, various state and non-state armed players operated there. Today, the IDF actively patrols the area, seizing weapons stockpiles and thwarting terrorist activity on a near-daily basis.
Expanding the demilitarized zone—combined with effective monitoring mechanisms and meaningful international involvement—could reduce the risk of cross-border attacks from Syria into Israel. This would be further reinforced by opportunities for security cooperation to confront shared threats: from terrorism and arms smuggling to drug trafficking and even countering the renewed activity of the Iranian Shiite axis from Syrian soil. Such coordination could potentially extend to Jordan, and possibly even Iraq and Saudi Arabia, thereby creating a U.S.-backed regional platform. This would, in effect, render obsolete the existing UNDOF mechanism, which has proven ineffective, particularly during the Syrian civil war.
Moreover, the agreement may also preserve the “aerial corridor” from Israel to Iran through Syria—serving Israel’s interests by enabling operational freedom for offensive actions in Iranian skies if necessary, as demonstrated during the 12-Day War.
According to reports, the deal will place significant emphasis on the security of minorities—especially the Druze population in Suwayda which faced violent massacre and atrocities this past summer. Israel must demand, among other things, a secure humanitarian corridor open to the Druze area in southern Syria. The protection of this community is not only a moral obligation but also a strategic necessity: stability in southern Syria means a quieter border for the Golan Heights in Israel. Conversely, jihadist control of the region would allow them to establish territorial continuity across southern Syria, east to west, right up to Israel’s border.
Parallel to this agreement with Israel, there are reports of negotiations in Suwayda between the Druze and the Syrian government. The proposed framework includes minority representation, infrastructure rehabilitation, and international oversight led by the US and Jordan. Most importantly, it envisions the creation of a locally led Druze police force, effectively granting the Druze a measure of security autonomy while preventing jihadist security forces from entering the area. It is clear that the two agreements—between Israel and Syria on the one hand, and between Suwayda’s Druze and Damascus on the other—are interconnected both in signing and in implementation.
No trust, only guarantees
In signing agreements in the Middle East, there should be no reliance on trust, only on guarantees. Both sides must understand that any violation will be met with an immediate response. The era in which one side violates while the other side quietly complies is over. A good agreement is one that allows Israel to defend its interests in the face of violations. The deal must not tie Israel’s hands or prevent it from responding to emerging threats. If terrorist groups are allowed to build power across the border, the agreement’s achievements will evaporate quickly. Even more dangerously, such an agreement must not lull Israeli and American security establishments into complacency, ignoring breaches over time.
From day one, every violation must be met with an Israeli response. Israel will strike in response to each breach. While the mediator can assist in dialogue, it must be made absolutely clear that he cannot, should not, and in most cases will not handle violations himself. This message must continue to resonate even after the signing of the agreement. Israel must not shy away from crises. Syria is not the distant UAE, and Israel cannot afford to take risks—not another massacre of Druze civilians, and not a threat to Israeli communities in the Golan Heights. Ignoring the first will only hasten the second.
The Lebanese model can serve as a precedent in this context, as the American side letter granting Israel the freedom to strike any Hezbollah violation or attempt to rebuild its military presence in Lebanon has proven to serve the security of both Israel and Lebanon alike.
Normalization with Syria?
Ultimately, a security agreement between Israel and Syria could lay the groundwork for limited, discreet signs of normalization—similar to the quiet dynamics Israel maintains with other states in the absent of formal diplomatic ties.
Such an agreement could also strengthen Al-Sharaa’s regime, granting him both legitimacy and backing for internal “house cleaning” against problematic jihadist elements with whom he is currently forced to share power in Syria. It could further contribute to Syria’s reconstruction process, a goal shared by all stakeholders, including the international community.
In the bottom line, we must not let hope blind us, nor let fear take away our hope for peace. The proper approach to such an agreement is “respect and suspect”—and to remain uncompromising in confronting any violation related to terrorist or military build-up that could endanger Israel’s security in general, and the safety of its northern citizens in particular.