Security negotiations between Israel and Syria have accelerated in recent days, following the announcement of a historic meeting between the countries’ foreign ministers in Paris. At the same time, Israeli Druze leader Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif met in Paris with US envoy Thomas Barrack to discuss assistance and guarantees for the safety of the Druze community in Syria.
This follows a recent massacre that shook the Druze enclave in Syria. Hundreds were killed, many were wounded, and about 500,000 members of the Druze community have found themselves in the midst of a severe humanitarian crisis – trapped in an isolated enclave surrounded by hostile Sunni tribes.
In the eyes of extremist Sunni Islam, which currently controls Syria, the Druze are considered infidels, deemed worthy of death. For the Druze of Syria, the threat is not theoretical but a matter of daily survival.
Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa is attempting to build a new state. A recent report from the Alma Research and Education Center, however, reveals that at least 22 top military officers appointed by him have jihadist backgrounds and previously commanded extremist Islamist militias during the civil war.
The recent massacre is not an isolated incident. A UN report recently determined that regime forces were also involved in last spring’s massacre of Alawites. Clear evidence now shows that Sharaa’s forces were directly involved in the attack on the Druze. Leaked images from the massacre show soldiers in uniforms bearing ISIS patches.
The Druze consider them – and Shara himself – to be indistinguishable from ISIS. It’s no wonder. Sharaa’s rule has shown no real interest in protecting Syria’s minorities.
International blindness
Despite all this, the international system has chosen to look away. The United States and other actors are determined to legitimize Sharaa as Syria’s president. For them, he is the man who can “stabilize” the country. His war crimes, terrorist past, the jihadist makeup of his leadership, and the inclusion of foreign fighters who arrived in Syria 15 years ago to join ISIS are all being overlooked.
In a world desperate to find a “partner” in Syria, Sharaa has become the only option.
Syria is not a country that can be unified. It is a fragmented state, where identities are not national but tribal and sectarian: Druze, Kurds, Alawites, Sunnis, and more – each with its own internal loyalties and historical grievances. There is no foundation here for a “nation-state,” but rather a tangled web of rivalries.
A century ago, when Britain and France were designing the Middle East, the French proposed a Syrian confederation in which each minority would have its own autonomy. Even then, they understood the difficulty of forging a shared identity among such disparate groups.
At this point, it must be clarified: The American-backed effort by Sharaa to disarm all militias in Syria is bound to fail.
These militias represent communities that see Sharaa and his army as existential threats. They will not surrender their weapons for the sake of an abstract nation-state that has never truly protected them – especially not when its leader adheres to an extreme ideology that views them as infidels.
For Druze fighters, their weapons are the only means of protection – against both the Bedouin tribes and the regime’s security forces that actively participated in the massacre.
Proximity to the Israeli border, and the Druze voice in Israel
The Druze in Israel are an integral part of Israeli society – a minority that declared loyalty to the state from its founding and whose sons serve in the IDF. Naturally, they demand that the state help their brethren across the border in Syria.
THE DRUZE enclave in Sweida lies only about 70 kilometers from the Israeli border, yet there are some Druze towns farther north that are adjacent to the border fence.
This pressure runs up against a difficult security reality: The area between the Israeli border and the Druze enclave is predominantly Sunni, with cells of ISIS having operated there over the years.
Opening a humanitarian corridor to provide supply for the Druze enclave through this territory would require ground security. The IDF, already stretched thin across seven fronts, will not rush to deploy troops there. The risk is too great.
The Jordanian option is also blocked. Although the distance from Jordan to the Druze enclave is much shorter – just 20 km. – King Abdullah refuses to allow aid through.
The reason is simple: Bedouin tribes in Jordan, whose Syrian relatives took part in the Druze massacre, would see such aid as betrayal. Moreover, during the recent events, Druze forces in Syria expelled tens of thousands of Bedouin from their villages.
How can the humanitarian crisis be addressed?
Until now, Israel has provided aerial aid – food, medicine, even protective military equipment made in Israel. This is an important but limited move. What can be dropped from parachutes or helicopters pales in comparison to what a convoy of trucks could deliver – hundreds of tons of supplies.
The challenge is clear: How to scale up the aid without putting Israeli soldiers at risk?
Is there a way to turn this challenge into an opportunity? Humanitarian aid could enter via Israel, which could protect it within the narrow buffer zone near the border – a zone already under Israeli control. This is a very small area –just a few kilometers – so the bulk of the corridor would fall under Syrian government responsibility.
Meanwhile, Israel could provide an aerial shield using drones for intelligence and rapid response. In this way, Israel would not send troops into hostile territory, but it would still support the effort.
Such a move could benefit all sides: If the convoys arrive safely, it would dent Sharaa’s ISIS-like image, and the Druze will receive the aid they urgently need.
Moreover, this coordination over the humanitarian corridor could serve as a platform for broader security cooperation between Syria and Israel – an idea that was already under discussion before the massacre and has now been revived following the recent meeting between the countries’ foreign ministers in Paris.
Notably, Israeli Druze leader Sheikh Mowafaq Tarif was also in Paris at the time, suggesting potential involvement in advancing the initiative.
The success of this initiative depends on Sharaa’s willingness to secure the humanitarian convoys and on the ability of his militias to enforce that security on the ground.
If the US intends to continue supporting Sharaa, it must tie that support to concrete demands – chief among them, an end to the persecution of Syria’s minorities.
Israel, meanwhile, is not a remote actor. Its geographic proximity, coupled with deep familial and moral ties to the Druze, obligates it to remain engaged.
The massacre of the Druze and the ensuing humanitarian crisis pose a dual challenge: a moral one for Israel and the broader international community; and a strategic one, precisely because the world can no longer afford to look away.
While the situation is complex and fraught with risk, inaction is no longer a viable policy. The burden now rests with the US administration: Choose between perpetuating the illusion of stability under Sharaa, or use his growing Western legitimacy as leverage to secure genuine protections for Syria’s vulnerable minorities.